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Traditional law and economics scholarship  predicts that no compa-
nies will adopt takeover defenses prior  to IPOs, because defenses increase
agency costs between shareholders and managers, and reduce IPO pro-
ceeds. In fact, data  from 357 IPOs in the 1990s show that many companies
adopt defenses prior to IPOs. Even more puzzling for conventional schol-
arship,  defenses vary widely at the IPO stage. Analysis shows that more of
this variation in defenses can be explained by characteristics  of lawfirms
advising owner-managers than by  traditional theories about defenses.
Among  other  findings:  (1)  Companies advised by  larger law firms with
more takeover experience adopt more defenses;  (2)  In  1991-92,  compa-
nies with  Silicon  Valley  lawyers adopted almost no  defenses; by  1998,
Silicon Valley lawyers' clients were as likely  to use defenses as clients of
other lawyers;  (3)  Companies with high-quality underwriters and venture
capital backing adopt more  defenses;  (4) The  overall rate of defense
adoption increased in the 1990s. Together, these findings provide strong
evidence that lawyers determine key  terms in the  "corporate contract,"
due to agency costs between owner-managers  and their lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION:
TAKEOVER  DEFENSES AT THE IPO STAGE
In  1994, IBM made a $3.3 billion hostile takeover bid for Lotus  De-
spite a determination to remain independent, management  of Lotus capitu-
lated within  a week of IBM's bid.2 At roughly the  same time, Moore  Co.
made  a  $1.3  billion  hostile  bid  for  Wallace  Computer.3  After  thirteen
months  of bitter battle, Moore  Co. dropped  its bid, leaving Wallace  inde-
pendent.4  What accounts for these  strikingly different  bid outcomes? Hos-
tile  takeover  defenses  do,5  defenses  chosen  by  the  targets  years  before,
prior to the moment they became public companies. Defenses have become
difficult if not impossible to adopt once a company's shares  are sold to the
public.6  Choice  of  governance  structure  at  the  initial  public  offering
("IPO")  stage,  in other words,  turns out to have  a large effect on whether
target companies  can remain  independent in the face of a hostile bid. Sys-
tematic  analysis  of hostile bids  bears  out the contrast between  the  Lotus
and Wallace bids:  targets (such as Wallace) with one type of defense, clas-
sified boards,  were  in the  1990s three  times  more  likely to remain  inde-
pendent than targets (such as Lotus) that lacked classified boards.'
Understanding  that takeover  defenses  determine  bid outcomes,  how-
ever,  only  pushes  the  inquiry  back  one  step:  what  determines  whether
firms  adopt takeover  defenses,  and in particular why  do  defenses  vary  at
the  IPO  stage?8  If, on  the  one  hand,  defenses  reduce  firm  value  (by
1.  Laurence Zuckerman, LB.M. 's Big Move:  The Bidder; LB.M. Seeks To Buy Software Maker
In $3.3 Billion Bid, N.Y. TIMEs,  June 6, 1995,  at Al.
2.  See International  Business  Machines  Corp.  Schedule  14D-1  (June  6,  1995)  (on  file  with
author) (launching  IBM  bid on  June  6); Id. at 23  (describing  background  to IBM  bid, noting that  on
March  17,  1995,  Lotus CEO  Jim Manzi  "said [to  IBM representatives]  he did not want to discuss  an
acquisition  by IBM of [Lotus]";  Lotus Development Corp.  / IBM  Corp. Joint Press Release (June  II,
1995)  (on file with author) (announcing agreement  between IBM and Lotus on friendly merger).
3.  Nicolaas  Van  Rijn,  Moore Bids $ 1.3  Billion in Hostile Takeover of Firm, THE  TORONTO
STAR, July 31,  1995, at E6.
4.  Moore Drops Bid  for Wallace, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, August 7,  1996, at 65.
5.  Compare  Moore Drops Bid  for Wallace, supra  note 4, at 65 (attributing failed bid to "slew of
antitakeover defenses") with Kate Bohner Lewis,  The Lotus Position,  THE  INFORMER, July  17,  1995, at
18  (attributing  appeal  of  IBM  bid  for  Lotus  to  arbitrageurs  to  fact  that  Lotus  had  "basically  no
defenses" and was thus likely to succeed).
6.  See infra note 23.
7.  This estimate is based on a sample of fifty-two  hostile bids from  1997 to  1999 analyzed and
discussed  in  a  separate  working  paper,  John  C.  Coates  IV  &  Guhan  Subramanian,  Do  Takeover
Defenses Matter? Evidence on Bid Outcomes and Bid Deterrence from  the  1990s M&A  Marketplace
(Jan. 7, 2001) (on file with author).
8.  This Article confirms  recent research  showing that takeover defenses vary prior to IPOs. See
Robert  Daines & Michael  Klausner, Do IPO Charters  Maximize Firm Vahte? Antitakeover Provisions
in IPOs, 17 J.L.  EcON.  & ORG.  83,  96 (2001);  Laura Casares  Field, Control Considerations  of Newly
Public  Firms: The Implementation of  Antitakeover Provisions and Dual Class Shares Before the IPO,
Working Paper, at 35-36 tbl.4 (Feb.  10,  1999),  available at http://www.ssm.com;  Laura  Casares Field
& Jonathan M.  Karpoff, Takeover Defenses at IPO  Firms (Oct. 27,  1999) (Working Paper, on file with
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increasing  agency  costs  between  shareholders  and  managers),  as
Easterbrook and Fischel9  argued,  then  why  do  half of companies  adopt
substantial  defenses prior to IPOs  (as  shown  in Part IV)?  If, on the other
hand,  defenses have largely  positive effects  on firm value (by increasing
bargaining power or overcoming  some market  failure), 0 why do only half
of companies adopt defenses prior to IPOs? The challenge, in other words,
is not simply to explain the presence  of defenses  at the IPO  stage, but to
explain the variation in defense adoption.1
In this Article,  I present evidence from two large samples of IPOs that
suggests that takeover defenses are chosen at the IPO stage primarily based
on the takeover experience of the corporate  lawyers  working for the com-
pany at the time of the IPO. The characteristics of the lawyers working on
the IPO  were more predictive of defenses being adopted  (or not adopted)
than were testable company characteristics,  such as a company's  size,  lo-
cation, or industry. Lawyers, in other words, represent largely autonomous
actors  making  decisions  for  corporate  clients  and  determining  corporate
control structures, which in turn have large effects on hostile bid outcomes
years  later.  Corporate  lawyers,  at  least  at  the  IPO  stage,  appear  to  be
working  relatively  free of market,  ethical,  or other  constraints,  and many
appear to be making  choices,  and mistakes, without determining  whether
such choices  are in the long-term interests of their clients (that is, pre-IPO
owner-managers).
Put more formally, this Article explains variation in takeover defenses
at the  IPO stage,  hypothesizing that the quality of legal  services provided
to  entrepreneurs  and  other pre-IPO  shareholder-managers  varies  signifi-
cantly, depending on the experience, size, and location of law firms serving
as  company  counsel  at  the time  of an  IPO  ("law  firm  hypotheses").  In
competition with the claims  advanced in this Article are two categories  of
explanations  for the  IPO defense puzzle. First, one might maintain that in-
vestment banker advice about the effect of defenses on IPO prices varies  in
quality, and it is this variation that explains why companies adopt different
defenses  ("banker  hypotheses").  Second,  the efficiency  of defenses  may
vary with company or pre-IPO  shareholder characteristics,  so that defenses
author);  Tatiana Lapushchik,  Antitakeover Provisions at the JP0 Stage: Empirical Evidence on  the
Mutual Preferences  (Mar.  10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
9.  Frank  Easterbrook  &  Daniel  Fischel,  The  Proper Role  of a  Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv.  1161  (1981).
10.  See Martin  Lipton, Takeovers Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35  Bus. LAw.  101,  120-24
(1979).
11.  As Daines  & Klausner themselves  acknowledge,  supra note  8,  at 86,  111,  their effort  to
explain the IPO defense puzzle produced  not answers but more empirical  puzzles:  they find defenses
correlate  positively with  industry-level  research  and development  and  negatively with  industry-level
takeover activity in the mid-1990s. As discussed in Parts  III and IV, both findings are contrary to prior
theory on how the efficiency of  defenses might vary among companies.
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are  optimal  at  some  companies,  but  not  others  ("variable  efficiency  hy-
potheses").
This  Article  describes  the  law  firm hypotheses,  analyzes  empirical
implications of the  competing theories,  and empirically  tests each theory,
to the  extent  feasible,  as  an alternative  to  the  law  firm  hypotheses.  Data
from a  sizeable sample  (n=162) of IPOs from  1991-92,  and a second large
sample  from  1998-99  (n=195), are  used  to test explanations  for the  IPO
defense puzzle. Firm charters,  bylaws,  and prospectuses  are reviewed,  and
summary data on the number, type, and strength of defenses are presented.
These data are regressed against data on law firms to test the law  firm hy-
potheses,  and against data  on underwriters  to test the banker  hypotheses.
Also included in the regressions  are variables that proxy for different vari-
able  efficiency  hypotheses  (specifically,  agency  costs,  bargaining  power,
market myopia, and private benefits of control).
The  empirical  analysis  produces  three  striking  results.  First,  strong
evidence  is found that key terms in the "corporate  contract,"  a company's
suite of pre-IPO defenses,  are determined by lawyers. The takeover experi-
ence, size, and location of law firms strongly correlate with the number and
strength of pre-IPO takeover defenses adopted by companies they advise.12
Companies  advised  by  larger  law  firms  with  more  takeover  experience
adopt more defenses.  In 1991-92, companies  advised by lawyers located in
Silicon Valley  adopted  fewer  defenses,  but by  1998,  Silicon Valley  law
firms were just as likely to recommend defenses as law firms elsewhere.
Second,  companies  represented by high-quality underwriters  or with
venture  capital backing are  more  likely to adopt defenses,  and the  rate of
defense adoption increased during the 1990s. While  open to interpretation,
these  findings  are more  consistent with  theories  that hold it  is  generally
optimal 3 for pre-IPO owner-managers  to adopt defenses than conventional
agency-cost theories that hold it is uniformly a bad idea for defenses to be
adopted. 4 These correlations  are important because  underwriters,  and to a
12.  In  theory,  causation  could  run  the  other  way;  that  is,  clients  that  desire  defenses  choose
lawyers with M&A experience.  In reality, however, few  companies switch  law firms  in anticipation  of
IPOs,  and thus  client  choice  of lawyer  is  not  a  plausible  cause of the  correlation  between  lawyer
characteristics  and defenses.  See infra Part II.D.
13.  The  Article  is  wholly  agnostic  on  whether  defenses  are  socially  efficient  and  only  offers
reasons  to think that defenses  are privately optimal for pre-IPO owner-managers.  See Conclusion, infra
(discussing normative implications of findings).
14.  Defenses  could  be  generally  optimal  for  pre-IPO  owner-managers  if defenses  provide
benefits  (such  as  increased  bargaining  power)  that  are  generally  greater  than  their  costs  (such  as
increased  agency costs). See  infra Part  III  (discussing theories of the costs and benefits  of defenses).
Alternatively,  defenses  could  be generally  optimal for pre-IPO  owner-managers  if IPO  pricing is so
poor that adoption of defenses does  not result  in  a lower IPO price, so that defenses  would allow pre-
IPO owner-managers  to  retain  more control over their companies  "for  free"  (the cost being bome by
IPO  investors).  That  IPO  pricing  may  be  generally  poor  is  suggested  by studies  showing  first-day
"underpricing"  and long-run  "overpricing."  E.g.,  Jay  R.  Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial
Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN.  1 (1991);  Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN.
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lesser extent venture capitalists ("VCs"), are critical sources of information
for pre-IPO  owner-managers  about the IPO prices,  and in all prior writing
about defenses, scholars have reasoned that if defenses are bad for pre-IPO
owner-managers,  it must be because  defenses reduce IPO prices." 5  Yet the
correlations  between  defenses  and  underwriter  reputation,  and  between
defenses and VC-backing, both suggest that if defenses reduce IPO prices,
pre-IPO  owner-managers know about the effect on prices and are choosing
to adopt  defenses  anyway.  The  evidence  thus  suggests  that defenses  are
"worth  it,"  and (combined with evidence  showing  that defenses have  in-
creased in the  1990s) that defenses  are generally  good for pre-IPO  owner-
managers.
Third, consistent with evidence from Field,16 some evidence  suggests
that the most extreme  form  of takeover defense  (dual  class capital  struc-
tures) are distinct from other defenses and are motivated by high, primarily
psychic  (that is, non-pecuniary)  private benefits of control. Little  evidence
is  found to support  variable  efficiency  hypotheses  for  defense  adoption.
Together, these findings  suggest that variation in defenses is explained by
lawyer  choices  that  have  little  to  do  with  the  interest  of their pre-IPO
owner-manager  clients.
The Article  proceeds  as follows.  Part  I provides  a brief overview of
takeover  defenses  and their importance  to corporate  control.  Part  II pro-
poses a theory in which the characteristics of the lawyer-client relationship
provide lawyers with sufficient autonomy that they determine their clients'
pre-IPO  defenses,  largely unconstrained by market  forces or ethical rules.
Part  I  reviews traditional  "company-level"  theories  about  how defenses
might be good or bad for companies and their shareholders. These theories
provide the basis for the variable efficiency hypotheses used as alternatives
to the lawyer and banker hypotheses. Part IV sets up an empirical  test for
the competing theories, describes the samples and methodology,  and pres-
ents empirical  findings. Part V presents  interpretations  of the data,  and the
Article  concludes  with  a  brief  discussion  of  the  implications  of  the
Article's empirical findings.
23 (1995).  Poor IPO pricing across-the-board  does not explain variation  in defenses at the IPO  stage,
however, for it would mean defenses  are  privately optimal  for all  owner-managers  to adopt,  and no
theories predict IPO pricing would be particularly bad for companies adopting defenses.
15.  E.g.,  Daines & Klausner, supra note 8;  Field, supra note  8; Easterbrook  & Fischel,  supra
note 9.
16.  Field, supra  note 8, at 26.
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I
BRIEF OVERVIEW  OF TAKEOVER  DEFENSES
The impetus  for the development  of modem takeover defenses 7 was
the emergence  of the hostile tender offer. 8  Hostile tender offers  allowed
anyone with the financing to gain rapid control  of the largest businesses in
the  world by publicly  committing  to pay  a  significant premium over the
target's stock market price. After emerging in the  1950s, 9 the hostile ten-
der  offer  enjoyed  a  stunning  rise  in  importance  after  Morgan  Stanley,
which  like  other well-known,  "white-shoe"  investment  banks  had  tradi-
tionally declined to work on hostile bids, broke ranks in  1974 to advise on
a hostile bid for International Nickel.2"  By the early  1980s, most U.S. pub-
lic companies were vulnerable  to hostile bids, and takeover defenses were
developed  to  mitigate  that  threat.  Through  the  mid-1980s,  companies
adopted a number of takeover defenses in the form of charter amendments.
In retrospect, the most significant of these  was the staggered  or classified
board, which (if properly implemented)  imposes a year delay on efforts by
shareholders  to take control of a target's board.2'
But charter amendments  require shareholder approval,22 which has not
generally  been  forthcoming  for  defenses  since  institutional  shareholders
organized  in the late  1980s.  Not surprisingly, shareholders  have been un-
willing to approve defenses once a high-premium offer has been put on the
table, as after IBM's  85%  premium  bid for Lotus,  since defenses may en-
able target managers to defeat the bid and  deprive  shareholders of the  bid
premium. But even when  a bid is not on the table, shareholders  have been
17.  A  note  on  terminology:  Two  types  of  defenses  may  be  distinguished:  (1)  transactional
defenses,  which are  financial or operational  transactions anticipating or reacting to a bid and designed
to make a takeover more  difficult, by raising  a firm's share price, paying off the bidder,  or reducing  a
bidder's profit; and  (2)  structural defenses, which are legal mechanisms, often adopted in advance of a
bid, designed to deter or impede bids without having a financial or operational effect on the target. This
Article focuses  on structural defenses, but for brevity refers to "defenses"  as shorthand.
18.  See  DOUGLAs  AUSTIN  &  JAY  FISHMAN,  CORPORATIONS  IN  CONFLICT  7-23  (1970)
(documenting  rise  of hostile  tender  offer  1956-67);  Gerald  Davis  &  Suzanne  Stout,  Organization
Theory and the Market for Corporate  Control: A  Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics  of Large
Takeover Targets 1980-90, 37 ADMIN.  SCI.  Q. 605,  608 (1992)  (documenting  rapid increase  in hostile
bids in 1980s).
19.  See AUSTIN  & FISHMAN, supra note 18.
20.  See BRUCE  WASSERSTEIN,  BIG  DEAL:  THE  BATTLE  FOR  CONTROL  OF  AMERICA'S  LEADING
CORPORATIONs  470  (1998)  (describing internal debate  at Morgan  Stanley over decision to represent  a
hostile bidder, as no other high-quality Wall Street investment bank had previously done).
21.  Companies  with classified  boards  (also known as  staggered boards)  elect a portion  (usually
one-third)  of their directors  each year, with directors  serving multiyear (usually three-year)  terms. See
DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit.  8,  § 141  (1991)  (authorizing  classified  boards with  two or three  classes having
two-  or three-year  terms);  see generally Richard  H.  Koppes  et  al.,  Corporate Governance Out  Of
Focus: The Debate Over Classified  Boards, 54 Bus. LAW.  1023 (1999)  (discussing classified  boards).
For evidence regarding the importance of classified boards, see Coates & Subramanian, supra note 7.
22.  E.g.,  DEL.  CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1991  & Supp. 1998).
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unwilling to approve defenses.  The one  significant defense24 that can still
be adopted "midstream"  (that is, after ownership is dispersed following an
IPO) is the poison pill, 25 which does not require shareholder approval. 6 But
the pill  can be eliminated  via proxy fight,  and for a  large percentage  of
public companies with poison pills, proxy fights take little longer than ten-
der offers.  Despite adoption of pills by 60% of the S&P  1500, there were
almost  seventy hostile  bids  in  1995,  nearly  as  many  as  the peak  of the
takeover boom of the  1980s,  and over forty hostile bids were launched  in
2000.28
23.  See John  C.  Coates  IV,  Takeover Defenses in  the Shadow of the Pill: A  Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79  Tax.  L.  REv.  271,  323-25  &  n.209  (2000)  [hereinafter  Coates,  Critique]
(presenting evidence  that midstream defenses are not  approved by shareholders  in  1990s);  Gerald  F.
Davis & Tracy A.  Thompson, A  Social Movement Perspective  on  Corporate  Control, 39 ADMiN.  Scx.
Q.  141  (1994)  (documenting  organization of institutional investor community opposition to defenses  in
late 1980s).
24.  Modest  defenses  can  be  adopted  by  bylaw  amendment,  but  such  amendments  can  be
"undone"  by shareholder action. See DEL.  CODE ANN.  §  109 (1991)  (permitting bylaw amendments by
shareholders).
25.  A standard poison pill is adopted when a board  declares  and pays  a dividend consisting  of
rights to purchase additional  stock from the company. The rights are governed by a "rights plan," and a
rights  agent is  appointed  to act  (in  theory) for  rights holders  in  respect  of their rights, much  as  an
indenture  trustee would act  for bondholders under  an  indenture. If specified events  occur (such as  a
hostile acquisition  of more than a specified amount of a company's stock), the pill is "triggered,"  and
the  rights allow  holders  (other than  a  hostile  bidder) to  purchase  stock  at a discounted  price.  The
primary practical effect of a pill is to deter hostile stock acquisitions  through tender offer or otherwise.
See Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz,  The Share Purchase  Rights Plan, reprinted  in RONALD J. GiLSoN
& BEINARDn  S.  BLACK,  THE  LAW  AND  FINANCE  OF CoPoRATE  AcQUISMONs  4-12  (2d ed.  1998
Supp.) (setting forth terms of  standard poison pill).
26.  Id. At some  companies, proxy fights can  take six to eighteen months  or more depending  on
state  law  and  companies'  specific  defenses.  These  defenses  include  terms  governing  whether
shareholders  can act by written  consent, call special meetings, remove directors  without cause, expand
the size of  the board, or fill vacant board seats, as set forth in Appendix B. See also John C. Coates IV,
Measuring the Domain of Mediating  Hierarchy: How Contestable  are U.S. Public Corporations?,  24
J. CORP. L. 837, 853-55 (1999)  [hereinafter Coates, How Contestable?];  John C. Coates IV, An Index of
the Contestability  of Corporate  Control: Studying Variation in Legal Takeover Vulnerability (Working
Paper, July 17,  1999) [hereinafter Coates, Index]. But courts have been reluctant to permit companies to
adopt midstream defenses  that substantially  impede proxy fights. See, e.g., Chesapeake  Corp. v. Shore,
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS  20 (Del.  Ch. Feb.  11,  2000) (striking down bylaw amendments that would have
required  supermajority  shareholder vote to amend  bylaws);  Blasius  Indus. v. Atlas  Corp.,  564 A.2d
651,  654-56  (Del.  Ch.  1988)  (striking  down  bylaw  amendments  that would  have  impaired  consent
solicitation);  Quicktum  Design Sys.  v. Mentor Graphics  Corp.,  721  A.2d  1281,  1291-93  (Del.  1998)
(striking down type of  pill that would have impaired proxy fight); Carmody v. Toll Bros.  Inc., 723 A.2d
1180,  1189-94 (Del. Ch. 1998) (striking down a type of pill that would have impaired proxy fights). Cf
Invacare  Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies,  Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578,  1580 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (upholding
type of pill that would have impaired proxy fights under Georgia law); Amp Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc.,
1998  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  15617,  (E.D. Pa.  Oct.  8,  1998)  (upholding  a  type of pill that  would  have
impaired proxy fights under Pennsylvania law).
27.  See Coates,  Index, supra note 26 (describing method  of studying how long bids can take,
given target's defenses). See also Part IV.G.5 and Figure 2 infra (control can be obtained by proxy fight
in less than ninety days at two-thirds of sample).
28.  For data on 1995,  see Coates, How Contestable?,  supra note 26, at 855. Data on 2000 come
from the Securities Data Corporation database, now maintained by Thomson Financial Securities Data.CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
Because midstream defenses have been constrained by legal rules and
skeptical  investors,  the moment  prior to going public  is  the  one  time  at
which U.S.  companies  have been able with certainty to reduce their legal
takeover  vulnerability.  After  an  IPO  is  complete  and  ownership  dis-
persed, 9  the  takeover  defenses  of a  public  company  in  the  U.S.  in  the
1990s have  generally been fixed. °  Only at the  IPO stage does  a company
continue  to  have the ability to choose  different types  and amounts  of de-
fenses  that will regulate hostile  bids for the life  of the company.  For that
reason, the legal advice a company receives about defenses just prior to its
IPO is particularly important.
As will be described in Part III, scholars have long debated the effects
of defenses  on companies  and their shareholders,  and the evidence to date
is  at  best  inconclusive.3  Many  believe  defenses  harm  shareholders  by
making  it harder  for takeovers  to discipline  managers  and increasing  the
"agency  costs"  between  shareholders  and managers  caused by the separa-
tion of ownership from corporate control.32 Others believe defenses may be
privately beneficial by providing targets with "bargaining power," by ame-
liorating the effects of "market myopia,"  or by allowing some shareholders
to  preserve  "private  benefits  of control."' 33  Before  reviewing  traditional
theories  about  defenses,  however, one  feature  of such theories should be
noted:  prior scholarship  on defenses  has uniformly  made the  simplifying
assumption  that if defenses  are  good  for a  given  company,  they  will be
adopted by that company;  if they are bad,  they will not be adopted.34 The
theory  of this Article,  however,  is that reality is more  complex.  Defenses
may be adopted even if they are harmful, or omitted even if beneficial, be-
cause the decision to adopt defenses is made not by "companies"  or by the
owners or managers of those companies, but by lawyers.
II
BLAME THE LAWYERS
Companies  about to  go public  for the first time  employ  two sorts  of
specialized  agents:  investment  bankers  and  lawyers.  Generally,  bankers
provide  advice about  the pricing  and timing of the  IPO,  and manage the
sales  process  itself.3 5  Lawyers  provide  advice  about  securities  laws  and
29.  Ownership dispersion takes some time. See infra Part IV.G.6.
30.  For evidence, see infra  Part  IV.G.6 (reviewing rarity of new defenses being adopted post-IPO
by companies  studied).
31.  See Coates,  Critique,  supra note 23 (reviewing and critiquing  inconclusive  empirical  studies
of defenses).
32.  See infra Part III.A.
33.  See infra Part 1II.B.
34.  See Daines & Klausner, supra note 8,  at 88-89; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 1161;
Field, supra  note  8,  at  16;  Field & Karpoff, supra note 8, at 20.
35.  SECURITIES  UNDERWRITING:  A  PRACTIONER'S  GUIDE  (Kenneth  J.  Bialkin  &  William  J.
Grant, Jr. eds.,  1985)  (describing roles of lawyers and bankers);  CHARLES J. JOHNSON,  JR.,  CORPORATE
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disclosure  obligations, and  manage  the  Securities  Exchange  Commission
("SEC") registration process.16 Each professional  may influence  the take-
over defenses a firm adopts prior to the IPO. Without legal advice, the firm
is unlikely to adopt  defenses.  Without  financial advice,  the firm will not
know whether or how a given defense will affect the IPO price. Companies
are  dependent  on their specialized  agents  for information  and advice that
bears  directly  on what defenses  are  likely to be adopted  during the  IPO
process.
Given that background, variation in defenses  at the IPO  stage can be
explained by positing inefficiencies  in the provision of either financial  or
legal advice. If defenses are generally inefficient  and the IPO pricing proc-
ess  itself is  efficient,  companies  will  pay  a pricing  penalty for  adopting
them. But if bankers provide poor advice to companies about the price ef-
fects of defenses,  then companies may adopt defenses despite  such a pric-
ing penalty.37 If, on the other hand, defenses  are generally optimal for pre-
IPO  owner-managers,  either because  they increase  company value or  de-
crease  it by  less  than the control  they  provide  is  worth to initial  owner-
managers, then companies  should adopt them. But companies may still not
adopt defenses if the lawyers  on whom they depend fail to advise adoption
or if bankers fail to provide good advice about their price effects.
For  reasons  discussed  in Part II.G,  it seems  more  likely on a priori
grounds  that  market  inefficiencies  would  occur  in  the  market  for  legal
services before it would occur in the market for financial advice. Thus, the
explanation proposed and tested in this Article for why defenses vary at the
IPO  stage  is failure  in the market  for legal  services.  In  short:  blame the
lawyers.
A.  The Lawyer-Client Relationship  and  Agency Theory
Just  as division  of labor between  shareholders  and managers  creates
the  classic  agency  relationship  at  the  heart  of conventional  economic
analysis of corporate law, so the division of labor between lawyers and cli-
ents creates  a classic agency relationship,  in which the client is dependent
FINANCE  AND  THE SEcurrIEs LAWS  95-100  (1990)  (same);  Seymour Jones  et. al.,  Going Public, in
THE  ENRE'RENE  R  ,  aL VENTURE  403-06  (William A. Sahlnan  & Howard H.  Stevenson eds.,  1992)
(same).
36.  Id.
37.  If lawyers  advise  clients  to  adopt  defenses  even when  they  are  harmful,  that  advice  will
generally not result in too many defenses unless clients also receive bad advice from bankers about the
price effects  of defenses.  To see the reason  for the asymmetry,  note that defenses  have no plausible
negative  effects at the IPO stage other than by reducing the IPO price, whereas  defenses  will  in any
event provide control benefits to pre-IPO owner-managers,  whether or not they also have price effects.
Thus, for defenses to be adopted too frequently, a failure would need to occur in the market for banker
advice, so that the negative  effect of defenses (on price) would not be understood by owner-manager
clients.
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on lawyers.3 8  Lawyers  write the  documents  in which defenses  are (or are
not) contained. Takeover defenses are "chosen"  in the first instance not by
a manager or shareholder,  who focus  on other, more important tasks (such
as  lining  up  investors,  working  with  investment  bankers  on  the
"roadshow, ' 3 9  and  running  the business),  but  by a  lawyer.  Charters,  by-
laws,  stock  certificates,  and prospectuses  are  all  generated  by  law firms,
drafted by associates (or paralegals),  reviewed by partners (or associates),
and only cursorily (if at all) reviewed by nonlawyers  during the IPO proc-
ess.
Given  this  dependency  on  lawyers  by  corporate  clients  and  their
owner-managers,  basic  economic theory  of agency provides  a simple ex-
planation of why lawyers might not do what is in the best interests of their
clients.  Put simply, principals  (clients)  have little information  about what
their agents are doing and about the effects of agents'  actions, which makes
it possible that agents will not always act in their principals'  best interests.
Clients can monitor their lawyers  by asking  questions,  scrutinizing  docu-
ments, and thinking about defenses themselves. But most clients will be ill-
equipped  to monitor  implementation  and  will  defer to the advice  of the
lawyer for the same reasons the client has retained the lawyer to begin with
(lack of expertise, division of labor). 4"
Gaining proficiency with  defenses,  providing  good  advice about  de-
fenses, and implementing clients'  decisions based on that advice all require
effort on the part  of lawyers.  Were  clients  able to perfectly  monitor law-
yers, this is the type of effort in which clients would want lawyers  to en-
gage. Since  clients cannot  easily tell  if lawyers  are  expending that effort,
lawyers have little incentive to do so. As such, lawyers will only undertake
that minimal  level of effort that can be  easily monitored  by clients.  Law-
yers will devote the rest of their time and energy to other activities, such as
38.  The dependency  between  lawyer  and  client  arises regardless  of whether  shareholders  and
managers are the same people,  as is sometimes the case prior to an IPO.
39.  See FREDERICK  LIPMAN, GOING  PUBLIC  59,  165 (1997)  (describing road shows as hectic  and
requiring full  attention  from managers  and  bankers;  Microsoft's IPO  road show  covered eight cities,
including London  and Edinburgh,  in ten days).  When  Glendale Federal  Bank raised equity  capital  to
meet  regulatory  guidelines  in  the early  1990s,  managers  spent  eight  weeks  holding  twenty  large
investor meetings from Los Angeles  to London,  plus many more small meetings, conference  calls, and
review sessions. See also Official CS First Boston / Glendale Federal Bank Roadshow Tee-shirt (on file
with author).
40.  MACKIN  FLEMING,  LAWYERS,  Money  AND  SuccEss  26  (1997)  (former  judge  and
practitioner critical of  high  legal  fees in litigation but likening valuation of legal services  to "pricing  of
modem  art,"  subject  to  "unending  analysis  and  interpretation,"  the  "extent  and  ultimate  worth"  of
which cannot  readily be  determined");  Donald  C.  Langevoort  & Robert  K. Rasmussen,  Skeiving the
Results:  The  Role of Lawyers in  Transmitting Legal Rules, 5  S.  CAL.  INTERDIsC.  L.J.  375,  401-02
(1997)  (in-house  corporate  counsel  may have  limited  competence  and  their own  agency  problems).
Older, larger, and  more profitable  companies  are  more likely to have better and larger  in-house legal
staffs  more  capable  of monitoring  outside  firms.  On  the  rise  of  in-house  counsel,  see LAW  FmI
MANAGEMENT  §  1.3.2  (Susan  S.  Samuelson  ed.,  1994);  Abram  Chayes  &  Antonia  H.  Chayes,
Corporate  Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 277 (1985).
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are  still  worse than  other types  of legal  advice  because of the particular
character of advice concerning takeover defenses.
Evaluating legal services is more difficult than evaluating other types
of goods or services.  Economists distinguish three types  of goods or serv-
ices:  search  goods,  consumption  goods,  and  credence  goods. 4"  Search
goods  are  those  whose  quality  can  be readily  ascertained  by  inspection
prior to consumption, as with postcards.  Experience goods are those whose
quality  can  generally  be learned  only  after they  are  purchased  and  con-
sumed,  as with  a meal  at a restaurant.  Credence  goods  are  those  whose
quality  may never  be fully known by the consumer,  as  with automobile
parts,  for  example.  Legal services  rarely fall  into  the  category  of search
goods.  Instead,  legal  services  often  fall  into the  category  of "experience
goods." Experience  goods obviously pose a risk of deception and raise spe-
cial  contracting  problems.  Legal  advice  often,  however,  is  a  "credence
good," for which quality may never  be fully known.46  Legal advice  about
defenses is certainly not a search good. Few legal consumers, even sophis-
ticated  consumers,  can fully know the quality of legal services  to be  pro-
vided simply by meeting a lawyer or reviewing the lawyer's public record.
Nor will consumers usually know the quality of legal services after they are
received,  since  legal  advice  often  involves  questions  of judgment  under
conditions of uncertainty that will persist even after a trial or negotiation or
other legal event is completed.
What  constitutes  the  "best"  legal  advice  about  defenses  at the  IPO
stage  is unclear for two  reasons. First, the costs and benefits remain theo-
retically  controversial47 and empirically  uncertain.48  Second, takeovers  are
sufficiently uncommon  so that a particular  company may never encounter
one. Although evidence will be presented in Part IV that is consistent with
the view that defenses are generally  optimal for pre-IPO  owner-managers,
even that evidence  is far from conclusive,  and it remains possible that de-
fenses  are good only for some companies, or for none at all. As a result of
deep  and  continuing uncertainty  about  the "merits"  of defenses,  it  is un-
likely that clients will be able to know for certain whether the advice about
defenses they received at the time of IPOs  in the  1990s was good, bad, or
indifferent.  Knowing  this,  lawyers  were  and  are  even more  likely  than
controls  could mean  mistakes  were rare  or trivial,  or not clear  ex post, or that clients  are unable  or
unwilling to sanction firms.
45.  For  the  distinction  between  search  goods  and  experience  goods,  see  Philip  Nelson,
Informnation and Consumer Behavior, 78  J. POL.  EcoN.  311,  311  (1970).  For the distinction  between
experience goods and credence  goods, see Darby & Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount
of  Fraud,  16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 67 (1973), and sources cited infra  note 46.
46.  Winand Emons,  Credence Goods and Fraudulent  Experts, 28  RAND J. ECON.  107  (1997);
Asher Wolinsky, Competition in Markets  for Credence Goods, 151 J. INSTrrUMONAL  & THEoRETIcAL
ECON.  117 (1995).
47.  See infra Part HI.
48.  See Coates, Critique,  supra  note 23, at 336.
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the solicitation  of other potential  clients,  "grandstanding"  activities (effort
that produces  highly visible and impressive results),4' or the pursuit of lei-
sure activities.
The possibility that lawyers  shirk their obligation to act with due care
is supported by direct evidence of mistakes by lawyers found in the sample
(described in Part IV), which suggest that a significant number of attorneys
are not paying  much  attention to basic  corporate  documents.42  Somewhat
astonishingly,  several  companies  in the  sample also  used "form"  charters
and  bylaws  published  by  third-party  service  providers  (for  example,
Blumberg) for generic corporations, with no effort to tailor the forms to the
firm or the fact that it was going public.
B.  Takeover Advice as a Credence Good
Standard economic  theories of agency also  suggest  that the potential
for mischief in the relationship  between lawyers  and clients is particularly
large. Information asymmetries  between lawyer and client in the IPO con-
text are  likely to be serious,43  and will be exacerbated  by uncertainty and
time:  any effect takeover defenses have is unlikely to emerge for years, at
which point the  lawyers  involved may no  longer have a relationship  with
the client.'  But agency problems with legal advice about takeover defenses
41.  Cf  PAUL  A.  GOMPERS  & JOSH  LERNER,  THE  VENTURE  CAPITAL  CYCLE  240-60  (1999)
(discussing "grandstanding"  in the venture capital industry).
42.  The problem  of mistake-ridden  corporate  lawyering is  not new:  "The  Secretary  of State  of
New York advised that 20-25% of the 56,000  certificates  [of incorporation] filed  yearly around  1960
were rejected for failure to comply with formal requirements."  DETLEV F. VAGTS,  BAsIC  CORPORATION
LAW  78-79 (1989).
43.  Unlike  stock  markets,  where  full  disclosure  is  enforced  by  a  strict  liability  legal  regime,
clients  rely  on  lawyers  to  provide  them  with  not  only  legal  knowledge  itself but  also  information
necessary  to evaluate the quality of the legal knowledge  provided.  George M.  Cohen,  When Law and
Economics Met Professional  Responsibility, 67 FOROHAM  L.  REV.  273,  283-89 (1998)  (observing  that
asymmetric  information  between  client  and  lawyer  results  in  agency  problems);  Eugene  Fama  &
Michael  Jensen,  Separation of Ownership  and  Control, 26  J.L.  &  EcON.  301,  315-17  (1983)
(monitoring of lawyers may be  impossible even  for other lawyers);  Ronald J. Gilson,  The Devolution of
the Legal Profession: A  Demand Side Perspective, 49  MD.  L.  REV.  869,  889-92  (1990)  ("peculiar
characteristic of legal services is that a prospective client will have difficulty determining the quality of
services even  after they are rendered," impairing market responses of collectivization  of information,
warranties,  and reputation).
44.  See  FLEMING,  supra note 40,  at 26  (legal  services  may  be  hard  to  evaluate  if effects  or
services take place over a period of years);  MICHAEL H.  TROTTER,  PROFIT  AND THE PRACTICE  OF LAW
83-89  (1997)  (summarizing  surveys and  anecdotes  of "lawyer  bumout,"  leading  to higher  levels  of
early retirement);  AMERICAN  BAR ASSOCIATION,  STATE  OF THE  LEGAL PROFESSION  1990  11-12 (1991)
[hereinafter  1990  ABA SURVEY]  (45%  of post-1984  graduates  changed jobs once  by 1990,  of which
76%  had three or more employers).  If mistakes  are large  and clear,  and clients  able to  impose tort  or
reputational  sanctions for past mistakes of now-departed lawyers, firms  would have an incentive  to use
internal  quality  controls  to prevent  mistakes.  Rigorous  controls  on  contract  terms  such  as pre-IPO
governance terms are (or were) uncommon. ROBERT L. NELSON,  PARTNERS  WITH POWER:  THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION  OF THE  LARGE  LAW  FIRM  91  (1988)  (characterizing  "traditional  management"  of
law firms as "ad hoc," with "no regular monitoring"); LAw FIRM MANAGEMENT,  supra  note 40, § 2.2.4,
at  2:14  (agreeing  that  large  law  firm  management  has  been  'modified  anarchy').  Lack  of such2001] BLAME THE LAWYERS 1313
agents  in other contexts to  exert  suboptimal effort  in learning  or advising
about defenses. 49 Clients, in turn, can be expected to anticipate lawyer be-
havior  in this respect, with the upshot being a socially inefficient  level of
legal advice being provided,  relative to first-best welfare, as with credence
goods generally.
50
The possibility that there is a socially inefficient level of effort being
exerted by lawyers is supported by the fact that in surveys,  lawyers them-
selves  acknowledge  frequently  making  mistakes,  a phenomenon  that ex-
tends  to  the  largest  and  most  reputable  law  finms.  A  recent  American
Lawyer survey of partners at firms  in the AmLaw  100 finds that over half
(52%)  of partners  surveyed  who worked  sixty-or-more-hour  workweeks
"worked  so fast they made mistakes."" 1  Among partners  working less than
fifty-five hours per  week on average,  35%  admitted they  made  mistakes.
Anyone  who  has worked  in  a law  firm knows  that,  on average,  partners
work  shorter workweeks than associates,  so these figures understate errors
among  lawyers  at law  firms generally. Partners also  increasingly delegate
important legal tasks.52 Self-reporting  also underestimates  errors, not  only
49.  See text accompanying supra note 41.
50.  Emons, supra note 46,  at 117  (when  "consumers can never be certain  of the quality  of...
services  [of]  experts....  experts  have  strong  incentives  to  cheat";  developing  a  model  in  which
credence  goods are consumed, but at inefficient levels relative to first-best);  Wolinsky, supra note 46,
at  130  ("despite...  intense  competition,...  markets  for...  credence  goods...  may  feature  some
degree of fraud,"  developing a model in which credence  goods are consumed but with an equilibrium
that does not maximize expected customers'  surplus). Lawyers  can use reputation to improve matters,
but only under certain conditions. See infra  note 94.
51.  The Partner  Survey:  The  View Front the  Top, Amt.  LAw.,  June  1999, at 79,  82.  On whether
lawyers are generally incompetent,  see Warren  E.  Burger, A  Sick Profession?,  5 TuLsA  L.J. 1 (1968)
(majority of trial lawyers  incompetent);  Roger  C.  Cramton  &  Erik  M.  Jensen,  The  State  of Trial
Advocacy and Legal Education: Three New Studies, 30 J. LEG.  EDUC. 253,  253-56 (1979)  (reviewing
studies  finding  federal  judges  report  9%  of trial  lawyer  performances  incompetent);  1990  ABA
SuRvEY,  supra note 44, at 33,  56 (70%  of lawyers  report observing  incompetence by other  lawyers
"sometimes"  or "often",  10%  "often,"  30%  of private  practitioners  report  career  advancement  not
determined by quality of work);  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD  Er  AL.,  THE  LAW AND  ETHMcS  OF  LAWYERING
150 (3d ed.  1999)  ("defining  competence  is ...  difficult";  ethical  "discipline  for  incompetence  [is]
relatively rare").
52.  At  many  firms,  associates,  "legal  temps,"  paralegals,  or secretaries,  with  little  training,
perform  important legal tasks. Leverage-Call  in the Troops,  AM.  LAW., July  1999,  at 84-85 (ratio of
associates to partners rebounded  from downtum  in early  1990s to reach all-time levels in  1998);  1990
ABA SURVEY, supra  note 44, at 20 (58%  of lawyers report not receiving frequent instruction, training,
or feedback  from superiors); MARc  GALANTER  & THOMAS  PALAY, TOURNAMENT  OF  LAWYERS  65-66
(1991)  (paralegals  increased  more  rapidly  in large  firms  from  1972 to  1987  than lawyers  did;  legal
temp  agencies  grew  from  zero  in  1983  to  twelve  in  1988);  Mark  C.  Suchman,  On  Advice  of
Counsel:  Law  Firms and Venture  Capital Funds as Information  Intermediaries  in the Structuration  of
Silicon Valley  9,  105 (1994)  (secretaries) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,  Stanford University) (on file
with author);  TROTTER,  supra note 44, at 49, 57,  76,  101-11  (decreasing  quality of legal work).  Such
delegation is due in part to the "doubling of associate  leverage from 1960 to  1990," and resulting fall in
average age of active lawyers. Id. at  101 (founder and managing partner of two  large Atlanta  law firms
with  thirty  years  practice  experience,  stating  "as  the... number  and  percentage  of inexperienced
associates  have  increased,  the  average  level  of maturity  and  experience  of major  firm  lawyers
has..,  declined and with it the quality and value of  the firms'  work product").CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
because  lawyers  may be worried about their reputations  (researcher prom-
ises  of anonymity  notwithstanding),  but  also because lawyers  will not al-
ways  notice their  own mistakes  as they  make  them,  particularly  in  areas
where they are not expert.
C.  The Market  for Lawyers in the IPO Context
Making  matters  worse  for  clients  in need  of advice  about takeover
defenses  are  characteristics  of the market  for lawyers  in the  IPO context.
IPO  lawyers  do  not specialize  in takeovers  or  takeover  defense,  for the
most part. 3 The legal market has been sufficiently  segmented  for the past
fifteen years that most lawyers who routinely work on hostile takeovers  do
not routinely  advise  companies  going public  for the  first time,  and vice
versa. 4 It is rare for companies  going public to be advised by lawyers who
have current proficiency in takeovers.  Even whole firms  specialize  in one
or the other. Leading takeover firms, such as Wachtell Lipton,  do not han-
dle a high volume of IPOs; and leading IPO firms, such as Wilson Sonsini,
do not (or did not  during the early 1990s)  handle  a high volume of take-
overs.
In addition, lawyers  representing  start-up  companies  often have mul-
tiple relationships with pre-IPO  financiers  and managers. Unlike  investors
as a class  and many pre-IPO  shareholders,  owner-managers  are often not
repeat  players  in  the  IPO  market.  In  reviewing  Suchman's  studies  of
Silicon Valley,56  Bernstein notes that Valley lawyers  "may have  a strong
financial  incentive  to  draft  contractual  provisions  that  favor...  [venture
capital]  funds  at the  expense  of...  entrepreneurs."57  Regarding  defenses,
in  particular,  IPO  law  firms  may  correctly  anticipate  that  while  their
53.  See LAw  FirM  MANAGEMENT,  supra note 40,  § 1.4,  at  1:32-39 (contrasting M&A  firms from
"high-tech"  firms,  characterizing  Wilson  Sonsini  as example  of "high  tech"  firm  competing  not  on
basis of "proficiency"  but by offering "broad"  services to "narrow"  clientele);  Lawrence  M.  Friedman
et al.,  Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practices  in Silicon Valley:  A Preliminary  Report, 64 IND.  L.J.  555,
562 (1989)  (same).
54.  Specialization  is  complex:  lawyers  specialize  by  client,  activity  (litigation,  negotiation,
counseling),  and legal knowledge.  Degree of specialization  can be measured by time, revenues,  lawyer
self-identification,  or organizational structure. But none dispute the general notion that lawyers are and
have  become  increasingly  specialized.  RicHaRD  L.  ABEL,  AMERICAN  LAWYERs  122-23  (1989)
(specialization began  in  1940s and has increased with each decade;  by 1982,  70% of Chicago lawyers
surveyed  "considered  themselves  specialists");  GALANTER  &  PALAY,  supra  note  52,  at  48-49
(departmentalization,  specialization, and  differentiation of large law firms  all increased  from  1960s to
1980s);  LAw  FiRm  MANAGEMENT,  supra note 40,  § 1.3.2;  id. § 2.2.4,  at 2:13 ("trend  is toward  an
increased  division of labor");  TROTTER, supra note 44, at 50-51  (increased law firm  specialization  due
to client demand for speed,  more law, more  competition, more in-house corporate  law generalists,  and
younger lawyers, who specialize to justify high billing rates).
55.  Exceptions  exist:  Skadden  Arps  had  and  has  the  size  and  market  position  to  give  it  a
significant role in both IPOs and takeover fights.
56.  SucMmAN,  supra  note 52.
57.  Lisa  Bernstein,  The Silicon Valley  Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?,  74  OR.  L. Rv.
239,  248 n.43  (1995).
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relations with venture capitalists  will persist after the IPO, their relations
with  managers  may  diminish or disappear after  the IPO if the  company
fails. Even if the company succeeds, it may become active in merger activ-
ity and need a new law firm with proficiency in that area."  Relative to VC
interests,  the  interests  of owner-managers  may get short shrift  from  IPO
lawyers. 9 Even if there is no  direct conflict between VC and manager in-
terests, IPO law firms may allocate effort and attention to the former rather
than the latter. Since VCs typically sell stakes in start-up companies shortly
after an IPO,60  they have little ongoing interest in whether the company  is
well-protected  from takeover bids. This  is not to  say VCs would oppose
defenses.6  Still, in general, VCs, and lawyers looking out primarily for VC
interests, would not care as much about defenses as well-informed  or well-
advised owner-managers.
D.  Barriers  to Competition in the Market  for Lawyers
The market for legal services is also protected from full and free com-
petition by a variety of barriers to entry. Law firms  have long been pro-
tected by regulatory barriers to entry, in the form of the bar exam, a three-
year professional  degree,  and no access to public capital markets,62 which
make  the  establishment  of new  law  firms  more  difficult  than  otherwise
would be  the  case.  In addition,  such regulations  generally  prevent  other
businesses  (such as accounting firms or for-profit corporations)  from pro-
viding third-party legal services,  and thereby restrict the number of people
58.  If a firm grew or bought M&A proficiency, the conflict described in the text would disappear.
Wilson  Sonsini  has been pursuing  this  strategy:  its  M&A  activity  grew  significantly in  the  1990s,
representing @Home in its $6.7 billion merger with Excite, and Netscape in its $4.2 billion acquisition
by AOL.  Decisions  at the  IPO stage  continue  to affect  clients  in the  M&A context,  however. E.g.,
Quickturn  Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721  A.2d 1281  (Del.  1998)  (Wilson Sonsini  client forced to sell to
white  knight after Mentor bid, largely because of Quicktum's near absence of pre-IPO  defenses left it
vulnerable  to proxy  fight);  Krysten  Crawford,  Quicklurn Design Systems,  THE  REcoRDER,  Dec.  15,
1993,  at 2 (reporting  Quicktum  IPO,  with  Larry  Sonsini  as  company counsel);  see infra note  236
(discussing Quicktum fight).
59.  Cf SucatmN, supra note  52,  at  111-13,  who  describes  Silicon  Valley  lawyers  "subtly
steering  [entrepreneur]  clients toward  negotiating positions that comport  with  prevailing  community
practices."
60.  See GoMPERs  & LERNEaR,  supra note 41,  at 270 tbl.13.1  (on average, VCs distribute 70%  of
stake in portfolio firm to VC fund investors within one year of IPO).
61.  Indeed, if defenses  increased  company  value  enough to  improve  IPO  pricing, VCs  would
want them,  and even if defenses have mixed or neutral effects  on IPO prices, VCs with experience in
the takeover arena may even suggest that managers consider adopting them, as a way of looking out for
their entrepreneur  clientele and enhancing the VCs'  reputation. Black & Gilson propose that VCs have
an implicit contract to return control to successful entrepreneurs by allowing start-ups to go public even
if IPO proceeds  are lower than the price a larger,  existing company would pay. Bernard  S. Black  &
Ronald J. Gilson,  Venture Capital  and the Structure of Capital  Markets: Banks  Versus Stock Markets,
47 J. FiN. ECON. 243,257-64 (1998).
62.  See generally  Edward  S.  Adams & John  H. Matheson,  Law Firms on  the Big Boards?: A
Proposal  for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms,  86  CALIF. L. REv.  1 (1998)  (reviewing ethical rules
that prevent sales of  equity by law firms to outsiders, and proposing that such rules be lifted).CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
providing legal services.6"  Lack of access to the public capital markets has
meant that law firms have not historically invested in systems and technol-
ogy  to the  same  extent  as  other professional  service  firms,'  which  con-
strains competition among lawyers in providing technology-based  services.
Lawyers  also  enjoy a  large  amount  of "natural"  (that  is, nonregula-
tory) protection from vigorous competition. The supply of individuals with
the talents and inclination  to succeed  as top-tier corporate  lawyers may be
inherently  (or  "naturally")  limited.65  Clients  also  have  reasons  to  avoid
switching to new lawyers  at the  IPO stage.66 The clients'  pre-IPO  lawyers
are likely to be needed during and after the IPO,  simply because  they will
be  more  knowledgeable  about  many  aspects  of the  clients'  legal  affairs
than new lawyers will be, particularly arrangements with VCs or other pre-
IPO  outside  shareholders,  lenders,  suppliers,  and  customers.  Pre-IPO  law
firms  play an important role in controlling  access  to capital  providers  and
other third parties, which can give them significant market power,  at least
in the short run. 67 Long-standing personal relationships,  a sense of debt or
gratitude if lawyers provided below-market  fees during the  start-up period,
concerns  about  confidentiality,68  and relationship-specific  information  all
deter clients  from  switching  law firms.  Gilson  and Mnookin  characterize
the lawyer-client  relationship  as  "approaching"  a "bilateral  monopoly."69
Switching  costs  may  partly  explain  the  appearance  of  small  law  firms
63.  ABEL,  supra note  54,  at  48-71;  JOSEPH  W.  BARTLETT,  THE  LAW  BusINESS:  A  TIRED
MONOPOLY 7-23  (1982).
64.  BARTLETT, supra note 63, at 27-36. See also infra Part II.G.
65.  Gillian K.  Hadfield,  The Price of Law:  How the Market for Laiyers Distorts  the Justice
System,  98  MICH.  L.  REv.  953,  984-92  (2000)  (discussing  natural  barriers  to  competition  in  legal
market).
66.  Hiring two firms has its own problems. See infra  text accompanying  notes 78-79 & 92-93.
67.  SucHMAN, supra  note  52, at 144,  150 tbl.6.2 (Wilson Sonsini drafted 43% of 107  first-round
high-tech VC financing contracts, making  up "full population"  of such investments by  two leading VC
funds  in Silicon  Valley  1975-90);  Id. at  109  (giving example of market power);  Id. at 96  ("Wilson
Sonsini ...  alone controls access to between 40% and 60% of all the venture capital  in Silicon  Valley")
(citing Gail D. Cox, A  Valley of Conflicts,  NAT'L L.J.  June 20,  1988, at 1, 48-49); Bernstein, supra note
57, at n.65  ("Given their control  over Silicon Valley's  capital flow..,  and their active  role in creating
and  transmitting ...  information ...  Silicon Valley  lawyers  [may  be]  able  to exercise  a  great  deal  of
market power."); Friedman  et al., supra note 53, at 562  (same).
68.  FLEMING, supra note 40, at 27  (clients "reluctant  to disclose important confidences to  [new]
lawyers...  a  factor [that]  at times...  may overrule all  others, including  costs").  If a client  sues a  law
firm for malpractice,  for example, the law firm's duty of confidentiality  falls away.
69.  Ronald  J.  Gilson  &  Robert  H.  Mnookin,  Sharing Among  the  Human  Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate  Law FirT  and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN.  L. REv. 313,
359  (1985)  (observing  that lawyer-client  "relationship  approaches  a  bilateral  monopoly"  because  of
relationship-specific  information);  Gilson,  srpra  note  43,  at 897-99;  see  generally Paul  Klemperer,
Markets with  Consumer Switching Costs, 102  QJ. EcON.  375  (1987)  (arguing  that switching  costs
create  market power).  For older, larger and  more profitable companies,  law firm  switching costs may
be  less  important,  and increasingly  so.  Gilson, srpra  note  43,  at 914-16;  LAW  FIRM  MANAGEMENT,
supra note 40,  § 1.3.1,  at  1:18.  Whether such costs are now associated  with  individual  lawyers,  rather
than  law firms, as lateral hiring and  lawyer mobility have  increased, id., does not affect whether such
costs reduce market discipline and increase lawyer-client  agency cost for start-ups.
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(fewer than twenty-five  lawyers)  as corporate  counsel  in 10%  of the IPO
sample  analyzed in Part IV, despite  the general trend toward  large size in
the corporate law firm market.7" At times, the  costs of switching  may be
worth it, as when an actual takeover bid appears on a company's doorstep.
But at the time of an IPO,  the remoteness  of takeover bids may make re-
tention of new  counsel  with takeover proficiency  a  negative  net present
value proposition.
E.  The Mechanics of  the Production of  Takeover Defenses
If takeover proficiency were distributed widely among and within law
firms,  including  down  to  the  lowest-level  associates,  the  lawyer-client
agency problems might not be serious.  But  as  noted above,  IPO  lawyers
often lack firsthand experience  in takeover fights. They thus lack takeover-
law proficiency  (1)  to decide  what  defenses to  advise a  client to  adopt,
or  (2)  to  implement  the  decision  once  made.  Nonexpert  lawyers  have
three  general  methods  of handling  these  two  tasks.  First,  lawyers  might
research the issue and arrive at their own answers. Second, they might talk
to lawyers with takeover expertise, either in their own firm if possible or at
other firms.  Third, they might rely on "boilerplate,"  form documents used
in prior IPOs.
1.  What ifthe Lawyer Researches the Issue?
Having lawyers  research the issue  and arrive at their own conclusion
is  expensive  and error-prone.  Initially, theories  about  defenses are  highly
contentious and unresolved (as will be discussed in Part III), and empirical
evidence  on what defenses  are best remains uncertain.7'  Even if the  deci-
sion of whether to adopt defenses  were simple at the highest level of gen-
erality, defense analysis  is complex when it comes  to specifics. Laws vary
from state to  state, and even if a company sticks to conventional terms and
does not try to innovate, it will need to make three choices  for each of at
least eleven terms:  whether to include a given term; whether to include the
term  in  its  charter  or  its  bylaws;  and  under  what circumstances  and  by
whom the term can be modified in the future. Together, the number of pos-
sible  configurations  for even  a "plain vanilla"  set of corporate documents
runs  into  the  hundreds  of  thousands.72  Over  75%  of the  companies
70.  Just as important,  takeover  proficiency  is  no more  likely  to  be  found  in  firms  with  TPO
proficiency  than  in  firms  with  pre-IPO  proficiency;  in  fact,  law  firms  are  more  likely  to  have
proficiency  in both  of these early  stages of a company's  lifecycle than they  are to have proficiency  in
takeovers  and one  (but  not  both)  of these  areas.  Cf  Friedman  et  al.,  supra note  53,  at  558-59
("consumption needs for lawyers sharply change  [when company decides) to 'go public"'; emphasizing
securities law focus of IPO lawyer practice; distinguishing takeover specialists).
71.  See Coates, Critique,  supra  note 23.
72.  If eleven basic but important terms described  in Appendix  A take  on  three values  (yes, no,
silence), and default law can be chosen from two states (Delaware  or home state), the resulting possible
1317 2001]CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW
analyzed in Part IV had a set of fifteen governance terms that were unique
within the sample, and no one set accounted for more than 4% of the sam-
ple.
Although defense advice  also involves  questions of judgment, at least
on its face, little to no guidance can be found in the most relevant practical
literature. A review of the best legal treatises available  to assist practitio-
ners, for example,  suggests that experienced  corporate attorneys  pay little
attention  to  defenses  during  the  IPO  process.  One  treatise  in particular,
Venture Capital and Public Offering Negotiation, has been highly success-
ful since its first publication in  1983.  Now  in a third edition,73 the treatise
runs  over  1,300  pages  in thirty-seven  chapters,  and  is  coauthored  by the
pantheon of the venture capital bar, including lead author Michael Halloran
of Pillsbury Madison;  Larry Sonsini, name partner of Wilson Sonsini;  Lee
Benton, managing partner of Cooley Godward; Robert Gunderson, founder
of Gunderson  Dettmer;  and  Richard  Testa,  founder  of Testa  Hurwitz. 74
Topics  include  the range  of legal issues  that  arise  in  IPOs.  However,  in
contrast  to  a carefully  annotated  form of charter  to  be  used  at the  time
venture  capitalists  first invest,  before  the IPO,75 the  treatise  provides  no
good advice  about (or models for) takeover defenses  for a company about
to  go  public. 76  Other treatises  or practitioner  outlines  addressing IPOs  are
no more useful to the nonexpert lawyer.77
combinations are  311  x 2  = 354,294.  Many configurations  will be  equivalent; many  will not represent
meaningful  arrangements.  But  the  practical  complexity  is  still  daunting.  A  study  of  513  large
companies found 318 different combinations of 20 terms reviewed (fifteen firm-specific  terms and five
terms imposed by state antitakeover laws). Morris G. Danielson  & Jonathan M.  Karpoff, On the Uses of
Corporate  Governance Provisions,  4 J. CORP. FIN.  347, 366-67 (1998).
73.  MICHAEL  HALLORAN ET. AL.,  VENTURE  CAPITAL & PUBLIC  OFFERING NEGOTIATION  (3rd ed.
1997).  Originally  published by Prentice Hall  Law & Business, it is now published  by Aspen  Law &
Business (1997), with supplements through the year 2000.
74.  Other coauthors  of note include  J.  Robert  Lovejoy,  head of the  general  banking  group  of
Lazard Freres & Co., a major investment bank;  Daniel M.  Kaufman, senior executive of Dream Works
Interactive  LLC;  Keith  Keamey,  partner at Davis  Polk  & Wardwell;  Thomas  W.  Kintner,  corporate
counsel for Madge Networks;  and Kathryn B. McGrath, partner at Morgan Lewis & Bockius.
75.  HALLORAN  ET AL., supra note 73, at ch. 8 (addressing voting rights, control rights, and board
representation).
76.  See generally id. at  chs. 20-37  (providing no  models  of charters  or bylaws  for  companies
about  to  go  public  and  omitting  discussion  of or  advice  about  takeover  defenses).  To  the  extent
defenses  are  discussed  at all,  the  treatise  implies by  omission  in  its  model  form  of prospectus  that
companies should not adopt classified boards or limit shareholders power to act by written consent, call
special meetings, remove directors without cause, or increase board size. See id. at chs. 28-70.
77.  In  all  of the  practical  guides  to  or treatises  on  IPOs,  start-ups  or  venture  capital  I have
reviewed, defenses  are not mentioned  at all or are only mentioned in passing, with no detailed advice
about  what  defenses,  if any,  to adopt  or how to  implement  defenses.  E.g.,  JOSEPH  W.  BARTLETT,
FUNDAMENTALS  OF VENTURE  CAPITAL  133-47 (1999)  (chapter on  "how to...  go public");  JOSEPH W.
BARTLETT,  VENTURE  CAPITAL:  LAW,  BUSINESS  STRATEGIES,  AND  INVESTMENT  PLANNING  262-92
(1988)  (chapter  on  "the  initial public  offering");  JACK S.  LEVIN,  STRUCTURING  VENTURE  CAPITAL,
PRIVATE  EQUITY  AND  ENTREPRENEURIAL  TRANSACTIONS  291-316  (1997)  (chapter  devoted  to
"structuring  an  IPO or sale  of the VC-financed  portfolio  company");  JOHN  L.  NESHEIM,  HIGH  TECH
START-UP 221-54  (1997)  (chapter  on  IPOs);  FREDERICK  D.  LIPMAN,  GOING  PUBLIC  (1997);  JOHN E.
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2.  What if the Lawyer Speaks to a Takeover Specialist?
If the lawyer turns to another lawyer with some proficiency in take-
overs, she faces different difficulties.  Clients may be unwilling to foot two
lawyers'  bills for the same work, so bringing in another lawyer may reduce
the IPO lawyer's  profit.  Worse,  a second lawyer may  steal the first  law-
yer's business. A  client may (wrongly but understandably)  expect that "a
corporate lawyer" handling its IPO should have proficiency in a "corporate
law"  topic  like  takeover  defense.  If the  IPO  lawyer must  go to  another
firm, the second firm may be able to bundle both types of legal advice to-
gether, or appear to, for so long as necessary to capture the relationship. 78
If, on the other hand, the first lawyer minimizes  contact between the  sec-
ond lawyer and the client, to minimize the risk of relationship capture, the
second  lawyer will not have good  incentives to provide  optimal advice.79
Those lawyers with "free"  time to perform such tasks may not be the best
lawyers  for  the  job;  expert  takeover  specialists,  after  all,  make  large
amounts of money, and face large opportunity costs for their time.
3.  What if the Lawyer Uses Boilerplate?
If research  and  consultation  are  not effective  ways  for a  lawyer to
provide a client with good advice about defenses, that leaves boilerplate  as
a source of information about what defenses are best for lawyer to advise a
client to  adopt. 80  But  inexpert  reliance  on boilerplate  can  be dangerous.
Boilerplate  can  either be developed  internally  or borrowed  from at least
RILEY & LAIR  H. SIONS III, How TO  PREPARE  AN INrrIAL PUBLIC OFFERING  1997 (Practising Law
Institute); JAhEs  B. ARKEBAUER  & RON ScHULTz,  GOING  PUBLIC 85 (1998);  STEPHEN C. BLOWERS ET
AL.,  THE ERNsT  & YOUNG  GUmE TO TAKING  YOUR  COMPANY PUBLIC (1995).  It could be argued that
practitioners  can  turn  to  treatises  devoted  solely to  hostile  takeovers  and  defenses  for  advice  and
guidance on those topics, but doing so requires a lawyer to know enough to seek such guidance,  a need
that does  not arise naturally in the IPO  process.  Also,  since such  treatises  are generally written  with
large, mature public companies in mind, they do not contain model charters or bylaws or advice written
with an IPO in mind. E.g., M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,  TAKEOvERS  AND  FREEzE-OUTs  (1995).
78.  If the IPO lawyer can find a lawyer with some takeover proficiency in her own firm, this risk
is mitigated, but there remains  some risk that the second  lawyer will attempt to become  the primary
lawyer handling that client's  future corporate  matters.  Gilson & Mnookin,  supra note  69,  at 351  ("it
would hardly be surprising were a client's  loyalty to shift from its  original contact to the lawyer who
actually does its work"). This result is particularly likely if the client is going to be engaging in M&A
transactions, which have much in common with takeover defense analysis, and less in common with the
kinds of disclosure, general corporate and process-oriented advice that IPO lawyers provide.
79.  Even if the two lawyers are in the same firm, the second lawyer will often derive little direct
benefit from time spent drafting and tailoring documents (and making related  decisions) because more
profits and power in many firms  are allocated to "rainmaking"  lawyers who  originate new business or
client relationships than to "service"  lawyers who solely perform legal tasks for an existing client.
80.  The nature and likely effects of boilerplate terms  are likely to vary by context. The following
discussion is  confined  to boilerplate  corporate  governance  terms,  and may not  extend to boilerplate
terms in contracts  or litigation  papers.  On corporate  boilerplate more generally,  see Marcel  Kahan  &
Michael  Klausner, Standardization  and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of
Boilerplate"),  83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997).
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three sources,  of which two are ready-at-hand  and very  cheap.8  First, the
lawyer can rely on documents used by private companies  (private company
boilerplate).  However, private  company  boilerplate will  leave  companies
vulnerable to takeover. Private companies do not need defenses,  and in fact
benefit from having terms that would facilitate hostile takeovers if used by
public companies.82 The cheapest and easiest boilerplate of all then,  a com-
pany's own pre-IPO  documents, which remain in force if no effort is made
to change them, will generally make takeovers quite easy.8 3
Second, boilerplate  (of a sort)  can be  developed  by simply  keeping
documents to an absolute minimum, so that "gap-filler"  default terms sup-
plied  by  corporate  statutes  and  case  law  are  implicitly  adopted  (default
law).  Default  law  in  all  fifty  states,  however,  makes  takeovers  easy:'
Delaware  default  law  permits  shareholder  action  by written  consent,  and
default law  in states that follow the Revised Model  Business  Corporation
Act ("RMBCA") permits special meetings  of shareholders  to be called by
as few as  10%  of the shareholders,  which can also greatly facilitate a hos-
tile takeover bid."  IPO lawyers who borrow the language of corporate  stat-
utes to write  governance terms, or who leave documents  silent where they
are  unsure  of the  correct  choice,  will  generally  choose  terms  that make
takeovers  fairly  easy. Thus,  a bias against defenses  is built into the  legal
system, and to the extent that IPO lawyers  lack proficiency in the choice  of
81.  A firm will be better off developing  its own boilerplate than  borrowing boilerplate if the firm
routinely relies on boilerplate,  if for no other reason than word processing costs, but it requires  greater
initial investment, as well as ongoing costs to maintain. It will often be cheaper for firms to free ride on
competitors, or borrow from other sources. Research,  development, and maintenance of boilerplate  also
forms  a  type  of  "public  good"  within  a  law  firm,  and  basic  economic  principles  predict
underinvestment  in  activities  that  produce  firm-wide  benefits.  ANDREU  MAS-COLELL  Er  AL.,
MICROECONOMic  THEORY  361-62  (1995).  Cf  TROTTER,  supra note  44,  at  Ill  (noting  that  in  the
context of general  legal research memos,  "One does not accumulate billable time by preparing indexes
to legal memoranda  and, of course, billable projects are given precedence.  [S]ome firms have employed
librarians or other staff to do the job, but the skill level of people hired for this work is often lower than
that of lawyers,  and they often do not have any experience  with the issues researched  ....  Many firms
abandon the effort when they encounter these obstacles.").
82.  Shareholder  action by  written  consent, for  example,  is  a benefit  to  private companies  that
wish  to avoid  formal shareholder  meetings  with associated  expenses.  But for  public  companies,  the
ability of shareholders  to act by written consent  can  leave companies  vulnerable to  a hostile takeover
bid. Id.
83.  E.g.,  Amended  and  Restated Certification of Incorporation  of ABC Corp.  (forms of sample
"D  stage"  preferred  stock  financing  documents  prepared  at  Wilson  Sonsini)  (on  file  with  author)
(private company  charter  neither  eliminating  ability  of shareholders  to  act  by  written  consent  nor
establishing staggered board).
84.  This may surprise many corporate  academics who  are accustomed to thinking of  state  law as
greatly  impeding takeovers, based  on  the  many antitakeover  statutes adopted  by states  in the  1960s,
1970s,  1980s. The surprise diminishes, however, when it is recognized  that in the era of the poison pill,
most  statutes specifically  designed to  impede takeovers have had  little effect  not already achieved by
the  availability  of the poison  pill.  Additionally,  few states  have  modified their  basic  rules  on  how
directors  are elected, which are the important  constraint on takeovers in the era of the pill. See Coates,
Critique,  supra  note 23, at 320-23.
85.  REVISED  MODEL Bus.  CORP. AcT § 7.02 (1998).
1320 [Vol. 89:1301BLAME THE LAWYERS
defenses,  the companies  they advise will tend  to go public with minimal
defenses in place.
The third  source  from which  a law  firm can borrow boilerplate  are
public  companies,  which  fall  into  three  categories:  (1)  companies  that
have  recently  gone  public  with  law  firms  that  have  takeover  profi-
ciency;  (2)  companies  that  have  recently  gone  public  with  law  firms
prominent  in the  IPO;  or  (3)  other  public companies.  If an  IPO  lawyer
borrows  from a random public company, or one randomly chosen from its
own industry or locale, defenses will vary but will on average be fewer in
number than is a full set of defenses installed by an expert lawyer. Existing
public companies do not have the ability to adopt some midstream defenses
even if they would benefit shareholders if adopted pre-IPO. 6 In addition, at
least some law firms  will have allowed  inertia to determine  their clients'
governance  terms  (by  relying  on private  company  boilerplate  or default
law).  Thus,  the  IPO  population,  too,  will  on  average  be biased  toward
fewer defenses."  Only if the source is a public  company that relied on law-
yers proficient in takeovers will the boilerplate be based on expert advice,
and even  then idiosyncratic  client  needs  or unusual  features  of the  com-
pany's  state  of incorporation  or  ownership  structure  may  make  such  a
company's defenses a poor model.
Finally, suppose a law firm develops  its own boilerplate and encour-
ages its lawyers to use it in all IPOs the firm handles. Results  will tend to
be fairly uniform:  firms that encourage lawyers to use standard forms will
tend to produce  IPO  documents  that track  each  other more  closely  than
they will track IPO documents  in general. While results will be consistent
for that firm, they may be consistently good or consistently bad, from the
perspective  of  advice  on  defenses.  If  the  firm  does  a  poor  job  of
"reinventing  the wheel,"  if it  bases  its  internal  boilerplate  on  a  private
company model or relies on default law, or if it borrows from another inapt
model, resulting documents  will reflect that choice and consistently contain
few defenses.
86.  Suppose,  for example,  pre-IPO shareholders  place an idiosyncratic  value on control,  so they
would be willing to sell more cash-flow rights for the same price with greater assurance of maintaining
control.  For  such  companies,  defenses  might  maximize  total  value  (to  both  pre-and  post-IPO
shareholders).  But  if  the company  went  public  without  defenses,  installing  them  midstream  might
represent  a transfer of value from outside to inside shareholders.  In addition, institutional shareholders
do not seem to penalize  companies for adopting defenses prior to an  IPO,  see infra note 242, but have
in the  1990s routinely voted against midstream adoptions of the very same defenses. See supra note 23.
Companies that went public before the time defenses became  important (in  the 1980s) may not have a
set of defenses that would be best for a company going public now.
87.  While borrowing  from recent  IPOs  will on average  increase the number of defenses (since
some  IPO  companies  will  rely  directly  or  indirectly  on  lawyers  with  takeover  proficiency),  the
borrowed boilerplate will still, on average, produce  fewer defenses than might be optimal (since some
IPO companies will not).
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4.  Implementation Once the Decision Has Been Made
After the decision  of what defenses  to adopt has  been made,  lawyers
must still implement that decision. Implementation  is not intrinsically dif-
ficult:  writing a provision to classify a board, for example, is hardly rocket
science.88 Yet as long as clients cannot easily monitor implementation, and
few nonlawyers have the patience or training to read and evaluate charters
or bylaws,  a risk remains that lawyers  will shirk implementation.  Anyone
with firsthand experience in large corporate law firms will attest that senior
partners  at  successful  law  firms  rarely  directly  perform  the  tedious  and
time-consuming  task  of drafting  or even reading basic  legal  documents.
Instead, such tasks are delegated to junior partners, or, increasingly, associ-
ates  or even paralegals.89  Such  individuals  may lack  the training  to draft
even straightforward provisions  effectively.  More important than training,
however,  is the fact that the same agency problem that exists between the
client and the most senior lawyer also exists between the most  senior law-
yer and next most senior lawyer, and so on down the chain. As long as the
person actually charged with drafting corporate documents does not have a
significant  fear  of being  double-checked,  that person  will have  the  same
agency-based incentive to shirk on the drafting job.
F.  Potential  Constraints  on IPO  Lawyer Autonomy
Lawyers may face constraints in advising clients on takeover defenses
in IPOs, and in exercising effort and care in implementing client decisions.
In principle,  for example, a lawyer is ethically obliged to let a client make
important  decisions  about  goals,  which  might mean that  a lawyer  has  a
duty to facilitate monitoring by  clients.  But a lawyer's  ability to  frame a
complex  choice  for a client, and to  decide  (in the course of providing  ad-
vice) what information to give the client, will so shape  the choice that cli-
ent autonomy is the exception and not the rule for defenses,  at least in the
context of small-and mid-sized companies.
With  respect  to  defenses,  ethically  conscientious  but  inexperienced
lawyers may even make  matters worse, if they lack confidence to provide
strong advice  about what defenses to  adopt. That is because  they may be
tempted to frame the question as a choice along a continuum:  no defenses,
some defenses,  all (standard) defenses. A client faced  with that choice  and
neutral  advice from the lawyer about what to  do may often be tempted to
88.  Even installation of a classified  board is not simple,  however, because there are  at least two
ways (removal  and  "board packing")  for bidders  to evade  the  effect of a classified  board, ways that
vary  in  detail  by  state  of  incorporation.  To  make  a  classified  board  effective  for  a  company
incorporated  in  a state that follows  the RMBCA,  for example,  a lawyer must vary from default law to
eliminate  the ability  of shareholders  to  remove  directors  without  cause  and  to  set  the  number  of
directors or to fill vacancies. See Appendix B.I.A. 1.
89.  See supra  note 52.
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mimic  Goldilocks,  and adopt defenses  that are neither too strong nor too
weak. Because of the ways defenses interact, however, such a choice will
tend to produce a net set of defenses much closer to the "weak" end of the
continuum than the middle."  In any  event,  it seems  highly  unlikely that
ethical duties, which are rarely enforced in this context,  constrain corporate
lawyers fully.91
Clients can in theory try to double-check advice by turning to another
lawyer, but this generally works only if advice is simple and discrete.  Oth-
erwise the second lawyer may provide unverifiably bad advice designed to
make  the initial  lawyer  look bad,  and the initial  lawyer can  dismiss  any
dispute with the second lawyer as competitively motivated or representing
a  simple  difference  in judgment. 9"  Further,  the  client  must  have  some
knowledge  about the matter in question to even realize that his attorneys
may be making a mistake and to seek a second opinion. As in the litigation
context,  second opinions in the corporate advisory context are of uncertain
value, and rare.9 3
The value  and importance of reputation  also no doubt serves to con-
strain lawyers to a degree. However, reputation will only constrain lawyers
to the extent that the quality of services  is observable by third parties and
reputational  information  can be produced  and used by others for profit. 9 4
The  third  parties  best  able  to  evaluate  law  firm  error  and  use  those
90.  See Coates, Index, supra note 26, at 67-70.
91.  See HAzARDErAL.,supranote51,  at 150.
92.  TROTTER,  supra note 44,  at 115-17,  illustrates  the difficulties  clients  have hiring  a  second
lawyer,  even one  with special expertise. After a matter handled by Trotter's firm stimulated a  Senate
inquiry,  the client's  in-house  counsel invited  a  former  SEC  general  counsel to  tell the  board about
securities  law risks, with the prospect of the SEC lawyer handling the SEC investigation that ensued.
Trotter describes  himself as interrupting  former SEC  general counsel  "to suggest that..,  it might be
appropriate  to  start  the  deliberations of the board  by  inquiring  if the  company had  done  anything
wrong, which in fact it had not ....  In due course my client had the good judgment not to employ the
[former SEC  general counsel]."  Id. at 116. In the story, Trotter is vindicated:  the "Senate committee
held  its  hearing and moved  on.  .." and  "the  SEC... closed  its  file."  Id. To Trotter  the  moral  is
clear  "It was quite irresponsible  for the [former SEC general counsel]  to seek to stampede  the  board
into employing him....  Id. Another lesson,  however, is also  clear:  it is difficult  for a  client to use
unaffiliated lawyers for discrete but related matters.
93.  Michael  Klausner  et  al.,  The  Law  And  Economics Of Lawyering Second  Opinions In
Litigation, 84 VA. L. REv. 1411,  1419-26 (1998).
94.  Cf Benjamin  Klein & Keith B.  Leffler, The Role of  Market Forces  in Assuring Contractual
Performance,  89 J. POL. ECON.  615,  615  (1981)  (investment in brand name or reputation  may permit
otherwise  uninformed  clients  to assess  quality of experience  goods),  and Larry  E.  Ribstein,  Ethical
Rules, Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure,  84 VA. L. REv.  1707,  1707 (1998)  (observing that large
law firms have large reputational bonds), with  OLrxatR E. WLuLMIsoN, THE ECONOMNC  INSTITUTIONS
OF  CAPrrAusNi:  Fmis,  MARKm,  RELATioNAL  CoNTRACrnMG  395-96  (1985)  (reputation  deters
"contract defection"  if defection  can  be  made public knowledge,  consequences  of defection  can be
ascertained, and parties who experience or observe defection penalize offenders  or successors),  Cohen,
supra note 43,  at 288-89  (reputational  constraints  only function if third parties  can verify quality of
advice  given),  and Langevoort  & Rasmussen,  supra note  40,  at  410  (observing  that  asymmetric
information that creates  lawyer-client agency problem makes it hard for third parties to ascertain lawyer
misfeasance).
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assessments to their advantage are other law firms,  and law firms do occa-
sionally  compete  by  trumpeting  each  others'  mistakes.  Yet  clients  face
similar  problems  evaluating  such  claims  as  they  do  in  seeking  second
opinions.
In theory, to overcome  some of these problems,  a third-party reputa-
tional intermediary  not engaged in legal practice might evaluate law firms
neutrally, and sell rankings. No pure intermediary of that sort exists, how-
ever.  The  closest  substitutes  are  investment  banks,  boards,  and  venture
capitalists; they are again likely to impose some constraint on IPO lawyers,
but the constraints are likely to be  far from complete.  Bankers,  for exam-
ple, have their own lawyers, who review firm charter and bylaws and secu-
rities.  But  underwriter  lawyers  have  two  fairly  narrowly  defined
roles:  most important,  they must see  to  it that the disclosure  documents,
for which underwriters  bear potential liability, accurately describe what the
firm documents  say;  and second, they alert underwriters  to any terms that
are  likely to  have  price  effects. 95  For the  latter task,  the lawyers  rely  on
shared experience with underwriters  about what terms are "standard,"  and
generally will  only raise questions  if the firm is  adopting  some  novel  or
unusual term.  Defenses of the sort studied  in this Article are neither novel
nor unusual, and would  generally be  accepted without much discussion by
underwriters'  counsel. More  important, the  absence  of a standard defense
would not be itself a reason for an underwriter lawyer to object on behalf
of underwriters, as the omission would not plausibly have any effect on the
underwriters.  Some  underwriters'  counsel  with  M&A  proficiency  may
point out missing defenses anyway (to look good in front of the underwrit-
ers,  or to try to  edge  out company  counsel  for future business),  so  some
constraint  is  imposed  on company  counsel  in this  way. But  many  omis-
sions could easily go uncorrected.
A  final  and  more  general  set of  potential  constraints  on  company
counsel  in  an  IPO  are  legally  informed  participants  in  the  process,  who
may provide  "curbside"  advice  to  clients or company counsel  about what
defenses to adopt. These participants include  in-house  counsel,  as well  as
managers,  VCs,  directors,  investment  bankers,  or  accountants  who  have
legal training or takeover experience. Again, these participants will impose
some constraint on company counsel in the IPO process.  Still, it is unusual
for these participants to have sufficient proficiency, interest,  and responsi-
bility for monitoring pre-IPO choice  of legal terms to provide more than a
weak constraint on company counsel.
95.  SECURITIFS UNDERWRITING,  supra note 35, at 144; Jones et al., supra  note 35, at 406.
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G.  The Market  for Lawyers Versus the Market  for Bankers
Considering that the other possible  source of advice  on defenses  are
bankers,  it might be useful  to contrast the legal and banking industries  to
show why it seems plausible  that the latter would do a better job of pro-
viding good advice on a novel or difficult question. The legal industry is so
fragmented  as to suggest  serious barriers to competition;9 6 the banking in-
dustry is much more concentrated, yet not so much so as to suggest oligop-
oly.97  Thus,  competition  among  lawyers  is  likely  to  be  weaker  than
competition among bankers, with the result that the latter are likely to pro-
vide better services, on average, to their clients. Likewise, relative law firm
reputations  fluctuate,  making reputation  a less  reliable  constraint  on law-
yers, whereas banker reputation does not.9  Lawyers are generally paid flat
time  or task-based  rates;  underwriters  get paid  more  if the  IPO price  is
higher.9 9  Lawyers are still mostly local, and even today few firms are truly
national;  top  investment banks have long  served  the entire  U.S.,  and are
increasingly global.'  Law firms can be owned only by lawyers, and can-
not raise outside  equity  to  invest in technology  or growth;''  investment
banks can be owned by anyone, raise capital easily, and invest massively in
96.  Analysis of data on IPOs  from Thomson Financial Securities Data ("TFSD") shows that the
top four lead underwriters captured a 52.2% market share  1990-2000; the Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index
("HHr')  for the top twenty-five  lead underwriters  was 856.
97.  Analysis of data on IPOs from TFSD shows that the top four issuer law firms captured 13.6%
of their market  1990-2000; the  HHI  for the twenty-five  top  law  firms was  112. See also LAw  FRM
MANAGEMENT,  supra note 40, at  §  1.5.1  n.3  ("The  legal  industry is  highly  fragmented.");  Richard
Sander & Douglass Williams, Why  Are There So Many Lanyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market,
14  LAw  & Soc. INQUIRY  431, 431  (1989)  (noting that the top fifty  law firms had  8%  market share in
1986);  MICHAEL  PORTER,  CoMPErrrvE STRATEGY:  TECHNIQUES  FOR  ANALYZING  INDUSTRIES  AND
CoMPETrORS  92 (1980)  (describing market as fragmented if top 4 firms control under 40%).
98.  Analysis  of data on IPOs from TFSD shows just one investment bank appeared  in the top ten
lead  underwriters  only  once for years  1990-92,  nine banks appear  in  the top-ten  ranks  for all three
years,  and  nineteen  banks  appear  in  the top  twenty-five  ranks  all  three  years.  Among  law  firms,
fourteen law firms appear once in the top-ten ranks, only two (Skadden Arps and Shiff Hardin) appear
in the top ten all three years,  and only eight firms  appear in the top twenty-five for all three years.  See
also Richard Carter et al.,  Underwriter  Reputation, Initial  Returns, and the Long-Run Performance  of
IPO Stocks,  53 J.  FIN. 285  (1998)  (updating prestige rankings  based on tombstone and  underwriting
allotments; making few changes in ratings of top underwriters).
99.  ARKEAUER  &  SCHULTZ,  supra note  77,  at  85  (IPO  lawyers  "typically  bill  by  time");
LiprAN,  supra note 39, at 30-31  (underwriters charge fees based on percentage of  new capital raised).
100.  See, e.g.,  THm  GOLDMAN  SACHS  GROUP,  INC., PRELIMINARY  PROSPECTUs  F-22 to-23  (Apr.
12,  1999) (26% of identifiable assets and 29% of total 1998 revenues from Europe and Asia).
101.  BARTLETT,  supra note  63,  at 27-36  (observing  that  law  firms  not  publicly  owned).  On
whether public ownership  would be efficient for law firms, compare Fama & Jensen, supra note 43, at
315-17  (arguing  that agency  costs and  difficulty  of monitoring  makes  public  ownership  infeasible);
Oliver Williamson,  Organization  Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate  Control,  26 J.L. & EcoN.
351,  358 (1983)  (arguing the impossibility of separating client information from and insuring retention
of individual  lawyers makes public  ownership  infeasible); Gilson  & Mnookin, supra note 69,  at 329
n.30 (suggesting public ownership of law firms may not be inefficient).
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technology  and product development."°  Relative  to banks,  law  firms  are
egalitarian  and  inflexible,  whereas  banks  are  hierarchical  and  restructure
frequently.'03  Lawyers traditionally resisted new lines  of business; bankers
rapidly fill client demand."°4 Lawyers  are apt to resist expansion for fear of
recession and layoffs; bankers do not blink at layoffs, and banks balloon in
booms.'0  As  a result,  bankers  are  less  likely to  oversell  services  during
lean times, or to cut comers during boom times. Again, the likely result is
better services  from bankers  than lawyers, on average.  If we  had no other
evidence  and had to choose  a likely source  of inefficiency  to explain the
IPO defense puzzle, would we blame the bankers for providing bad advice
about the  IPO price effects of defenses? Or would  we blame the lawyers
for providing  bad advice  about the advantages  that takeover defenses  can
provide?
III
TRADITIONAL  COMPANY-LEVEL  THEORIES ABOUT DEFENSES
The theory described  in Part II-that law firms have sufficient auton-
omy to determine  what defenses  their clients  will adopt  at the IPO-pre-
dicts that defenses will (or will not) be adopted without  regard to whether
defenses actually benefit or harm  an adopting  company. Instead, adoption
turns  on beliefs  or  abilities  of a company's  lawyers.  Traditional  theories
about defenses, by contrast, can be described  as "company-level"  theories
that  provide  reasons  that  defenses  directly  harm  or benefit  an  adopting
company. Such theories  simply assume that defense  adoption will  follow
automatically from the "company-level"  analysis.  Company-level theories,
102.  LISA  ENDLICH,  GOLDMAN  SACHS:  THE  CULTURE  OF  SUCCESS  228  (1999)  (by  1995,
"every...  major firm  in [the investment  banking]  industry had ...  transformed themselves  into public
corporations,"  save Goldman Sachs, which went public in  1999); See GOLDMAN  SACHS,  PRELIMINARY
PROSPECTUS, supra note  100, at 82 (stating "technology is fundamental  to our overall business strategy,
with expenditures  of... $970 million in  1998 and a budget of$1.2 billion in 1999"); David Komansky,
Inheriting the Mantle, in  THE  New  FINANCIERS  146  (Charles  B.  Wendel  ed.,  1996)  (president  of
Merrill  Lynch,  stating  "technology  is  my  single  biggest  concem  [and]  our most  rapidly  growing
expense").
103.  ENDLICH,  supra note  102,  at  22-23  (contrasting  relatively  flat  management  structure  at
Goldman with "steep pyramids [at] most large banking  organizations," but noting that even  at Goldman
there were "two  layers" of top management  plus "operational  divisions");  ELLEN J.  POLLOCK,  TURKS
AND  BR  MINs:  UPHEAVAL  AT  MILBANK,  TWEED  (1990)  (describing  multiyear  effort  needed  to
change established law firms' compensation  and management structures);  BARrLErr, supra note 63,  at
34-36 (contrasting law firm management with business management).
104.  ENDLICH,  supra  note  102,  at  17  ("close  client  relations...  enables  [investment  bank
Goldman Sachs] to respond quickly to changing client needs").
105.  Id. at 222-24 (reporting layoffs  in 1983,  1987,  1991,  and  1994 of up to  10-20% of workforce
at Goldman  Sachs,  one  of world's  most  prestigious  investment  banks);  CHARLES R.  GExSST,  WALL
STREET: A  HISrORY  353-67  (1997)  (after  1987  market  crash,  investment  banks  contracted  and
unemployment  increased;  "Wall  Street  ...  still  susceptible  to  severe  boom  and bust  cycles").  For
evidence  on  slow  growth  among  law  firms,  even  during  the  boom  years  of the  1990s,  see  text
accompanying supra notes  181-183.
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in other words,  assume  that once the harms  and benefits of defenses  are
calculated,  the  sum will  straightforwardly  determine  whether  a company
will  adopt defenses.  If the harm  is greater  than the benefit,  defenses  are
bad, and will  not be adopted;  if the benefit is greater  than the harm,  de-
fenses  are  good,  and  will be adopted.  These  company-level  theories will
provide  the basis for the alternative  hypotheses  to be tested in Part  IV, in
competition with the theory developed in Part II.
A.  Theories in Which Takeover Defenses Are All Good or  All Bad
Hostile takeovers  have stimulated  a  large amount  of legal  and eco-
nomic  scholarship  over the past twenty years, 06 and defenses have stimu-
lated a striking split of opinion between legal academics,  on the one hand,
and practicing  lawyers, judges,  and legislators,  on the  other. Exceptions
exist,  but  academics  have  generally  opposed  defenses,  and  practitioner-
commentators  have  generally  supported  them.  To  be  sure,  positions  on
both sides  have been more  moderate  than merely  noting  the  split might
suggest:  no  practitioner  endorses  all  defenses,  regardless  of the  circum-
stances," 0 7 and few  academics  oppose all defenses. 1 08 Still, the split is viv-
idly illustrated by the policy positions articulated at the outset of the 1980s
by  a leading takeover  lawyer-Martin  Lipton,  a founder  of the takeover
specialist  law firm of Wachtell  Lipton Rosen & Katz-and two prominent
legal academics-Judge Frank Easterbrook and Dean Daniel Fischel of the
University  of  Chicago  Law  School.  Writing  from  inside  "the  target's
boardroom,"  Lipton  argued  the  ordinary  business judgment  rule  should
apply to takeover defenses,  in which case they would normally be upheld,
absent  evidence  of gross  negligence  or self-dealing.0 9  Easterbrook  and
Fischel took a diametrically opposed position, arguing that directors should
respond passively to takeover bids and that courts should presume defenses
illegal."0
Each  side's  position  on  defenses  was  a  function  of their  views  on
takeovers.  Lipton argued that hostile bids are disruptive and costly for tar-
gets, and that coercive bids harm shareholder interests. In addition, Lipton
argued that bids often exploit  stock market mispricing, that asset bust-ups
106.  See Roberta  Romano, A  Guide to Takeovers:  Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9  YALE J.
ON  REG.  119  (1992)  (reviewing  literature  of  1980s);  Coates,  Critique, supra note  23  (surveying
empirical evidence from  1980s and 1990s).
107.  E.g.,  Martin Lipton & David A. Katz, Teamsters Union Proposes  Alternative to Rights Plan,
Client Memorandum  (Dec.  21,  1995)  (criticizing  proposed  "blooming  preferred"  on  grounds  that it
would "disenfranchise  many shareholders  and impair the liquidity of a company's common  equity").
See also Martin Lipton, Corporate  Governance in the Age ofFinance  Corporatism,  136 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 59-69  (1987)  (proposing  as  part  of  reform  package  a  prohibition  on  staggered  boards  and
supermajority vote requirements).
108.  See infra Part III.B.
109.  Lipton, supra  note 10, at 120-24.
110.  Easterbrook & Fischel,  supra note 9, at 1194-1203.
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that follow takeovers  cause unnecessary  and socially harmful  layoffs,  and
that  threat  of  bids  reduces  investment  in  good  long-run  projects."'
Easterbrook and Fischel  argued that takeovers  are generally good because
they produce  immediate  profits  for target  shareholders,  transfer assets  to
those  who value them  most,  and  improve  social  welfare." 2  Most  impor-
tantly,  threat  of bids  reduces  the  agency  costs  between  shareholders  and
managers, costs exacerbated by collective action problems facing dispersed
shareholders  of large public companies." 3  The  exacerbation  in company-
level agency costs theoretically  caused by defenses remains at the center of
the  legal  and economic  policy debates  on  takeovers,  defenses,  and  their
regulation.
By  themselves  neither Lipton's nor  Easterbrook  and  Fischel's  argu-
ments provide  much  help  in understanding  why  companies  would adopt
varying numbers  and types of takeover defenses at the IPO stage.  Standing
alone,  Lipton's  position  would  suggest  all  companies  should  adopt  de-
fenses prior to an IPO,  and Easterbrook and Fischel's position would sug-
gest that no firm should adopt a defense;  yet in reality many do and many
do not.'  To explain variation in pre-IPO  defenses,  more fine-grained the-
ory is needed.
B.  Company-Level Theories Justifying Some Defenses
Takeover defenses have received partial support from legal commen-
tators such as Bebchuk,1 5 Gilson,"6 and Coffee," 7 and economists  such  as
Stein,"'  Shleifer  and  Summers,"9   and  (implicitly)  Demsetz20   and
111.  Lipton, supra note  10, at  120-24.
112.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 1168-74.
113.  Id.
114.  See infra Part IV. See also Daines  & Klausner, supra note  8, at 96 tbl.2; Field, supra note 8,
at 26.  The mismatch between  first-generation theory and data is unsurprising, since both theories  were
less  positive  explanations  of  firm  behavior  at the  IPO  stage  than  normative  positions  (albeit  with
embedded positive claims) that were taken up to influence legal policy on midstream defenses.
115.  Lucian  A.  Bebchuk,  Toward  Undistorted Choice  and Equal  Treatment in  Corporate
Takeovers, 98  H~av.  L.  REV.  1693  (1985)  [hereinafter  Bebchuk,  Undistorted Choice]; Lucian  A.
Bebchuk  & Lars Stole,  Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to  Under-or Overinvestment in  Long-Term
Pojects, 48  J.  FIN.  719  (1993);  LUciAN  A.  BEBCHUK,  A RENT-PROTECTION  THEORY  OF  CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP  AND  CONTROL  (Harvard  Law  School  Working  Paper  No.  260,  1999)  [hereinafter
BEBCHUK,  CORPORATE  OWNERSHIP].
116.  Ronald Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure  Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35
STAN.  L. REv.  51  (1982).
117.  John  Coffee,  Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical  Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM.  L. REv.  1145  (1984).
118.  Jeremy  Stein, Efficient  Capital  Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic  Corporate
Behavior, 104  Q.J. ECON.  655 (1989);  Jeremy  Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial  Myopia, 96 J.
POL.  ECON.  61  (1988).
119.  Andrei  Shleifer  &  Lawrence  H.  Summers,  Breach of  Trust  in  Hostile  Takeovers,  in
CORPORATE  TAKEOVERS:  CAUSES  AND  CONSEQUENCES  33  (Alan  J.  Auerbach  ed.,  1988)  (takeovers
may  facilitate  breach  of implicit contracts  to protect  investments  in firm-specific  human  capital,  and
permit wealth transfers from employees to bidders).
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Grossman  and  Hart.1 2
1  Most  commentators  have  explicitly  or  implicitly
acknowledged  that defenses  can harm shareholders  by  increasing  agency
costs, but, they have argued defenses may also play a valuable role after a
bid has emerged (ex post justifications), and may also have valuable effects
in anticipation of bids (ex ante justifications). Such benefits may be antici-
pated at the time of an  IPO, and may thus explain the adoption of defenses.
1.  Ex post Theories: Bargaining  Power
Once a bid has come in, defenses may increase target shareholder wel-
fare by solving collective  action  problems, impeding  coercive bid tactics,
enabling more  bid competition,  and allowing  target boards to act as  bar-
gaining  agents for target shareholders  and thus to extract  a larger share  of
the gains that successful  bids generate. 22  Target shareholders  are typically
dispersed  and  rendered  largely  passive  by  collective  action  problems."z
Managers  who are  loyal,  or whose incentives  to entrench themselves  are
constrained  (by  some  combination  of stock  compensation,  independent
directors,  blockholders,  and capital  and labor markets),  can  in theory use
delay  imposed  by  defenses  (and  the  threat  of  pursuing  alternative
120.  Harold Demsetz,  The Structure of  Ownership and the Theory of  the Firm,  26 J.L. & ECON.
375  (1983).  Demsetz focused not  on defenses but ownership structure,  such as the decision by a pre-
IPO  shareholder  to  retain  a  majority of voting  stock,  and  argued  that  ownership  structure  is  "an
endogenous outcome of  a maximizing process in which more is at stake than just accommodating to the
shirking [agency cost] problem."  Id. at 377.  See also Harold Demsetz & Kenneth  Lehn,  The Structure
Of Corporate  Ownership:  Causes And  Consequences,  93 J.  POL.  EcON.  1155  (1985)  (focusing  on
ownership structure as endogenous to firm characteristics).
121.  Grossman & Hart develop a  model in which  dual class capital  structures are endogenous to
private benefits of control  and  liquidity constraints,  among other things. Sanford Grossman  & Oliver
Hart,  One  Share-One  Vote  and  the  Market for Corporate  Control,  20  J.  FIN.  ECON.  175  (1988).
Bebchuk suggests  defenses can be a weaker form of concentrated ownership  structure,  and should be
analyzed  as solving  a  general  optimization  problem  involving  more than  minimizing  agency  costs.
BEBCHUK,  CopoRATE OWNERsmp, supra note 115, at 31-36.
122.  Bebchuk,  Undistorted  Choice,  supra  note  115;  Lucian  A.  Bebchuk,  The  Pressure  to
Tender:  An  Analysis  and  a  Proposed  Remedy,  12  DEL.  J.  CoRP.  L.  911,  917-31  (1987);  Elazar
Berkovitch  &  Naveen  Khanna,  How  Target  Shareholders  Benefit from  Value-Reducing  Defensive
Strategies  in  Takeovers,  45 J.  FIN.  137,  137  (1990);  Gilson,  supra  note  116,  at  51;  Rene  Stulz,
Managerial Discretion  and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FnI. ECON.  3 (1990);  Harry DeAngelo &
Edward  M. Rice, Antitakeover  Charter  Amendments and Shareholder Wealth,  11  J.  FIN.  ECON.  329
(1983);  Jonathan R. Macey,  The Legality and Utility of  the Shareholder Rights Bylaw, 26 HoFSTRA  L.
REv. 835, 841-53 (1998).
123.  Hostile bids may also create a "pressure  to tender," which can (in theory) cause  shareholders
to accept a  bid below their private valuation  of the target, and bidders can  increase  that pressure  by
using two-tier bid structures, as infamously done by T. Boone  Pickens in the 1980s. See Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,  493 A.2d 946 (Del.  1985). But see Robert Comment & Gregg Jarrell,  Two-Tier
and  Negotiated Offers:  The Imprisonment of  the Free-Riding Shareholder, 9 J. FIN. ECON.  283 (1987)
(blended value of two-tier bids is equivalent to premiums  in any-or-all bids, aggregating  friendly and
hostile in each case). "White knights" (that is, bidders other than the initial hostile bidder) may also be
willing to pay more than a given hostile bidder, but may need time to investigate the target or complete
financing, and defenses may buy that time, allowing target shareholders to increase their gains from the
sale of  the target. Coates, Index, supra  note 26.
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transactions) to negotiate for a higher price from a hostile bidder on behalf
of target shareholders.'24 These ex post justifications, referred to henceforth
collectively  as the  "bargaining  power theory"  for  brevity,  could  explain
why some firms adopt defenses before going public.'
2.  Ex ante Theories: Myopia and Private  Benefits of Control
Distinct from bargaining power theory are theories built  on different
types  of market failure that propose benefits that defenses may achieve by
deterring bids.'26 First and prominent in the late  1980s were concerns about
the effects of uncertainty and asymmetric information on stock market effi-
ciency.'27 Stock market efficiency may be impaired either for all companies
124.  Another ex post justification  is that bids are disruptive and  costly, and may  encourage rent-
seeking, and pills may be less harmfiil than either transactional  defenses that target managers might use
if pills were  banned  or the  heavy  court  oversight that  might  be  necessary  to  draw the line  between
harmful  and  beneficial  transactions  that could  function as defenses.  Atreya  Chakraborty &  Richard
Arnott, Takeover Defenses and Dilution: A  Welfare Analysis (July 1997)  (Working Paper, on file with
author).
125.  Auction  opponents  point  out that increasing  target shareholder  gains at the  expense  of the
bidder is a pure transfer-bidders  lose what targets gain-and so (in a static utilitarian  framework) has
no welfare consequences.  Worse, argues  Alan Schwartz, reducing  a bidder's gains  ex post reduces the
number of bids ex ante, and so  increases agency costs. Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender
Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON.  & ORG.  271  (1986).  See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note  9;  Frank
Easterbrook  &  Daniel Fischel,  Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholder  Welfare, 36 Bus.
LAw.  1733 (1981). Auction justifiers reply that increasing target shareholder returns lowers the cost of
capital and produces indirect social gains, and that bidder-to-target-shareholder  transfers will not have a
significant effect on bid incidence, because bidder profits from prebid toeholds often outweigh  costs of
bid search and  commencement.  Bebchuk,  Undistorted Choice, supra note  115.  In addition, increasing
evidence  suggests  that  bidders  often  if  not  usually  overpay,  MARK  S1ROWER,  THE  SYNERGY
TRAP:  How COMPANIEs  LOSE  THE ACQUIsrrloN  GAME  147 tbl.A.l  (1997),  due to hubris, the winner's
curse, or buy-side agency problems.  Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59
J. Bus.  197 (1986);  RICHARD  THALER,  THE WINNER'S  CURSE  50-62 (1992);  Bernard  S.  Black, Bidder
Overpayment  in  Takeovers,  41  STAN.  L.  REv.  597,  624-26  (1989);  Randall  Morck  et  al.,  Do
Managerial  Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions, 45 J. FIN.  31  (1990).  Bids  may also be induced by the
prospect  of monopoly  rents  (despite antitrust  laws),  or  by distortions  arising from  tax  law.  Steven
Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value, 44 J. FIN.  611  (1989).  Thus, it
is not certain whether increasing the number of bids will produce social gains.
126.  Defenses may  also facilitate  relations between  companies and  factor markets  (also known as
"nonshareholder  constituencies")  where  complete  contracts  are  infeasible  or  costly.  Managers,
employees, creditors, customers, and suppliers make company-specific  investments-in  human capital
(managers and employees),  financial capital (creditors), or fixed assets (suppliers and customers)-that
are not fully protected by explicit  (legally enforceable) contracts. E.g.,  Shleifer & Summers, supra note
119; Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A  Team Production Theory of Corporate  Law, 85 VA.  L. REV. 247
(1999),  reprinted in 24  J.  CORP.  L.  751  (1999);  John  Coffee,  Stockholders  Versus Managers: The
Strain in  the  Corporate Web,  85  MICH.  L.  REv.  1 (1986);  Ronald  Giammarino  et al,,  Defensive
Mechanisms and Managerial Discretion, 52  J.  FIN.  1467  (1997).  Adequate  empirical  proxies  for
company-specific  capital  are  hard  to  identify,  and  none  seem  capable  of distinguishing  defenses
adopted to protect company-specific  capital from defenses adopted to protect private benefits. Thus, the
company-specific  capital theory  seem nontestable,  and  should perhaps  be  viewed  as  a  more general
version of a private benefits theory.
127.  Stein,  Efficient  Capital Markets, supra note  118,  at 454-59.  Even  if stock  markets  are
"informationally  efficient,"  meaning  that investors  cannot  on  average  outguess  market prices  using
public information, they may not do a good "fundamental"  job of pricing target companies. See Jeffrey
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by market-wide  distortions caused by fads, bubbles, and informational cas-
cades, or for individual companies engaged in difficult-to-value projects. In
some instances,  mispricing  can be corrected  only if companies  make  dis-
closures  that would harm the firm (for example,  by giving away competi-
tively  sensitive  information).  If mispricing  and  myopia  are  substantial,
apparent  increases in shareholder wealth from premium takeover bids may
be overstated:  at best bids would sometimes represent costly rent-seeking,
and at worst apparent premiums  could mask inefficient transfers of value
from target shareholders  to bidders. Takeover defenses can reduce the risk
that opportunistic  bids  at prices  below target  companies'  true  value will
succeed  or even be made.  Alternatively, to ward off bids, target managers
may  maximize  short-term share  prices, reducing  long-run  value by fore-
going hard-to-value projects. 2  Bebchuk  and Stole formally  show that in
companies  where  the  level  of investment  in  research  and  development
("R&D")  or capital expenditures  ("capex")  is unverifiable,  some net pres-
ent value projects will not be undertaken; by contrast, in companies where
the productivity  of R&D-capex  is unverifiable,  some  negative net present
value projects may be pursued.12 9  Defenses can  reduce pressure  on target
managers to maintain the highest possible  short-term share price, and thus
improve long-run performance.
A  second  ex  ante  theory  explaining takeover  defenses,  one  that re-
ceived little attention in debates of the 1980s, takes two distinct forms, both
focusing on benefits that flow from controlling  a company. First are theo-
ries in which pre-IPO  shareholders  simply value control at an idiosyncrati-
cally  high  level. 3  Tastes  for  control  of  a  company  may  vary:
entrepreneurs  may place  special value  on companies  they create, and long
association  can create attachments  making  control, with assurance of con-
tinued association, uniquely valuable to an individual.  Companies that in-
N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and Securities  Research, 60
N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  761,  786-97  (1985);  Donald  L. Langevoort,  Theories, Assumptions and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA.  L. REv. 851,  912-20  (1992);  Stephen F. LeRoy,
Efficient Capital  Markets and Martingales,  27 J. EcON.  Lrr.  1583  (1989);  William K.S. Wang, Some
Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAviS  L. REv. 341,375 (1986).
128.  Stein,  Takeover  Threats, supra  note  118,  at  62.  See  also  Charles  R.  Knoeber,  Golden
Parachutes, Shark  Repellents, and Hostile  Tender  Offers,  76  AMER.  ECON.  REv.  155  (1986).
Shareholders  that are themselves firms (for example, mutual finds) may also be imperfectly monitored
by their own shareholders,  and may be managed for short-term profits rather than portfolio firm value.
129.  Bebchuk & Stole, supra note 115.
130.  Neoclassical  economic  theory  models  companies  as  anonymous  black-box  production
functions, valued solely for their ability to generate wealth,  which, assuming "complete markets,"  can
be used to buy whatever shareholders  desire. ANDREtJ  MAS-CoLELL ET  AL.,  MICROECONoMIc  THEORY
153-57  (1995)  (stating that traditional microeconomic theory views firm "merely as a  'black box,'  able
to transform inputs into outputs," but noting that "If prices...  depend on the production of the firm, the
objective  of the  owners  may  depend  on  their tastes  as owners").  Thus,  idiosyncratic  valuation  of
companies  is  absent.  Harold  Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:  Another  Viewpoint,  11  J.L.  &
EcoN.  1 (1969).  But complete  markets do  not exist,  and consumers  with enough  wealth may value
companies differently.
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volve multiple generations of a family (as with Ford Motor) may also make
control a unique good for members of that family.
Second are theories that stress the wedge that usually exists  between
the value of a firm to passive  shareholders  and the value of control of the
firm to a controlling shareholder. 3'  Even if Arthur Sulzberger, the control-
ling shareholder of the New  York Times, places  no idiosyncratic  value  on
being the one person with authority over the content of the paper, whatever
value that authority has  cannot feasibly be shared with outside sharehold-
ers.
132 Ownership of sports teams, entertainment companies, vineyards,  and
cigar companies  all plausibly offer private  benefits  that are  (second-best)
efficient for controllers to retain and harvest, rather than to attempt to share
or forego. 13 3
In  either  version  of private  benefits  theory,  a  controller  will  be  in-
clined to retain a "control  lock" (keep control wholly "noncontestable")  by
selling less than 50%  of the common stock, or by splitting votes and own-
ership  in  a  dual-class  or pyramidal  structure.'34  This  is  especially  likely
where private benefits are large relative to shared benefits. But as Bebchuk
notes, at a lower level of private benefits,  a controller may  do best by al-
lowing takeover bids but making them more costly by adopting defenses.'35
C.  Reconciling Traditional  Theories with Variation in Defenses
By their terms, the ex ante justifications just discussed apply more to
some companies  than to others.  Private benefits  of control  vary by owner
and  company,  and  although  market-wide  myopia  might  make  some  de-
fenses  generally optimal, the difficulty of valuing  a firm using public  in-
formation  is  likely  to  vary  by  industry,  life-cycle  stage,  and  business
strategy. In either case, defenses will (all else equal) be more valuable  for
some companies than for others.
131.  See John  C.  Coates  IV,  "Fair Value"  as  a Default Rule of Corporate Law:  Minority
Discounts  in Conflict Transactions,  147  U. PA. L. REv.  1251,  1273-77 (1999).
132.  In many, perhaps most cases,  private benefits taken from a  company by a controller reduce
by an equal or greater amount the "shared  benefits"  of ownership (dividends, resale value, liquidation
payments),  and  allowing  private  benefits  to  be  harvested  is  thus  often  inefficient  ex  ante,  and
companies  have an incentive  to make credible  commitments to minimize them. Id. at  1313-27. But at
times, the costs to pre-IPO owner-managers  of committing not to harvest private benefits will outweigh
gains  from  doing so.  BEBCHUK,  CORPORATE  OWNERSHIP,  supra note  115,  at 31-36;  Demsetz, supra
note  120, at 377.
133.  See Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 120,  at 378-79.
134.  BEBCHUK,  CORPORATE  OWNERSHIP,  supra note  115,  at 31-36;  see also Grossman  & Hart,
supra note  121,  at  179-80;  Milton Harris & Artur  Raviv,  The Design of Securities, 24 J.  FIN. EcoN.
255, 266-67 (1989).
135.  BEBCHUK,  CORPORATE  OWNERSHIP,  supra note  115,  at 31-36.  For example,  a  control  lock
may exacerbate  agency costs more than its expected value in protecting private benefits. Alternatively,
wealth and  liquidity constraints may be large  enough to prevent  a controller from pursuing profitable
opportunities  requiring outside capital  unless she is willing to go public without a control lock, but not
so large as to prevent the controller from making takeovers difficult by adopting defenses.
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On their face, by contrast,  ex post justifications  apply to  all compa-
nies:  if more bargaining power provides a net benefit,  defenses  should be
useful  for all firms.  However, when  one  considers  the negative  effect of
defenses  on value, the expected  increase in agency costs caused by reduc-
ing the threat of takeover,  the empirical  picture  is  more  complicated.  If
agency costs vary among companies, as they probably do, then that varia-
tion combined with the bargaining power theory, could make it optimal for
some companies and not others to adopt defenses.  Likewise, if the number
or size of premium  bids varies by firm or industry in a predictable  way,
then different  companies could make  different assessments  of the net cost
or benefit of defenses on bid incidence and outcomes. Thus, ex post justifi-
cations, too, predict that (all else equal) a subset of companies  (those with
high  agency  costs  or little  need for bargaining power) will  be better off
adopting fewer defenses.
IV
TESTING THEORIES OF DEFENSES AT THE IPO STAGE
Together,  Parts  II and III  suggest a number of predictions  about  the
types  of variables  that  should  correlate  with the  choice  of takeover  de-
fenses  by  IPO  companies.  Table  1 collects  the  explanatory  and  control
variables to be tested, the expected  effect in the level  of defenses  adopted
(that  is,  the sign of the coefficient  predicted by the hypotheses  to which
they relate), and summarizes the results obtained in the multivariate regres-
sion  described in Part IV.I. The remainder of Part IV will specify the hy-
potheses that will be tested, define and explain the variables to be used  in
the tests, describe the sample and data sources, and then present results.
2001] 1333CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
TABLE  I
THEORIES,  VARIABLES TESTED,  PREDICTED SIGNS,  AND  RESULTS
Theory  2S
Variable
M&A  +  +
experience
of law firm
Law firm  +/-  +l-
identity
Law firm  +1-  +l-
location
Law firm  +]-  +-
size
Recent  +  +
industry-level
M&A activity
Delaware  +  +
company
Company/  +  - +
offer size
Company  +  +  +
age
Venture capital  +  - - +
backing
Development  - +
stage
Unit
offering
Underwriter  +  +]-  +
quality
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TABLE 1  (CONT'D)
THEoIuEs,  VARIABLES  TESTED, PREDICTED  SIGNS, AND  RESULTS
CO)  I  a
Theory  CD~  ~
Variable
Free cash flow  ns
Debt / assets  +  -ns
ROE post-IPO  -- _ns
Industry  "_-/+-  +/-  +-- +/-  ns
Dual class  - ns
Stock sold by  - - ns
pre-IPO
shareholders
in IPO
Number of  ns
shareholders
R&D  intensity  +  ns
(R&D/assets)
Capital ex /  +  ns
assets
Property, plant  ns
and equipment
CEO founder  +  +
CEO tenure  +  ns
Stock sold by  - ns
CEO in IPO
Company  +  +  for
named after  dual
owner  class
I  only
Family  +  +  for
ownership  dual
class
I  only
Note:  ns = not statistically significant
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A.  Law Firm Hypotheses
1.  Takeover Proficiency
Most  straightforwardly,  takeover  defense  adoption  should  correlate
with whether  corporate  counsels  have  takeover  proficiency.  (This  is true
whether  defenses  are  generally  good  or  bad  for  pre-IPO  owner-
managers:  if good, the correlation should be positive; if bad, negative.)  As
noted  in Part  II, many  firms  with takeover proficiency  do  not  have  IPO
proficiency, and vice versa. However, some firms have significant business
in each practice area;  to the extent these  firms show up in an IPO sample,
the companies  they  advise should generally exhibit  higher levels of take-
over defense.
Public rankings of lawyer takeover proficiency per se do not exist.'36
Thus,  two  new  measures  of takeover- or  merger-related  proficiency  at  a
given law firm were constructed for this Article. First, the number of M&A
transactions  on which a given  law firm  is primary  deal  counsel to  one  of
the parties should provide a good measure of M&A proficiency. M&A and
takeover proficiency  do not perfectly coincide.  The vast majority of M&A
transactions involve privately held companies  invulnerable to hostile take-
over bids,  so  lawyers  who specialize  in M&A  can have flourishing  prac-
tices  without  ever  working  on  hostile  bids.  Still,  M&A  and  takeover
proficiency overlap, and the vast majority of the dollars  involved in M&A
are concentrated  in public  company  deals that involve  some hostile  take-
over risk. M&A lawyers (as with many people) tend to be more attracted to
dollars than particular types of work.
A second  measure  of takeover proficiency  is  to  index  law firms  by
their takeover-related litigation experience. Takeovers, after all, are heavily
litigated, and although court rulings and newspaper reports publicize many
aspects  of such cases, there is no better way to gain takeover-related legal
experience  than to fight a takeover battle. Because  of the speed  and  com-
plexity of such lawsuits, and in contrast to the compartmentalized  way that
lawyers  normally  function,  takeover  law  proficiency  is not  compartmen-
talized within litigation departments of M&A law firms;  corporate lawyers
typically work in close company with litigators during the lawsuits,  devel-
oping  litigation  and deal  strategy together,  going to court,  and  critiquing
briefs  and  motion  papers.  Spillover  effects,  in  other  words,  should  be
common  between  takeover  litigation  and  deal  advisory  proficiency.  If a
given law  firm is frequently named as counsel in cases involving takeover
136.  Rankings of firms active  in M&A existed  in the early  1990s, but  only for top  twenty M&A
firms in a given year. In contrast to the investment bank pecking order, which is consistent year to year,
particularly  within client industries,  fewer than ten law firms  appear in the top twenty each year. Thus,
the correlation  coefficient  between  MASDC (see  Appendix C for a  definition) and the M&A  Top  20
rankings for 1990  from Corporate  ControlAlert  is modest (.20); if M&A Top  20 rankings are replaced
with a dummy variable set to one if a firm appears in the top twenty, the coefficient rises to .76.
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or M&A law,  one would expect, all else equal,  the firm to develop an ex-
pertise in advising clients on that law.
2.  Law Firm Identity
To the extent law firms  rely on boilerplate developed  internally,  one
should expect the identity of the IPO companies'  corporate counsels to cor-
relate with the  level of takeover defenses  adopted by those companies. To
the extent  such firms also have takeover proficiency, the direction of the
correlation is clearly positive, but for firms without (much) proficiency, the
direction of the correlation is less clear:  it may be that some firms without
proficiency  are self-conscious about this fact, and borrow boilerplate from
firms  with takeover  proficiency  (meaning  a  positive  relationship  should
show up); other firms may not only lack takeover proficiency, but may out
of ignorance, inattention,  or hubris  not realize  this fact, and simply main-
tain  internal  boilerplate  with  few  defenses  (causing  a  negative  relation-
ship).  Further complicating  matters is  the fact that few  law firms  have  a
large enough market share of the IPO advisory business for firm-level cor-
relations  to  show up  at  statistically  significant  levels  for law  firms  as  a
whole.  If exceptions  exist,  they  are  likely  to  be  very  large  firms  like
Skadden  Arps  and firms  prominently  associated with  start-up  companies
like Wilson Sonsini in Silicon Valley and Hale & Dorr in Boston.
3.  Law Firm Location
Law  firms  relying  on borrowed  boilerplate  are  also  likely to exhibit
geographic correlations.'37 Law firms that are closer to each other in physi-
cal  proximity  are  more  likely  to  share  information,  either  formally  (by
sharing documents  or  experiences),  or by lateral  hiring,  or by conscious
borrowing  from large,  locally prominent law firms with high IPO  market
shares  (Silicon  Valley  law  firms  are  likely  to  look  to  Wilson  Sonsini;
smaller New York law firms are likely to look to Skadden Arps or Sullivan
& Cromwell) or via common  counterparties  (particularly  accountants, in-
vestment  bankers,  or VCs). In any event,  more  geographically proximate
137.  Since New York law firms are more numerous and may be more diverse in size and nature  of
practice,  geographic  effects might  be less pronounced  for  lawyers  based  in New  York.  New  York
retains the largest share of large  firms, large  firm revenue, and  large firm profit, see The AmLaw  100
Profits  Per Lanyer,  By  City,  Am.  LA,,w., July  1999, at 123-25  (breaking down nation's largest 100 law
firms by headquarters  ("HQ") location), but its share of large  firms has fallen  from more than half to
less than a quarter since the 1960s, see GALANEwrF  & PALAY,  supra  note 52, at 48. New York also has
very  small  generalist  law  firms  representing  the  "other  hemisphere"  of the  profession  (individual
clients), making  it as or more diverse on size  and practice dimensions than other locales.  In race and
gender diversity, however, it lags:  in a 500+  firm sample  1980-90,  New York had fewer women and
minority lawyers, both associates and partners, than Chicago, Los Angeles, or the District of Columbia.
Elizabeth  Chambliss, New Partners with Power? Organizational  Determinants  of  Law Firm Integration
70 (1992)  (unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file with author).
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law firms are more likely to think of one another as salient sources of pub-
lic company boilerplate.'38
Geographic  concentrations  of  law  firms  are  likely  when  economic
activity  is geographically  concentrated,  and  economic concentrations  may
be  sustained  or  stimulated  by  geographically  concentrated  legal  prac-
tices.'39  In the  1980s,  "almost half of [Silicon Valley's]  venture capitalists
maintain[ed]  offices  in  a  single  office  building  in Menlo  Park."'40  Law
firms were, as late as  1960, exclusively local.'4' Ample  anecdotal evidence
exists of high-profile (and presumably well-regarded  and competent)  New
York  law  firms  and  investment  banks  establishing  offices  in  Silicon
Valley, Moscow, Prague,  London, and other remote locations in an attempt
to build practices that they had failed to build from their home locations.'42
The  fact that such  efforts  are  made  is  evidence  that physical  proximity
matters, notwithstanding the Internet and the fax.
Once established,'43  economic concentrations will tend to generate  (or
be  sustained  by)  law  firm networks  that share  information  and  develop
138.  Suchman, supra note 52, at 106, quotes a junior partner at a Silicon Valley  law firm as saying
"other  Silicon Valley  law  firms.  ..  often [have] adopted our forms or vice versa."  In addition to direct
borrowing,  geographically  proximate  firms may  have similar clients  with  similar needs,  but resulting
contract or defense similarity would then be caused by client type or contracting need and not law firms
themselves.  Controls  for  geographic  location,  industry,  size,  and  so  on,  of clients  are  included  in
multivariate models  tested in Part IV.
139.  Recent  work contrasts Silicon Valley and Boston's high-tech  community on  Route  128.  See
Ronald  J.  Gilson,  The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon  Valley,
Route  128  and  Covenants Not  to  Compete,  74  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  575,  580-86  (1999)  (reviewing
literature);  ANNALEE SAXENIAN,  REGIONAL  ADVANTAGE  1-9  (1994) (contrasting  adaptation of Silicon
Valley  firms  to  international  competition  in  1980s  with  unsuccessful  efforts  by  Route  128  firms;
arguing  divergence  caused  by  "differences  in  productive  organization,"  such  as  density  of  social
networks, openness of labor markets, and  degrees of specialization,  hierarchy and secrecy, that affect
rate of "collective learning and flexible adjustment ...  experimentation and entrepreneurship").
140.  SucHMaNr,  supra note 52, at 24,  29. See also WILLIAM  D. BYGRAVE  & JEFFRY  A. TIMMONS,
VENTURE  CAPITAL  AT THE  CROSSROADS 240  (1992)  (noting  concentration  of  VC  funds  in  Silicon
Valley).
141.  See  GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra note  52, at 23,  47  ("In  1960  big  law  firms  were  clearly
identified with a specific  locality, as they had been since the origin of the big firm.").
142.  Such branches  could  be established by new offices or by merging with  existing firms in the
new  locale. Id. at 47 ("by  1980, of the  100  largest  firms,  87  had  branches");  Karen  Dillon,  Brand
Names at the Brink, AM.  LAW.  (May  1995), at 5  (reporting  that  12%  of Sullivan & Cromwell  lawyers
work in six foreign offices;  10%  of Davis Polk  lawyers work in five foreign  offices);  TROTtER,  supra
note 44,  at 204 ("Cravath ...  is the only law firm among the sixty largest  in the U.S. with only one U.S.
office").  Even law firms as close to Silicon Valley as  San Francisco  found it necessary  to open  offices
in Palo  Alto to compete  with Wilson  Sonsini  and  other law firms  in  Santa Clara  County. SucwmAN,
supra note 52,  at 35,  120-21  (quoting interview  subject,  a  lawyer  at  a  Palo  Alto  office  of a  San
Francisco  law firm, as saying  "here,  in  1991,  the guys  in San  Francisco  still didn't understand  how  a
business deal is struck in the Valley").
143.  Silicon Valley's  growth, fueled by proximity and  interchange  with Stanford University, was
famously rapid:  "As  recently as  1950,  [Silicon  Valley]  ...  touted  itself...  as  'the  Prune  Capital  of
America,"'  SucHmA  supra note  52,  at 6.  Less  known  are  roles  played  by  (1)  the Department  of
Defense,  NASA,  and  Lockheed,  see EVER=TT  M.  ROGERS  & JUDITH  K.  LARSEN,  SILICON  VALLEY
FEVER:  GROWrH  OF  HIGH-TECHNOLOGY  CULTURE  39,  269  (1984);  SAXENIAN,  supra note  139,  at
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network-specific  norms and standard practices. In the VC financing stage,
for example,  Silicon Valley lawyers  use "coolde  cutter"  forms into which
they  "cram"  deals that  do not completely  fit.t"  Geographically  standard-
ized arrangements  concentrate activity still further:  Silicon Valley lawyers
interviewed by Suchman, for example,  contrasted  the small amount of ar-
gument  or  negotiation  with  one  another  over  venture  capital  finance
agreements with the way that "lawyers  in other parts of the country ...  go
crazy over a lot of stuff that would just draw a yawn from a Silicon Valley
lawyer." ' 4  Geographically  standardized  practices  may  also  work  to
"creat[e]  socially  constructed  barriers  to  entry  that  prevent  [nonlocal]
lawyers ...  from effectively competing for [local] business."'46 Geographi-
cally proximate  law firms  will tend to think of other local  firms as their
most dangerous  competitors,  and thus  be more  interested  in keeping  up
with what the others are doing. The result is that (perceived) best practices
will be more readily copied within geographic localities.
4.  Law Firm Size'47
Since larger law firms have broader clienteles  and are capable of sup-
porting  more  intensively  specialized  lawyers,'  they  should  have  more
takeover proficiency for IPO lawyers to draw upon. Even if sharing of pro-
ficiency  within  firms  is  difficult,  it seems  likely to  be  less  difficult than
sharing  proficiency  between  firms,  on  average.  Thus,  larger  law  firms
should tend to include more defenses,  on average.
At very small  levels (one-to ten-person law  firms), smaller law firms
may  exhibit  more  consistency  in  the  defenses  their  clients  adopt  than
within larger law firms, simply because the same people will handle all of a
firm's deals,  and will be likely use their own deals  as precedent.  Beyond
that relatively  small size,  however, larger law firms  as a class  should ex-
hibit more  correlations  within  themselves  than  smaller  firms  as  a  class,
20-27 &  178  n.38  (1994)  (positing two reasons  for Silicon  Valley's  growth:  (1)  defense  and NASA
contracts,  with  Lockheed  alone  employing  over  12,000  in  Santa  Clara  County  by
1964;  (2)  interchange  of biotech  specialists  with  University  of California  at  San  Francisco),  see
SucwaANi,  supra note 52, at 20; and  (3)  federal tax,  pension and securities  legislation that stimulated
VC  funds in Silicon  Valley, see BYGRAVE  & TIMONS,  supra note  140,  at 24-66  (describing  legal
changes  1978-81,  rising  market  share  1978-88  of VC  limited partnership  funds,  favored in  Silicon
Valley, relative to small business investment corporations).
144.  SucHmAN,  supra  note 52, at 99-106.
145.  Mark  C.  Suchman  &  Mia  L.  Cahill,  The  Hired Gun as  Facilitator:  Lawyers  and the
Suppression of  Business Disputes in the Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. INQuiRY 679, 701-02 (1996).
146.  Bernstein, supra note 57, at 253.
147.  On the rapid  growth of law firms through 1990,  see  GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra note  52, at
40-46 (observing that 100+ lawyer firms  grew from less than  12 in 1960 to 251  in  1986; largest firms
grew faster than the legal profession as a whole; "market  share of the fifty largest law firms  doubled"
from  1972 to  1986);  1990 ABA SuRvEY,  supra note 44, at 1-12  (reporting that lawyers in 60+ lawyer
firms grew from 12%  in 1984 to 21%  in 1990).
148.  LAw FIti MANAGEMENT,  supra  note 40, § 1.4.1,  at 1:30.
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because they will be more likely to develop internal boilerplate. Larger law
firms are also more  likely to have policies requiring or strongly encourag-
ing lawyers  to use those  internally  created  forms in their individual prac-
tices.
5.  Reincorporation  to Delaware
One last law firm effect may be caused by reincorporation. Nearly all
companies  choose  either  Delaware  or  their home  (headquarters)  state  as
their state  of incorporation.  Put  otherwise,  Delaware  is the  only  state  in
which companies choose to reincorporate  when they are about to go public.
For such companies, the need to draft a new  charter and bylaws that com-
ply with Delaware law  may prompt greater effort by the company counsel
to  review  firm defenses.  At  a  minimum,  it will  often  prevent  company
counsel from simply carrying forward private company boilerplate into the
IPO  documents.  Thus,  companies  incorporated  in Delaware  will tend  to
have more  defenses,  not because  Delaware  default law imposes  more  de-
fenses, but because the lawyers involved are more likely to do  a better job
on defenses as part of the IPO process.
B.  Constraints  on Law Firm  Effects
Law firm effects should be mitigated by other variables that proxy for
whether IPO companies have direct or indirect access to alternative sources
of legal proficiency.  These alternatives may constrain or modify company
counsels'  choice  of takeover defenses.  In particular, high levels  of M&A
activity  in  a given  company's  industry prior to an  IPO will  increase  the
salience,  and make both managers  and other IPO participants  more aware,
of takeover risk. Assuming defenses  are optimal or neutral,  M&A activity
in a company's  industry should make companies  more  likely to adopt de-
fenses.  Likewise, larger, older, less speculative, more profitable  companies
with pre-IPO  shareholders  that are  sophisticated  (for example,  VC  funds)
should  have better  access  to  independent  legal  advice.  Assuming,  again,
that defenses  are optimal  or neutral for all companies,  but not all lawyers
know this, fewer defenses should be observed at companies that are smaller
in size,  are younger,  engage  in unit  offerings,  are  owned by  individuals,
have less prestigious lead underwriters, and have lower earnings at the time
of the  IPO.  Conversely,  more  defenses  should be  observed  at companies
that  are  VC-backed if VCs  are aware  that defenses  are  good for pre-IPO
owner-managers.
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C.  Alternative Hypotheses and Control Variables
Drawing  on theories  described  in Part  III,  the following  additional
correlations are  tested, both as alternative  hypotheses,  and  as controls on
the law firm hypotheses.149
1.  Banker Hypotheses
If defenses  are uniformly good or bad, and the only reason that com-
panies  do  adopt  or exclude  defenses  is because  some bankers  are  falling
down on the job of informing  companies  about the effect  of defenses  on
IPO pricing, one would expect to see defenses correlate with the quality of
underwriters.  If there  is  a price  penalty  for  defenses,  then better  quality
underwriters  should  correlate  with  fewer  defenses,  on  average.  On  the
other hand, if there is no price penalty  (so that defenses are good from the
perspective of pre-IPO  owner-managers),  then better  quality underwriters
should correlate with more defenses.'50
2.  Company-Level Agency Costs /Bargaining Power Hypotheses
Bargaining power theory provides a reason for all companies to adopt
defenses,  and company-level  agency cost theory provides a reason for all
companies  not to  adopt  them.  But  in  each  case,  these  reasons  may  be
stronger at some companies than at others so that, together, they could ex-
plain  defense variation.  Defenses  might be efficient  at  companies  where
the incremental  agency costs  created by defenses are lower than the value
of bargaining power at some companies, but inefficient at other companies.
Higher  company-level  agency  costs  can be expected  to exist where
companies  have  higher levels  of cash flow and free  cash flow,  since  dis-
loyal manager-agents are able to misinvest the cash more readily than other
types of assets.'51 Company-level  agency costs  are also  likely to be higher
at older and larger companies,  which are more mature  and more  likely to
be  the "cash  cows"  that  can  be prime  candidates  for  managerial  slack.
149.  What  follows  are not  theories  but  alternative  hypotheses.  Thus,  these  hypotheses  do  not
necessarily  represent my own beliefs  or expectations  about  the determinants  of defenses;  they are  an
attempt to extract the implications of  traditional  theories about the effects of defenses and recast those
implications  into  plausible  and  testable  hypotheses,  so  as  to  provide  a  check  on  the  law  firm
hypotheses. The fact that some of  the specific alternative hypotheses are in tension with one another, or
with the law firm  hypotheses, should  be viewed  as a  virtue. The goal  is to  let the data resolve  these
tensions, rather than forcing a resolution with logic or armchair empiricism alone.
150.  One might also  expect that sophisticated pre-IPO shareholders,  such  as VC funds, would be
more  likely to  know of any price penalty  that  defenses  impose on an  IPO, and (since  they are  not
themselves  control shareholders)  to  resist defenses more  strongly than  other pre-IPO  shareholders  if
such  a price  penalty  exists.  But see  Black  &  Gilson,  supra note  61,  at  257-64  (suggesting  VCs
informally  precommit  to give  up  control even  if doing  so reduces  "exit"  value  of their investment,
which would eliminate or overwhelm any such correlation).
151.  Michael  C.  Jensen, Takeovers:  Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. EcoN.  PERSP.  21,  21
(1988)  (describing the relationship between free cash flow and agency costs).
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Conversely,  company-level  agency costs  are  likely to be lower at compa-
nies with more debt.  In each case, defenses  should be  inversely correlated
with the proxy for company-level  agency costs:  fewer defenses at compa-
nies with more  cash flow  and companies  that are  older  and larger,  more
defenses at companies with more debt. Agency costs also vary by industry;
if this variation is large relative to other factors,  defenses should also vary
by industry. Finally,  some theorists  predict that companies  with more  de-
fenses  will be managed  less  diligently,  so that  companies  with  more  de-
fenses would have lower returns on equity or assets.
Turning to the use  of defenses  to  create bargaining power, any  extra
value that such bargaining power provides  should vary with the time a tar-
get would need to develop alternatives  to a bid, as well as how much com-
petition  exists  for  the  target  regardless  of  defenses.'52  Some  company
characteristics  may make hostile  takeovers  more difficult,  providing  some
companies  with natural bargaining power, and making  defenses  less valu-
able. 53 For example,  high levels of debt impede "bootstrap" bids, high lev-
els of shareholder dispersion impede proxy fights,  and hostile takeovers  in
high-tech  or people-specific  industries  are  more  difficult,  because  (as  is
commonly  said  among  merger  lawyers)  their  "assets  walk  out  the  door
each  night."  Defenses  may thus  be less  valuable  at companies  with high
leverage,'54 high shareholder dispersion,  and VC-backing, as well as com-
panies in "high-tech industries," or in the development stage (that is, before
shipping product).
3.  Market  Myopia Hypothesis
Because myopia theory relies on the existence  of private information,
it may be impossible to test dispositively. Nevertheless, the theory suggests
that defenses may be more important for companies  that are hard to value.
High levels  of planned  capital expenditures  or research  and development
expenditures  might make a company harder to value,  whereas  high levels
of fixed  assets  (property,  plant,  and  equipment)  might  make  a  company
152.  Together, the Williams  Act,  Proxy  Rules,  and  poison pills  impose  a  minimum of thirty  to
sixty days delay on all bids for U.S. public companies, allowing bid competition to emerge.
153.  Daines  & Klausner, supra note  8,  at 98-99,  suggest  increases in bargaining power are  most
value-enhancing  when bid activity  is otherwise  low, and use  M&A activity in a company's industry in
the five years  around the  IPO  as a  measure of this activity.  They find  a  positive correlation  between
industry-M&A  and defenses,  leading them to reject the bargaining power hypothesis.  Cf infra Part V
(suggesting  alternative  interpretation of similar finding). However,  industry-M&A  may not be  a good
proxy  for  the  expected  value  of bargaining  power  from  defenses,  as  industry-M&A  can  shift
dramatically over time. See Mark  L. Mitchell  & J.  Harold Mulherin, The Impact of  Industry Shocks on
Takeover and RestructuringActivity, 41 J. FIN. EcoN.  193,  207 (1996)  ("50% of the takeovers  in [any]
given industry [during the 1980s] clusters within a two-year period").
154.  On the one hand, as just noted  in the text, if leverage  is an  important constraint on company-
level  agency  costs  and  if defenses  increase  those  costs,  leverage  should  correlate  positively  with
defenses. On the other hand, if leverage instead makes targets less attractive to bidders, they will make
bargaining power less important, and so correlate negatively with defenses.
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easier to value  (at least when inflation  is low and interest rates and fixed
asset prices are stable).  Companies  are on average  harder to value if they
are  in high-tech  industries,  or are in either the development  stage  or the
growth stage (after sales have begun, but before they turn profitable), since
their value is in the future, and there are fewer guides for valuation. 55 Such
companies should have more defenses if myopia theory is correct.
4.  Private  Benefits of Control  Hypotheses
As with myopia, the existence  of private benefits is by definition dif-
ficult to test. For "psychic"  private benefits, possible empirical proxies  in-
dlude whether the CEO founded  the company, the CEO's tenure  with the
company, whether the company  is named after the CEO  or a major ongo-
ing shareholder,  and whether the company is owned by an individual or a
family.
Private  benefits  of whatever  kind  are  unlikely  to  motivate  defense
adoption if the CEO is using the  IPO to  sell shares  (as opposed to using it
to  dilute her  ownership by raising more  equity  capital),  since  CEO  sales
may signal an intent to retire or sell out entirely in the near future. Where
private benefits of control are sufficiently high, owners may elect to retain
a  "lock"  on  control,  so  that  takeover  defenses  become  less  important.
Ownership  structures that allow for such a "lock" may thus be substitutes
for defenses.  If so,  fewer  defenses  are  expected  at  companies  with  dual
class capitalization, or where  pre-IPO  shareholders  retain more of the vot-
ing stock after the IPO.
Where executives own fewer shares prior to the IPO, they may be less
able  to  choose  defenses  to  maximize  their  private  benefits,  since  non-
executive  shareholders  are  likely  to insist  on  a  structure that  maximizes
shared benefits. IPOs with VC-backing, lower levels of CEO ownership, or
higher  levels  of independent  director  ownership  would  thus  have  fewer
defenses. Finally, nonpsychic private benefits (of a certain type) may vary
with company  industry. In particular,  Field finds a strong  correlation be-
tween dual  class capitalizations  in the printing, publishing,  and communi-
cations industry.'56 If dual class capital structures are chosen to protect such
private benefits, then  (controlling for dual class structures)  one would ex-
pect more defenses at companies in industries in which dual class capitali-
zations are more common ("dual class industries").
155.  Davm  Farber,  Cerent:  The  $6.9  Billion  Question  46,  51  (April  2000)  (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); Finding  Ways to Profit  from Internet Ventures: How Goldman Values
hiternet  Finns,  CRArN's N.Y. Bus., June 15,  1998,  at 12; Suchman & Cahill, supra note  145, at 683-90
(detailing uncertainty of  valuing technology firms).
156.  Field, supra note 8, at  19.  Combining industry data from Compustat with analysis of data on
dual  class capitalizations  from IRRC,  I was able to confirm  Field's findings for the broader  group  of
mature public companies making up the Standard & Poor's 1500. See also Demsetz & Lehn, supra  note
120, at 1162 (reporting similar findings regarding media firms and sports teams).
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D.  Description  of  Sample
The main sample began with 180 public  companies  chosen randomly
from  companies  that completed  firm commitment  IPOs during  1991  and
1992  (120  from 1991,  and  60 from  1992).  In each case the  IPOs were re-
ported by Going Public: The IPO Reporter,  which prior to  1998 regularly
published  a comprehensive  annual  list of firm  commitment  underwritten
IPOs during the previous year. Going  Public also identifies IPOs of closed-
end investment  companies  and real  estate  investment trusts,  and because
such  organizations  have  qualitatively  different  business  and  governance
structures,  those  IPOs  were  excluded.  For  similar  reasons,  three  limited
partnerships in the original sample  were excluded, leaving  162 companies.
The  final  sample  represents  17%  of the roughly  1000  ordinary  business
corporations  that went public  during those  years, and  14% of the  roughly
1200  total IPOs.  Dependent and independent  variables  determined  for the
main  sample  are  described  next,  followed  by  summary  statistics,  mean
comparisons,  and univariate  analysis, and  finally a multivariate regression
analysis.  To confirm and update  some of the Article's findings, a  separate
sample of 162 randomly chosen IPOs  from the first nine months of 1998,
and  a  smaller sample  of 33  IPOs,  were  randomly  chosen  from  all  1999
IPOs tracked by the Securities Data Corporation ("SDC").57
E.  Dependent Variables
For each company, data on company-specific  governance terms were
gathered  from a review and analysis  of each company's  prospectus,  char-
ter, bylaws,  and  (in a few  cases)  the terms  of the securities  issued.  Each
company was  required to  file those  documents with  the  SEC.' 5 8  In a few
cases,  companies  failed to  make required  filings of charters  or bylaws,  or
appear to have filed incomplete  or outdated versions. In such cases, review
of the IPO prospectus and subsequent filings on Forms  I0-Q or 10-K were
made  to obtain  the correct  documents,  with two  companies  for which  fil-
ings were  unavailable being  excluded  from the sample,  leaving  160  com-
panies.  Charter amendments at sample  companies from the date of the  IPO
157.  The  1998 sample  was taken from  Lapushchik, supra note  8,  at 15-16,  who randomly  chose
her  sample  from  Hoover's  Online.  The  1999  sample  was  randomly  taken  from  IPO-Alert,  at
http://www.alert-ipo.com  (visited  10/24/00).  Hoover's and  IPO-Alert  are  online commercial  services
that track public companies.  In each case,  IPOs  were excluded  if they  involved foreign  companies  or
banks,  limited  partnerships,  or real  estate investment  trusts;  IPOs  were also  excluded  from the  1998
sample if they did not have at least one mutual fund investor on December 31,  1998.
158.  Since  1994  (and before  that for  some  large  firms),  SEC  filings  have been made  available
online  via  the  SEC's  EDGAR  system.  Information  for  EDGAR  Filers,  at http://www.sec.gov  (last
visited  Sept. 28,  2001). However, most  firms that became public companies  prior to  1994  have never
refiled their charters or bylaws,  so such documents are not available via EDGAR,  and only occasionally
available through  databases in widespread use such as LEXIS.  Pre-EDGAR documents can be obtained
from the SEC via commercial services, but only at a nontrivial per-firm cost;  charters,  but not bylaws,
are typically available from the firm's state of incorporation, and only at a nontrivial cost.
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to  the present  were  reviewed.'59  Some  data  were  unavailable  for  some
companies, leaving fewer observations  in some regressions.
1.  Governance Terms  Affecting Takeover Vulnerability
Each company's documents were reviewed  for whether the company
had adopted  any or  all of ten variable governance  terms relevant to take-
over  vulnerability,  as  listed on  Appendix  A.  Each term  was  coded  in a
dummy variable,  indicating whether the term was  included,  affirmatively
excluded,  or not addressed  in the company's  documents.  In addition, the
location  of each term (charter or bylaws) was noted.  State  corporate  law
was analyzed for each state  in which a sample company was incorporated,
and default law on the ten relevant terms  was coded. Together,  the  com-
pany-specific governance variables and the default law variables provide  a
large percentage  of the information necessary to analyze the sample com-
panies' structural takeover defenses.
2.  Contestability  Index
As  I  have  discussed  elsewhere,  empirical  research  on  takeover  de-
fenses  has  to  date  provided  limited  useful  information.60  Among  other
failings, prior research has not attempted  to systematize  defenses to arrive
at a unified measure of legal takeover vulnerability, but instead has either
studied defenses on a defense-by-defense  basis (and so  did not control for
defense interactions),  or aggregated defenses in a theoretically unmotivated
way (introducing high  levels of noise).  To provide  consistency  with prior
research, this Article reports summary data using a term-by-term approach,
with emphasis on the two single defenses that have the greatest impact on
takeovers  (classified  boards and dual  class capital structures).  It also uses
those  specific  defenses  as  dependent  variables  in  alternative  models  to
check the robustness of the base model. But the focus of the Article is on a
new dependent variable-called the "contestability  index," or "CI"-which
is constructed from individual governance terms and is offered as a better
measure of legal vulnerability to takeover than any one term alone (or any
simple aggregation of terms).
The contestability index is complicated, such that a full description of
how it works is deferred to Appendix B.'6'  Briefly, the contestability  index
is composed of  (1)  governance variables  and  (2)  an algorithm that maps
those  variables  onto  a  numerical  index  that  equals  the number  of days
159.  Bylaw amendments are of less concern than charter amendments  because shareholders  retain
the ability to amend bylaws in all of the jurisdictions in the sample. The charter, by contrast, may not be
amended without board approval in any state. Bylaws thus enter into the contestability algorithm  only
where firms restrict shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws in the charter.
160.  See Coates, Critique,  supra  note 23, at 281.
161.  See  also  Coates,  Index,  supra note  26,  at  23-59  (providing  full  description  of  the
contestability index).
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necessary for a majority shareholder coalition  to replace  a majority of the
board.  Governance  terms  used  in the index  are  determined  as  discussed
above.  Where  documents  are  silent,  default  law  is  analyzed  to  supply
missing  terms.  Together,  this  analysis  establishes  four  things:  (a)  the
normal procedure for shareholders to elect directors,  (b)  the procedures (if
any)  that  shareholders  have  to  short-circuit  the  normal  process,  (c)  the
procedures  (if any) that shareholders  have to  change  any of the  foregoing
rules, and  (d)  any  constraints on the board's ability to block tender offers
with a poison pill.
Analysis  of these rules for a given company will indicate  a "shortest
path" for a majority shareholder coalition to replace the target's board. The
most intuitive "shortest path,"  the way someone not familiar with corporate
law might expect the process of director election to work, is simply for the
shareholders  to wait until their next, regular annual meeting and to elect a
majority of the board at that meeting.  In fact, this is the "shortest  path" at
only a small  subset of companies,  and even  for these  companies  the time
until the next regular meeting  can vary substantially  depending  on where
the company  is  incorporated  and when  in the  calendar  year the effort to
replace the board begins.
But for a majority of companies, shareholders  can "act early" through
one of two routes:  they can call a special meeting, or they can act by writ-
ten consent in lieu of a meeting. At most of these companies, shareholders
can also stage a "coup"  by removing the current board, or "pack" the board
by expanding  it, and in either case filling  the resulting  vacancies with  di-
rectors  nominated by or friendly to a bidder. At many  companies, bylaws
that on their face  might  restrict these  "shortest  paths"  can  themselves  be
changed by shareholders.
At another subset of companies, those with effective  staggered boards,
shareholders  must be willing to wait through two election cycles  to replace
a majority of directors. Many companies  that have staggered  boards, how-
ever,  are  vulnerable  to  "coups"  of  the  sort just  described,  whether  via
"early  action"  or at  a  regular  shareholders'  meeting.  A  small  subset  of
companies  with  staggered boards  also  have cumulative  voting  provisions
that enable managers to retain a lock on control  for two to three years.  Fi-
nally, another small subset of companies have  implicitly prohibited poison
pills,  so  that a  proxy fight  is  not  necessary:  a takeover  may be  accom-
plished by tender offer with the minimal  delay  imposed by the Williams
Act.
162
The  contestability  index  should  remedy  several  limitations  of prior
research. The fundamental  point is that defenses function primarily by im-
posing  delay on hostile  bids, which both decreases  their expected  benefit
162.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1994).
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for the bidder and increases the time a target has to seek alternative bids. 6 3
By  focusing  on delay caused by  different  terms, the  index  extracts  from
governance terms those features that have both an actual  and highly  vari-
able effect on takeovers  at different companies, and disregards those terms
(for example,  fair price provisions)  that have  effects  (for example,  deter-
rence of two-tier bids) that are duplicated by other terms (for example, poi-
son pills,  control share  statutes),
164 and also disregards  events (such as pill
adoptions) that  in themselves  have little  effect on  a company's  takeover
vulnerability. 6 5 In addition,  the index  captures the way  governance terms
affecting takeovers  interact.'66 A company's  full  complement  of terms can
make takeovers both harder and easier than a single term would imply. The
index  reflects  those  interactions  and  provides  significantly  improved  in-
formation about the legal vulnerability to takeover of the companies  in the
sample.
F.  Explanatory  and Control Variables
Basic IPO data, including the offering's lead manager, size  and date,
were taken from Going Public, and confirmed  from the companies'  SEC
filings.  Some  IPO  characteristics-such  as  law  firm identity,  and  loca-
tion;6 7 director and officer ("D&O") ownership;  pre-IPO shareholder own-
ership  retention;  firm and  legal age;  development-stage  status;  and  CEO
compensation,  age,  and  tenure;  and  whether  the  CEO  founded the  com-
pany-were gathered from IPO prospectuses.  Sponsorship by VC or LBO
funds  was taken  from annual  lists  of IPOs published  in  Venture Capital
Journal and Buyouts,  respectively,  and  confirmed  from  the  companies'
SEC  filings.  Ownership  by  individuals  or families  and corporate  parents
163.  For a discussion of  why delay is so crucial to hostile bids, see Coates, Index, supra note 26, at
11-23.
164.  See Coates, Critique, supra note 23, at 320-25.
165.  Id. at 318-20. An alternative to the contestability index is to develop  a ranking of defenses for
use in an  ordered  logit model,  as done by Daines  & Klausner, supra note  8.  See infra Part  IV.I  &
Appendix C.
166.  Coates, Critique, supra note 23, at 325-28.
167.  Lawyer  location  and size  were  coded  both  at  office  and  firm levels.  That  is,  data  were
gathered  on  (1)  where  lawyers  primarily  responsible  for  a  given  IPO  were  located,  based  on
information in the issuer's registration statement filed with the SEC for the IPO, and how many lawyers
were  located  in that  office, and  (2)  where the largest  office  of each  law  firm  was  located,  and  the
number of lawyers  in the firm  as a  whole,  using information  from  the National  Association  of Law
Placement, or, where NALP  did not include a  firm, from  Martindale-Hubbell.  For location,  law firm
office  is  hypothesized  to  have  a  larger  effect than  headquarters,  based  on  likely  information  flows
among lawyers in a given  office and the relative autonomy of separate teams of corporate  lawyers. For
size, total firm size is hypothesized to have a larger effect than office size, as capital resources and costs
and benefits of standardization of lPO documentation seem more likely to be determined by the size of
a firm as a whole. Data reported reflect those hypotheses unless otherwise noted.
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(that is, splitoffs  or equity  carve-outs)  was obtained  from prospectuses. 6
Carter-Manaster  rankings  of underwriter prestige were  taken from Carter,
Dark, and Singh.'69  For more precise  definitions  of explanatory variables,
see Appendix C. Pre-IPO financial data were obtained from the companies'
IPO  prospectuses,  and  post-IPO  financial  data  were  taken  from
COMPUSTAT.  Post-IPO ownership structure  was obtained from company
proxy  statements  filed  with the  SEC,  and post-IPO  charter  amendments
were obtained from filings on Forms  10-K and 1O-Q.
Data on law firm size and law firm locations were taken from annual
directories  published  by  the  National  Association  of  Law  Placement,
Martindale-Hubbell,  Inc.,  and  Harvard  Law  School's  Office  of  Career
Placement.  As  empirical proxies  for law  firm takeover proficiency,  three
simple, new  indices  were  constructed. 7'  First, to  focus  on M&A  experi-
ence that plausibly  requires takeover proficiency,  law firms were  indexed
by a variable called MASDC, which is the number of transactions  in a sub-
set  of SDC's M&A  database  for the three-year  period  (1988-90)  prior to
the  IPO sample period for which a given law  firm acted as counsel to one
of the principal parties to the deal. To focus on deals that involve some risk
of a hostile "bust-up"  bid, deals  were included only if they involved  ma-
jority acquisitions  of public  companies  that  lack controlling  shareholders
(n=1 131). The second and third indices  (SUITSALL  and SUITSDEL) use
appearances in merger or takeover-related litigation in the period preceding
the IPO. A Lexis search was conducted, in Delaware  and all state courts in
the  period  1980-90,  for any  of the following  words  or  phrases:  merger,
acquisition,  takeover,  tender  offer,  or  proxy  fight.  Duplicate  cases  were
excluded.  The  results  were  two  numbers,  which proxy  for  a  law  firm's
M&A-litigation experience for the period prior to the IPO sample period.
168.  Selection of defenses  may be distorted by parent-level  agency  problems when the company
going public  is owned by an existing  public  company, so  corporate  parentage  is controlled for in  the
model.
169.  Carter et al., supra  note 98, at 285.
170.  In addition to the constructed law firm indices, law firm rankings were taken from Corporate
Control  Alert (for top M&A firms), American Lawyer (for firms with the highest revenues per  lawyer
and profits per partner), and  Going  Public (for top IPO firms). July 1991 Ranking Chart,  CORPORATE
CONTROL  ALERT,  July  1991,  at  3  (ranking  law  firm  participants  in  M&A  transactions  announced
between  January and June  1991);  January 1992 Ranking Chart, CORPORATE  CONTROL  ALERT,  Jan.
1992,  at 3 (ranking  law firm participants  in M&A transactions  announced between July and December
1991); AmLaw  100: America's One Hundred  Highest Grossing  Law Firms in 1990, Am.  LAW., July-
Aug.  1991,  Special Pullout Section, at 1 (listing law firms with highest revenues  per lawyer and profits
per partner); Top 20 Lead Underwriters  Counsel  for IPOs and Top 20 Issuer Controls  for 1POs, GOING
PUBLIc:  THE IPO REPORTER,  Mar. 1992, at 5  (ranking law firms by market share and number of initial
public offerings).  Regression  results for those variables, not reported, were qualitatively the same as for
the constructed law firm indices.
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Standard  industrial  classification  ("SIC")  codes  were  obtained  from
the companies'  SEC filings on Form S1."  Three-digit SIC codes  are also
used  to construct  a proxy  variable  for recent  industry-level  M&A  activ-
ity:  all  mergers  and  acquisitions  involving  public  targets  with  market
capitalization  of at least  $10  million in the three-year  period prior to the
sample  IPOs  were  analyzed,  and  transactions  were  counted  for  each
target's  3-digit  SIC  code,  producing  an  index  of recent  industry-level
M&A activity ("MAINDACT").'72
G.  Descriptive  Data
1.  The Companies
Table 2 gives a general  sense of the kinds of companies going public
in the  early  1990s.  Many  small,  unknown,  and  development-stage  high-
tech companies  can be  found, particularly  in the biotech  industry.  DNX
planned to insert human DNA into mice to turn them into hemoglobin fac-
tories.  Embrex was  developing  a method to  allow  chickens  to be vacci-
nated in the egg, a tiny labor savings but one that could be leveraged over
six billion chickens  hatched each year in the U.S. But the sample also  in-
cludes large, well-known, and mature companies. The Equitable, an insur-
ance  company,  used  its  IPO to convert  from mutual  to stock  ownership,
and remains one of the fifty largest companies in the world; CompUSA has
become the country's largest computer retail chain; and Danskin  is a long-
established  and  well-known  maker  of women's  exercise  clothing.  The
sample  is  distributed among  seventy-six  different  three-digit  SIC  groups
and thirty-eight two-digit SIC  groups.  Sizeable  clusters  (10  or more  com-
panies) are found in a few industry groups, with more than 10 companies in
only three industries:  health services, medical instruments, and electronics.
171.  SIC codes present difficulties. There are an insufficient number of firms per 4-or 3-digit code
to use SIC codes as controls, 2-digit codes are so broad in scope as to be of little use for firm-level
analysis, and many firms engaged in related businesses are scattered through multiple 2-digit codes.
172.  This is  similar to  the approach  taken by Daines & Klausner, supra note  8,  at 98-99.  Also,
friendly and hostile deals were both counted,  as friendly deals are often quasi-hostile. See G.  WILLIAM
SCHWERT,  HOSTILITY  IN  TAKEovERs:  IN  THE  EYEs  OF  THE  BEHOLDER?  (Natl'l  Bureau  of Econ.
Research,  Working Paper No.  W7085,  1999), available at http://papers.ssm.com/ (noting that friendly
deals  are  often  quasi-hostile).  Because  recent  industry-level  M&A  activity  seems  more  likely  to
increase the salience of takeover risk, and hence manager attention  to defenses,  than it is to affect the
expected efficiency of defenses as bargaining tools, industry counts  were not scaled (that is, divided by
industry size):  high levels of large-deal activity attract attention from managers regardless of whether it
is  a  large  percentage  of industry  assets or  firms.  In  unreported  regressions,  however,  qualitatively
similar results were obtained with scaled industry counts.
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TABLE 2
COMPANIES  GOING PUBLIC IN THE EARLY 1990s
Company  Description of  Use of  Stage
Business  Proceeds
Equitable  Insurance  Convert to  Mature
Stock Form
Duracell  Battery Manufacturing  Reverse LBO  Mature
Danskin  Women's Exercise  Reduce Debt  Mature
Clothing and Hosiery
Designer
CompUSA  Computer Retail Chain  Fund Rollout  Growth
EZCorp  Second Largest  Fund Growth  Growth
Operator of Pawnshops
in the United States
Pharmchem  Examine "175,000  Fund Growth  Growth
urine specimens" Per
Month For Illegal Drug
Use
Osteotech  Process Human Bone  R&D  Development
for Nonprofit Donation
Agencies
Embrex  Vaccinate Eggs to Cut  R&D  Development
Labor Costs (6 Billion
chickens/year in US)
DNX  Put Human DNA Into  R&D  Development
Mice to Create
Hemoglobin Factories
Regeneron  Treatments for  R&D  Development
Alzheimer's,
Parkinson's, Lou
Gehrig's Diseases
Set forth  in Table  3 are  summary  financial  and operational  data  on
companies  in the  sample.  The  typical  company was  founded  (often  as  a
partnership  or unincorporated entity) in  1983 and incorporated  (or reincor-
porated) in  1986,  making  the median  company nine years  old at the  IPO,
1350 [Vol. 89:1301BLAME THE LAWYERS
with a "legal age" of five."  By 1999, seven or eight years later, about one-
third (3 1%) had been acquired, and another 3%  had gone bankrupt.174
Most IPO companies were small, with median assets of $21  million.'75
At the  IPO,  fixed  assets  comprised  about half of total  assets,  and  most
companies were barely profitable, with median earnings of $0.6 million. In
contrast, median earnings rose  significantly to $2.3 million in the first year
post-IPO. The median company had 350 employees, little working capital,
and only $4.5 million in long-term debt, and raised proceeds of $24 million
in the  IPO. Stock  was  sold to  a median  415  shareholders,  with pre-IPO
shareholders retaining on average 64% of the votes.
17 6
Over the next five years, most companies remained barely profitable,
with median earnings  of $0.4 million and negative average free cash flow.
Over that period, the median company spent $4.3 million per year on capi-
tal  expenditures,  invested  $400,000 per year  in R&D,  and  generated  an
ROA of 1% and an ROE of 5%.177  About a third of the sample,  however,
produced high earnings and threw  off significant levels  of free cash  flow.
Most of these were  equity carve-outs  or reverse  LBOs. Examples include
International  Specialties  Products,  with  average  annual  earnings  of $61
million and free  cash  flow  of $39  million,  and  Interstate  Bakeries,  with
average annual earnings  of $35 million and free cash flow of $60  million.
But a few  "pure"  IPOs  also generated  sizeable  earnings  and cash flow in
the  five  years  post-IPO.  Examples  included  Broderbund  Software  ($16
million  of earnings  and  $21  million  of free  cash flow),  and  Marquette
Electronics  ($13 million  of annual earnings  and $15  million  of free cash
flow). Thus, it remains plausible that variation in free cash flow might ex-
plain variation in defenses.
173.  Prior researchers  report IPO firm  age. See,  e.g., Field, supra note 8, at  5 (reporting average
firm age of eighteen and median age of eight in IPOs  1988-92);  Wayne Mikkelson  et al.,  Ownership
and Operating  Performance of Companies that Go Public, 44  J. FiN.  ECON.  281,  285  tbl.1  (1997)
(reporting median  firm age of five in IPOs  1980-83); Jay Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of  Initial
Public Offerings,  46 J. FIN.  3 (1991)  (reporting average firm  age of thirteen and median of six in IPOs
1975-84).  Still, it is often ambiguous  whether  the  data  refers to  original  founding of the company's
principal line  of business  ("firm age")  or the (re)incorporation  of a  legal entity  going public  ("legal
age"), or some mix of the two. SEC  rules do not require or specify rules  for disclosure of this datum.
Legal age is often (much) lower, especially for reverse LBOs or equity carve-outs,  and even first-time
IPOs  recently  reorganized  in  anticipation  of the  IPOs,  but  firm  age  is  itself often  ambiguous,  as
business lines shift over time and can be bought or sold without formal change to a legal entity.
174.  Cf Field, supra note  8, at 46 tbl.11  (finding  16%  of IPOs acquired  in five years and  18%  in
seven years); Mikkelson  et al., supra note  173,  at 286 (finding 24%  of IPOs acquired in five years and
36% in ten years). Varying overall M&A activity alters M&A hazard rates in a fixed post-IPO period.
175.  Average company size was much larger because of outliers such as The Equitable.
176.  See Field, supra  note  8, at 32 tbl.l  (finding similar results).
177.  Cf Mikkelson et al., supra note 173, at 292 tbl.3 (reporting ROA of 3%  over five years post-
IPO for 283 IPOs  1980-83).
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  AND OPERATIONAL DATA ON  SAMPLE COMPANIES
Variable  Percent  Median  Mean
Positive
Founded  1983  1973
Incorporated  1986  1983
Offering Size ($MM)  $24.00  $49.30
% Votes Retained by Pre-IPO  65%  64%
Owners
% Votes Owned by D&O Post-IPO  42%  40%
% Votes Owned by CEO Post-IPO  8%  15%
Splitoff (equity carve-out)  9%
Reverse LBO  19%
Venture Capital Backing  35%
Individual/Family  Ownership  32%
No. of Shareholders  (1 yr post-IPO)  415  8737
CEO Age at IPO  48  49
CEO Tenure at IPO  6  8
CEO Founded Company  48%
Firm Uses Owner Name  6%
Development Stage at IPO  23%
Unit Offering  11%
Earnings  (1 yr pre-IPO) ($MM)  65%  $0.56  $22.09
Total Assets (1 yr pre-IPO)  $21.17  $917.21
Working Capital (1 yr pre-IPO)  $3.81  $33.26
Long-Term Debt (1 yr pre-IPO)  $4.63  $113.06
Earnings (1 yr post-IPO)  66%  $2.26  $12.95
Total Assets (1 yr post-IPO)  $40.76  $1,020.84
Cash on Hand (1 yr post-IPO)  $7.82  $54.57
Fixed Assets (1 yr post-IPO)  $9.93  $207.27
Earnings (5 yr avg post-IPO)  54%  $0.42  $12.54
Free Cash Flow (5  yr avg)  32%  ($2.75)  ($0.40)
Buybacks (5  yr avg)  52%  $0.00  $5.29
Capex (5  yr avg)  95%  $4.30  $47.61
R&D (5 yr avg)  50%  $0.04  $11.34
ROE (5  yr avg)  14.8%  (21.7%)
ROA (5  yr avg)  1.1%  (15.3%)
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TABLE 3  (CONT'D)
SuMMARY FiNANciAL  AND  OPERATIONAL DATA  ON  SAMPLE COMPANIES
Variable  Percent Positive
Incidence of Takeover Defenses
Dual Class Capitalization  at IPO  11%
Dual Class to Maintain Control  8%
Classified Board  34%
Cumulative Voting  13%
Blank Check Preferred  86%
Implicit Ban on Pills  4%
Coup Possible  83%
Classified Board Avoidable  18%
Clear Gaffe (ex. Failed Cl. Boards)  10%
Company Headquarters
California  21%
Delaware  1%
New York  10%
Massachusetts  8%
State of Incorporation
Delaware  62%
California  8%
Massachusetts  4%
New York  3%
Company Counsel Location
New York City  30%
Boston  11%
California  19%
Silicon Valley  6%
Same as company  58%
Out-of-state  42%
Out-of-state Law Firm Location
New York  51%
Massachusetts  12%
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2.  The CEOs
Table 3 also presents  data on the CEOs of the sample companies.  The
average CEO was forty-eight years old at the time of the IPO and had eight
years  of experience  at the  company;  about half (48%)  of the  companies
were founded by the person who was CEO in the IPO. A few  (6%) named
their companies after themselves. 7 8 About 8% of CEOs sold stock and saw
their proportionate stakes in their companies decline as a result of the IPO;
the vast  majority  maintained  or increased  their voting power  and  equity
ownership.
3.  The Law Firms
The sample confirms that, as with legal services  generally, 7 9 the mar-
ket for corporate legal services  in IPOs  is highly fragmented:  160 compa-
nies turned to  111  different law  firms for legal  advice on one of the most
important transactions  in a company's  life-cycle. The top ten law firms in
the sample accounted for less than a third of the sample. Only one (Wilson
Sonsini)  captured more than  five percent  of the sample IPOs;  and no law
firm  captured  more  than  10%.  Table  3 shows that  sample  law  firms  are
geographically  concentrated  in New York City (30%),  California (includ-
ing  Silicon  Valley)  (19%),  and Boston  (11%),  and  about  a  quarter  are
scattered throughout the U.S. Most law firms (58%)  are located in the same
state as the company they advise, and more than half of the rest (51%)  are
located in New  York City. 8'  California  law  firms  do not  capture  a  large
share of out-of-state company IPOs.
At the IPO, corporate counsel ranged in size from two-lawyer shops to
the  Jones  Day and  Skadden  Arps behemoths,  each  with more  than  1000
attorneys.  Still, as Figure  1 shows,  most firms were large:  the median firm
had 214 attorneys,  and the particular office  working on the  IPO had  131.
Nearly  half  (47%)  were  in  American Lawyer's AmLaw  100  for  1991
(based  on gross  revenues).18 " '  Since  then,  sample  law  firms  have  grown
slowly to a median of 162 lawyers in 1998,  or about 5%  a year. In the early
1990s,  many  law firms  laid off attorneys  and retrenched,  consistent with
average slow growth over the decade.8 2  By 1998, twelve (8%) sample  law
178.  See Field, supra  note  8, at 32 tbl. 1,  39 tbl.7 (making similar findings).
179.  See supra note 97 and accompanying  text.
180.  Other locations  where law firms captured more than  5% of the out-of-state  company sample
are Boston (12%),  Washington, D.C. (6%), Texas (6%), and Chicago (5%).
181.  Of those in the AmLaw  100 (for which  the top rank is I and the bottom is  100),  the  median
rank (based on revenues per lawyer) was 66.
182.  LAw  Frm MANAGEMENT,  supra  note  40,  §  1.3.4,  at  1:24  ("[M]ajor  firms  in  every
market...  reported sharply lower profits for 1990.").
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firms had  disappeared,  ten by dissolution,  two by merger  into  other law
firnms.
183
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Law firms in the sample worked on an average of twenty public target
M&A transactions  from  1988  to  1990,  and litigated an  average of forty-
three reported  M&A cases  in all federal and state courts in the  1980s,  in-
cluding  seven in Delaware  courts.  Those numbers  are  skewed by M&A-
intensive  Skadden,  which  in those  periods  alone  worked  on  186  public
M&A  deals  and  handled  325  M&A  lawsuits,  including  eighty-six  in
Delaware courts. After the top decile, the M&A indices fall off rapidly; the
median  number of M&A  deals is  four, and the median number of M&A
lawsuits is seventeen (including one Delaware case).
183.  Fink Weinberger  dissolved in  1993 after expanding  into real estate in the late  1980s; Gaston
&  Snow  dissolved  in  1991  after  mismanagement,  defections,  and  insolvency;  Johnson  &  Gibbs
dissolved  in  1995  after rapid  growth in  the  1980s, recession,  layoffs,  defections,  and illness  of the
founder in the early  1990s; Townley & Updike dissolved  in 1995 after Dorsey & Whitney hired away
ten top rainmakers  and merger efforts with Coudert failed.  Other vanished law firms were:  Cascone &
Cole;  Cohen  & Cohen;  Grayson  Givner;  Katz  Karacic;  McKenna  & Fitting;  Mandell  &  Zaroff;
O'Connor Broude; and Trotter Smith (founded by TROTrER,  supra note 44). Several handled more than
one sample IPO, increasing the mortality rate reflected  in Figure 2 to 9%. By comparison, Hildebrandt,
Inc.,  reported  in GALANTER  & PALAY,  supra note 52, at 55  n.120, found that  10%  of midsize firms,
making up 25% of firms at the time, dissolved or merged  in just two years  ending in  1988.  One can
infer  either  that  law  firms  in  the  instant  sample  were  larger  than  "mid-size"  firms  studied  by
Hildebrandt, or the 1990s were a more stable environment for law firms than the mid-1980s, or both.CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
TABLE 4
DEFENSES BY Top LAW FiRMs IN SAMPLE
Client  Takeover
Takeover  Expertise
Defenses
CIO  0  0  U  ~  -
CIO  U  M  :
L1  0  Cn  Cn  S
Wilson Sonsini  Palo Alto  214  9  50  0%  0%  12  2  1
Skadden Arps  New York  996  7  525  86%  29%  186  325  86
Brobeck Phleger  San Francisco  403  4  50  0%  0%  8  34  2
Hale & Dorr  Boston  280  4  330  50%  0%  9  43  1
Latham & Watkins  Los Angeles  607  4  190  50%  0%  34  52  4
Bachner Tally  New York  48  3  45  0%  0%  1  4  0
Cooley Godward  San Francisco  334  3  418  67%  0%  4  7  0
Kirkland&Ellis  Chicago  439  3  108  33%  0%  23  110  9
Morgan Lewis  Philadelphia  641  3  52  33%  0%  11  117  1
Sullivan&  NewYork  387  3  163  100%  0%  143  130  10
Cromwell
WeilGotshal  New York  597  3  49  0%  0%  71  161  18
Debevoise  New York  375  2  45  0%  50%  30  36  3
Simpson Thacher  New York  455  2  45  0%  0%  97  74  3
Willkie Farr  New York  343  2  55  0%  0%  28  47  2
Baker & Botts  Houston  431  1  45  0%  0%  8  71  10
Cahill Gordon  New York  222  1  695  100%1  0%  40  103  10
FriedFrank  NewYork  371  1  605  100%  0%  101  116  13
Jones Day  Cleveland  1072  1  605  100%  0%  29  99  2
Kramer Levin  New York  124  1  45  0%  0%  10  54  4
Tenzer Greenblatt  New York  72  1  65  0%  0%  0  24  7
Definitions:
LAWFRMI: number of lawyers in 1991
IPOs:  number of IPOs in sample
CI:  contestability  index (see Appendix B)
CLASS:  classified board
DUALCON:  dual class capital  structure, low-vote stock sold to public in IPO
MASDC:  number of public company M&A transactions  1988-90 in Securites Data Co.
SUITSALL:  number of  cases  in Lexis 1980-89 with "merger, acquisition, proxy fight or
tender offer"
SUITSDEL:  number of Delaware cases in Lexis  1980-89 with "merger, acquisition, proxy
fight or tender offer"
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Table 4  lists  the law firms  that are  in the top  ten of the  sample  by
number of sample IPOs and by indices of M&A deals and M&A litigation.
Considerable  overlap exists, so that fifteen firms  fill out all thirty spots on
the three top-ten M&A lists. Correlation coefficients exceed  0.85 for each
pair of M&A  variables.  Sample  law  firms  with high M&A  indices  pre-
dictably are mostly large New York firms (Skadden,  Sullivan & Cromwell,
Weil Gotshal), but geographic dispersion  can also be seen, with law firms
from Chicago (Kirkland & Ellis), Los Angeles  (Latham), Cleveland (Jones
Day), Houston (Baker & Botts) and Philadelphia  (Morgan Lewis) showing
up  on  one  or more  lists.  Boston  law  firms  are  notably  absent  from  the
M&A top-ten lists.
4.  The Takeover Defenses
In total, fifteen categories of governance terms were encountered (set
out in Appendix A) and were coded in dummy variables (essentially "yes,"
"no,"  or "no choice"). Table 3 reports  summary statistics  on these terms. 84
Most companies  adopted  normal capital structures,  with a single  class of
common stock having one vote per share, but eighteen  (11%)  adopted dual
class  structures.  Of these, thirteen  (8%)  sold  low-vote  stock in the  IPO,
suggesting  that  the structures  are  intended to maintain  a  "lock"  on  con-
trol.'  Blank check preferred, which enables poison pills to be adopted re-
gardless  of the number of authorized  common  shares not yet issued,  was
provided for by 86% of companies, and the number of authorized  common
shares  was  sufficiently  large that pills  could be  adopted  at an additional
10%  of companies, leaving only 4% of companies with an implicit pill ban,
and none with an explicit prohibition on pills. 8 6
After dual  class structures,  the single most significant  structural  de-
fense (the classified board) was in place  at the time of the IPO in 34% of
the sample  companies. Yet in most cases,  IPO firms had mechanisms that
would render any classified board moot. At 69% of companies, sharehold-
ers could remove directors without cause,  and at 34% of companies, share-
holders had the power to expand and "pack" the board, so that the takeover
defense  effects  of roughly  half of the classified  boards in the sample  (or
about  18%  of the  full  sample)  were  avoidable.  At  70%  of companies,
184.  Not reflected  are sui generis governance  terms adopted by a small number (less than 5%) of
firms that relate to their industry, ownership structure,  or other factors. Thus, notwithstanding the near-
total contracting  freedom  that firms  theoretically  have at their disposal, they  rarely  exercise  it. This
finding is consistent with arguments I and others have made elsewhere that transaction costs, signalling
effects,  and network  externalities  may substantially  constrain  choice of governance  terms  by firms.
Coates, Fair Value, supra  note  131,  at 1295-1306.
185.  Daines & Klausner, supra note  8,  at 95-97 tbl.2,  find dual  class structures  in 64% of IPOs
1994-97, and Field, supra  note 8,  at 7, 31 fig.l, finds dual class structures in 7% of IPOs  1988-92, and
5% of her sample have dual class structures and sell low-vote stock to the public.
186.  Daines & Klausner, supra note  8,  at 96 tbl.2,  find blank check  preferred  in 95% of IPOs
between  1994-97.
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shareholders have the ability to either (or both):  (a)  act by written consent
(51%)  or  (b)  call  a special meeting  by  a vote of less than a  majority of
shareholders  (67%).  Given that cumulative  voting fell  out of favor in the
U.S.  well  before  the  sample  period, 87  a  surprisingly  large  13%  of
companies  chose  to permit it (either expressly  in their  charters  or by not
reincorporating to one of the vast majority of states that permit or presume
its elimination). Of those twenty companies, only two had classified boards
(which  as  described  in Appendix  B  can  turn  cumulative  voting  from  a
takeover vulnerability  into a defense).
5.  Incorporation,  Default Law, and Contestability  Index
To  calculate  a  firm's legal  takeover vulnerability,  it  is  necessary  to
review not only the company's  governance terms, but also the default cor-
porate  laws supplied by the twenty-three states where the companies  were
organized.  Table  3  reports  summary  statistics  on  state  of incorporation.
Delaware was the choice of state of incorporation for 62% of public com-
panies,'88  California was  second with  8%  of the companies,  and no other
jurisdiction was chosen by more than 5%  of companies. Over 95% of com-
panies incorporated in Delaware  or their headquarters jurisdiction, whereas
only  one  of the  Delaware  companies  was  actually  headquartered  in
Delaware.
Data on governance terms were then combined with the contestability
algorithm to compute  an  actual contestability  index ("CI") for each  com-
pany. The mean contestability  index for the entire sample  was  167, mean-
ing  it  would  require  a  minimum  of 167  days  to  take  over  the  average
company. The lowest index in the sample was for companies with implicit
pill  bans  (CI  =  30),  and the highest  for  those  companies  with  effective
staggered boards  and cumulative voting (CI = 998).  The most common CI
187.  See generally Jeffrey  N.  Gordon,  Institutions as  Relational Investors: A  New  Look  at
Cumulative Voting, 94  COLUM.  L.  REV.  124,  145-46 (1994)  (noting that mandatory  cumulative voting
was law in twenty-two states in the late 1940s, but was the default law in only six states and mandatory
in none by  1992). For data on cumulative voting, see Sanjai  Bhagat & James  A. Brickley, Cumulative
Voting:  The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339  (1984)  (reporting that
24%  of NYSE  firms had cumulative  voting in  1982);  CHARLES  M.  WILLIAMS,  CUMULATIVE  VOTING
FOR  DiPEcToRs  66-69  (1951)  (noting  that  in sixty-nine  proxy  fights  1943-48,  60%  of targets  had
cumulative voting, and estimating that 40% of 2,900 total firms  sampled had cumulative voting, most
due  to  mandatory  statutes,  but  9%  from  voluntary  choice);  David  Ikenberry  & Josef  Lakonishok,
Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66  J. Bus. 405,  414
(1993)  (reporting that in ninety-seven proxy contests  1968-87, 34% of targets had cumulative voting).
Analysis  of  data  from  INVESTOR  REsPONSIBILITY  RESEARCH  CENTER,  CORPORATE  TAKEOVER
DEFENSES  (1995  &  1997),  shows  that about  11%  of the  S&P  1500 and  the  500 other large  or high-
profile firms tracked by IRRC had cumulative voting in  1997,  but half of these firms also had classified
boards, which can turn  cumulative voting from a takeover vulnerability into a defense;  as  described in
Appendix C, many of the remaining firms presumably  had cumulative voting for a long time, and are
unable  to obtain shareholder approval to abolish it.
188.  Field & Karpoff, supra note 8,  at 37 tbl.3,  find a similar 59% of their sample  incorporate in
Delaware.
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was 45,  and the  distribution was  left-skewed:  the 25th percentile  and the
median of the distribution of the index were both 45, and the 75th percen-
tile was 211.
Figure  2  groups  companies  into  categories  based  on the  index  and
shows the u-shaped distribution of overall legal takeover vulnerability  for
both the IPO sample and the largest public companies in the Fortune 20. As
can be seen, most companies  left themselves fairly vulnerable to a hostile
takeover, but a  significant minority  (28%)  installed  substantial  defenses.
Because of the dichotomous  character  of most governance terms,  CIs do
not appear in a smooth distribution  across  the range  of possible  CIs,  but
instead cluster in five groups (with some variation within the clusters).
FIGURE 2:  DISTRIBUTION  OF DEFENSES
IPO  Sample and Fortune  20
50%  .
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m  IPO Sample  Fortune 20
6.  D&O Ownership,  Retention, and Amendments
In an IPO, pre-IPO  shareholders  do not usually sell  control;  instead,
on average,  they retain a majority of the firm's stock. In the sample,  the
median stake sold is only 35%, with less than 25%  of IPOs involving sales
of 50%  or more of the pre-IPO  shareholders'  stake." 59 Directors  and offi-
cers  ("D&Os")  own a large  percentage  of the retained  stake:  the median
post-IPO  ownership  by D&Os  as  a group,  and by the CEO  alone,  were
189.  Cf.  Field, supra note 8, at 5-6 tbl.1 & 2 (observing  that in 1,019  1988-92 IPOs, an average of
32% of voting shares sold, cutting median D&O ownership  from 73% to 50%); Mikkelson et al., supra
note  173,  at  287 tbl.2 (observing  that in 283  1980-83  IPOs,  average  of 32% of voting  shares  sold,
cutting median D&O ownership from 68% to 44%).
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42% and  8%,  respectively.19  Because  governance  terms can generally  be
changed by majority  shareholder vote, the retention of majority stakes by
pre-IPO shareholders  suggests that governance terms at the time of the IPO
might  not reliably  be the governance  terms that  will apply  in the future.
Therefore, the terms may have no real effect on the takeover vulnerability
of a  firm.  If true,  this  reasoning  would  suggest  that  companies  would
amend their governance terms following the IPO but before they sold down
their majority stakes.
By the seventh  year after the  IPO, in contrast,  median D&O  owner-
ship has fallen below  14%, and directors and officers own less than 20% of
the  company  in two-thirds  of the  sample.'91  Thus,  the  companies  in  the
sample studied in this Article should have "fixed" their CIs well before the
present. Nearly all  of the companies  amended their  charters  at least once
after the IPO, primarily to increase  shares of authorized  capital stock. Less
than  5%  of the  sample  amended  their  charter  so  as to  adopt meaningful
new defenses  that would alter their  CI.  Only seven  (6%) of the  105 firms
lacking classified boards at the IPO adopted  classified boards in the  seven
years after the IPO.
H.  Mean Comparisons  and Univariate  Regressions
Data on governance  terms  and the contestability  index  can be  parti-
tioned based  on other variables,  and the means compared  as first tests  of
some of the theories described  in Parts  II and III.  Summary data on parti-
tions  and related mean comparisons  are  shown  in Table  5,  and summary
data on defenses  installed by the specific top law  firms in the  sample  are
shown  in Table  4.19z  Univariate  regressions  are  also  used  to  supplement
these comparisons as a preliminary step toward the multivariate  analysis in
Part IV.I.
1.  Law Firm Identity and Location
At the most general level, law firm identity appears to affect defenses.
One-way analysis of variance shows that mean contestability indices differ
across law firms (p < .01). More detailed analysis is limited by the fact that
law firms  rarely serve more than once or twice as corporate counsel in the
sample.  The  only  exceptions  are  Skadden  Arps  (seven  companies)  and
Wilson Sonsini  (nine companies).  Both  appear to use boilerplate,  but the
two firms appear to use radically different suites of defenses.
190.  Mikkelson,  Partch  and Shah report that D&Os retain  an average of 44% of the companies  in
their sample of 283 IPOs  1980-83.  Mikkelson et al., supra  note  173, at 287 tbl.2.
191.  Cf  id. at  288-89  tbl.2  (stating that  after 5 years,  about 5% of 283  IPOs  1980-83  have  a
majority shareholder, and 60%  of directors are independent).
192.  Mean comparisons are two-tailed t-tests with unequal variance.
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TABLE 5
SuMMARY DATA ON PARTITIONS  AND RELATED  MEANS COMPARISONS
Mean Contestability  Classified  Dual Class
Index  Board  Control
(see Appendix B)  Structure
0
00  .--  Od  w-
0.  0
Splitoff (equity carve-out)  154.43  162.98  0.89  43%  0.48  7%  0.95
Reverse LBO  148.90  165.33  0.70  27%  0.38  7%  0.84
Venture Capital Backing  194.60  142.61  0.17  40%  0.18  5%  0.32
Family Ownership  144.35  170.60  0.48  22%  0.06  20%  0.00
Firm Uses Owner Name  109.30  165.92  0.35  20%  0.36  40%  0.06
CEO Founded Company  174.47  150.65  0.49  32%  0.90  8%  0.93
Development Stage at IPO  107.17  179.05  0.03  25%  0.26  11%  0.46
Unit Offering  55.76  175.46  0.00  12%  0.02  6%  0.74
Company Counsel
Skadden Arps  525.00  165.16  0.02  71%  0.08  29%  0.28
Wilson Sonsini  68.33  187.77  0.00  22%  0.46  0%  0.00
Silicon Valley  51.67  168.86  0.00  11%  0.07  0%  0.00
California  141.67  167.01  0.56  23%  0.17  3%  0.22
Company Incorporated
Delaware  187.69  121.31  0.06  38%  0.13  8%  0.71
California  45.41  171.76  0.05  0%  0.00  8%  0.92
RMBCA States (control  100.11  185.99  0.02  23%  0.06  7%  0.83
provisions)
Industry (3-digit SIC)
Drugs (283)  239.13  0.22  50%  0.19  6%  0.83
Computer Services  265.21  0.14  43%  0.48  0%  0.00
(incl. softvare) (737)
Medical Instruments (384)  163.60  0.99  30%  0.83  0%  0.00
Holding Companies (671)  231.50  0.43  63%  0.14  13%  0.69
Health Services (809)  73.29  0.00  43%  0.64  0%  0.00
Computer Equipment (357)  50.00  0.00  20%  0.53  0%  0.00
2001] 1361CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
TABLE 5  (CONT'D)
SUMMARY DATA ON PARTITIONS  AND RELATED  MEANS COMPARISONS
Mean Contestability  Classified  Dual Class
Index  Board  Control
(see Appendix B)  Structure
0  0 o dc
I.R.
Industry (3-digit SIC)
Restaurants  (581)  189.20  0.81  60%  0.33  0%  0.00
Electronic Components  98.25  0.20  0%  0.00  0%  0.00
(367)
Telephone  229.00  0.64  100%  0.00  0%  0.00
Communications (481)
Lead Underwriters  (CM2)
Lehman Bros. (7.50)  177.40  0.84  30%  0.83  20%  0.35
Merrill Lynch (8.88)  250.50  0.28  60%  0.12  10%  0.80
Alex. Brown (8.88)  255.50  0.35  63%  0.14  0%  0.00
Goldman Sachs (9.00)  159.25  0.96  50%  0.39  13%  0.69
First Boston (9.00)  313.86  0.19  71%  0.08  14%  0.64
Kidder Peabody (8.83)  203.00  0.68  29%  0.79  14%  0.64
Montgomery (8.75)  126.14  0.66  29%  0.79  0%  0.00
Prudential (8.75)  203.71  0.70  43%  0.64  0%  0.00
Morgan Stanley (8.88)  262.33  0.40  50%  0.48  0%  0.00
Painewebber (8.75)  118.50  0.38  17%  0.35  0%  0.00
Robertson (8.75)  48.33  0.00  0%  0.00  0%  0.00
OLS  I logit  logit
Top Ten Lead Manager  196.33  0.03  41%  0.02  7%  0.90
Average
CM21
93   0.02  0.01  0.68
Bold indicates statistical significance at 95%  level.
Six of Skadden's  seven  clients  have  classified  boards,  none  permit
shareholders to remove directors without cause, two have dual class control
structures,  and five have  CIs of 605.  (Recall that a CI of 605  means  that
shareholders  must as a legal matter wait 605 days before being entitled to
193.  See Appendix C.
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replace a majority of the company's board; such a large CI greatly impedes
proxy fights and,  in the era of the poison pill, hostile bids generally.)  In
near-complete  contrast, only one of the nine Wilson Sonsini  clients has a
classified board, all allow  removal of directors without cause, none have
dual class control structures, and six have CIs of  45. Companies  advised by
Skadden Arps have a mean CI of 525,  well above the mean for any other
partition tested; those advised by Wilson Sonsini, by contrast, have a mean
CI of 50, well below the sample  average  of 180.  A t-test and a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test easily reject the hypotheses that the mean and median CIs for
companies  advised  by the two firms  are the  same, or that the two  firms
make  similar recommendations  regarding  classified  boards  or dual  class
capital structures  (p < .001).
11
4
Consistent with the hypothesis  that geographic  networks  of lawyers
affect the legal advice they give, law firm effects generalize beyond Wilson
Sonsini  to  the sample  companies  advised  by other  Silicon  Valley-based
lawyers. 9 5 Companies  advised by Valley law firms have a mean CI of 52,
compared to a mean CI of 188 for companies advised by law firms outside
the Valley, and a mean of 179  for companies  advised by New York law
firms.'96  As will be discussed in Part IV.I.3,  however, neither the Wilson
194.  To verify that the difference between Skadden and Wilson Sonsini clients was not a statistical
fluke caused by small subsamples, I oversampled IPO companies covered by SDC in  1991-92 advised
by both law firms, checking  for the most important single  defense,  the classified board, at all  IPOs in
which either firm was issuer counsel. Results were  qualitatively the same as  reported here:  only three
of the total 43  Wilson Sonsini  clients  in 1991-92  had classified boards,  whereas  fourteen of the total
twenty Skadden clients  had classified  boards. A t-test again  easily rejects the hypothesis that the two
firms provided similar advice about classified boards (p < .001).
195.  Each  of Wilson  Sonsini's two early local  competitors-Ware  & Friedenrich  and  Fenwick,
Davis-appear once in the sample. Friedman et al., supra  note 53,  at 560-61 (detailing the early growth
of Wilson  Sonsini and Ware & Friedenrich firms). From 1980 through today, Wilson Sonsini left local
competition behind, growing from  12 lawyers in  1975  to 120 in  1988, 214 in  1991,  299 in  1996,  and
448 in  1998. Ware & Friedenrich,  which also had 12 lawyers in 1975, grew more slowly, to 66 in 1988,
86 in  1991,  132 in 1996,  and 269 in  1998  (after merging with Gray  Cary).  In the late  1980s, Wilson
Sonsini began to face more competition  from branch offices of San  Francisco  law firms, particularly
Brobeck & Phleger and Cooley Godward, see Sucim tAN, supra note 52,  at 34-44, and,  more recently
from  Gunderson  Dettmer  (a  1995  spin-off of Brobeck),  Venture  Law  Group  (a  1997  spin-off  of
Wilson), and the Palo Alto offices of Davis Polk, Simpson Thacher, and Sullivan & Cromwell. Lawyer
attrition has soared,  from  spin-offs,  lateral moves  to  out-of-state  firms,  and moves  in-house at start-
ups:  Wilson lost  110  associates  in  1999.  Still, Wilson  Sonsini  remains  the  leading  firm  in  Silicon
Valley today, with 600 lawyers in the year 2000 and the leading market share of IPOs in 1998.
196.  Beyond  Santa  Clara  County,  defenses  are  more  varied,  but  evidence  suggests  that  San
Francisco-based  law firms  active  in  Silicon Valley also  followed Wilson Sonsini's  lead and installed
few defenses for  their clients:  clients of Brobeck  Phleger's  office  in San  Francisco,  for  example,  all
had CIs of 45, and none had either classified boards or dual class structures.  One Bay Area exception is
Cooley Godward,  which  has an  average  CI  of 420 and  installs  classified boards  at two  of its three
sample  clients.  While  the  subsample  is  too  small  to  test  these  differences  statistically,  Cooley's
willingness  to  depart from  Silicon  Valley standards  in the  IPO  context  is mirrored  by a  distinctive
contract  style  in  the  VC  context  in  the  same  period.  See  SucMAN,  supra note  52,  at  271-72
(contrasting  Wilson  Sonsini's  VC  contracts  with  Cooley's  VC  contracts).  By  contrast,  Brobeck
Phleger's  VC  contract  innovation,  Id.  at  264  (characterizing  Brobeck  VC  agreements  asCALIFORNIA LA  W REVIEW
Sonsini  effect  nor  the  general  Silicon  Valley  effect  persists  from  the
1991-92  sample to the  1998-99  sample.  A discussion of how to interpret
these findings is deferred to Part V.
2.  Company Location and Industry
In contrast to law firm location,  headquarters location appears to have
no  correlation  with  takeover  defenses,  and  industry  type  no  correlation
with defenses other than dual class structures.1 9 7  Companies  headquartered
in California had a mean CI of 142,  statistically equivalent to that of com-
panies  headquartered  in  New  York  (162),  Massachusetts  (148),
Pennsylvania  (217), or elsewhere in the sample  (167).198  Companies head-
quartered in Silicon Valley had CIs that are not significantly different from
those headquartered  outside Silicon Valley, whether  in California  or else-
where. The same is true when company location and law firm location are
combined  in  a  two-by-two  analysis.  As  shown  in Table  5A,  companies
based  in Silicon Valley  advised  by law  firms  outside  Silicon Valley  had
more defenses than companies advised by law firms inside Silicon Valley,
regardless  of where  the companies  were based.'99  Law firm  location has a
greater effect on takeover defense adoption than does company location.
"paradigm-pushing"),  is  not  mirrored  in this  sample  of IPOs.  Beyond  Santa  Clara  County and  San
Francisco, the Silicon Valley results do not generalize to other California law firms:  once all California
law firms are  included, mean Cl  rises to  130, not statistically  different from mean CI  of 192 for non-
California law firms.
197.  SucHmAN, supra note 52, at 158-62,  finds law firm  location, headquarters  location, and VC
location each separately affect VC financing  contracts, but with controls for industry, investment size,
and investor diversity,  only law  firm  location  effects  persist in  a  combined  regression  (model  10  in
Table 6.7).
198.  Classified boards were  likewise no  less common  at companies  headquartered  in California
(27%), New York (34%), or elsewhere  in the sample (33%).
199.  Although cell counts  for Silicon Valley companies  and law firms  are small, concerns  about
small subsample sizes should be allayed  by the fact that the  same qualitative results  were found in an
oversample of Wilson Sonsini clients. See supra  note  194.
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TABLE 5A
DEFENSES BY LAW FIRM LOCATION AND  COMPANY LOCATION
Company  HQ Location
Silicon Valley  Other
Silicon Valley  Mean CI = 52  Mean CI = 45
n=7  n=2
Law Firm
Location  Other  Mean  CI = 178  Mean CI = 167
n=6  n= 147
Notes
Silicon Valley:  located in Santa Clara County, California
Company HQ:  headquarters of company
CI:  contestability index-see Appendix B
Mean and median CIs  for particular industry subgroups were also not
very different from the full  sample.  One-way  analysis  of variance  shows
insignificant  variation across industry  groups of mean CIs  or incidence  of
dual  class  control  structures  or  classified  boards  (p> .25),  and  a
Kruskal-Wallis  test  shows  insignificant  variation  of  median  CIs
(p> .80).200  Nor do industry and company location interact in any discerni-
ble way:  defenses  at high-tech  companies headquartered  in California  (or
Silicon Valley) did not differ significantly from high-tech companies head-
quartered  elsewhere, either as a group  or within specific  high-tech indus-
tries.20'  Again,  a  simple  two-by-two  analysis  of defenses  by  law  firm
location and companies in "high-tech"  industries, shown in Table 5B,  con-
firms  that law firm  location  dominates  in its  effect  on  takeover defense
adoption. Companies in "high tech" industries advised by law firms outside
Silicon Valley have more defenses than companies  in other industries, and
200.  Except for dual class  structures, apparent  differences  in Table 5  are not robust.  At the two-
digit SIC level,  health services companies in the sample have higher CIs than average, but at the three-
digit level,  they have lower CIs, and median CIs  are not significantly different from the full sample at
either level.  Computer equipment  companies,  which  have a  lower than average  CI at both two-  and
three-digit  levels  and  are  less  likely  to  have  dual  class  control  structures,  have  statistically
indistinguishable median CIs at both levels, and statistically similar odds of having classified boards.
201.  High-tech industries,  by three-digit SIC categories, are computer equipment  (357), software
(737), electronics (367), medical instruments (384), and "biotech,"  consisting of drugs (283) and health
services (809).  These industries  drive  Silicon Valley. SucHmAN,  supra note  52,  at 13-23;  ROGERS  &
LARSEN,  supra note  143, at 25-42. Mean  CIs, and classified board and dual class incidence,  are nearly
the same  for  California-HQ  versus  non-Califomia-HQ,  and  Silicon-Valley-HQ  versus  non-Silicon-
Valley-HQ,  in each industry and in all high-tech industries as a group.
2001] 1365CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89:1301
companies  advised  by  Silicon  Valley  law  firms,  high-tech  or  not,  have
nearly no defenses.
202
TABLE  5B
DEFENSES  BY LAW  FIRM LOCATION  AND  COMPANY INDUSTRY
Company Industry
High-Tech  Other
Silicon Valley  Mean CI = 55  Mean  CI = 45
n=6  n=3
Law Firm
Location  Other  Mean CI=200  Mean  CI=153
n  =  52  n=  101
Notes
Silicon Valley:  law firm located in Santa Clara County, California
High-tech industry:  high-tech 3-digit SIC code-see note  185
CI:  contestability index-see Appendix B
3.  State of  Incorporation
The state of incorporation of IPO companies  also accounts  for differ-
ences in takeover defenses.  Companies  incorporated  in Delaware had more
defenses than average (mean CI of 188 versus  121  for non-Delaware  com-
panies,  p < .03),  and  adopt  classified  boards  more  frequently  than  non-
Delaware  companies  (38%  versus  26%).203  By contrast,  companies  incor-
porated  in California  have fewer  defenses  than  average  (mean  CI of 45,
p < .001), as do those that follow  the RMBCA  on control  defaults  (mean
CI  of  100,  p<.001).  Not  a  single  sample  company  incorporated  in
202.  "High-tech"  industries  are  listed supra note  201.  Nor  are  industry or company  patterns of
defense  adoption  revealed  by  simply  eyeballing  the sample,  as  reflected  in Table  2.  Defenses  are
adopted by some but not all of the larger, well-known  companies in mature industries, and some but not
all  of the smaller,  development-stage  companies  in high-tech  industries.  Defenses  were  adopted  by
some but  not all  companies  intending to use  IPO  proceeds  to pay down  debt,  and  some  but not  all
companies intending to the use IPO proceeds to fund additional research and development.
203.  In  their  multivariate  regressions,  Field  &  Karpoff find  Delaware  companies  have  more
defenses, supra note  8, at 38 tbl.4, especially shareholder meeting  requirements, id. at 39 tbl.5, but are
no  more  likely to have classified  boards. The  fact  that Delaware companies  adopt more  defenses  on
average  suggests that whatever causes the "Delaware effect"  found in Robert  Daines, Does Delaware
Law Improve Firm Value? (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for L. & Bus., Working Paper CLB-99-011,  1999) (on file
with  author),  the  cause  is  not  greater  vulnerability  to  hostile  takeovers  on  the part  of Delaware
companies, as Daines speculates.
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California adopted a classified board, compared to 33%  for the full sample
(p < .001), and companies that follow  the RMBCA  control defaults  adopt
fewer classified boards than average (23%, p < .06).
4.  Underwriters
Underwriter reputation  also  correlates  positively  with defenses.  In a
simple regression of CI on Carter-Manaster ratings  for the lead underwrit-
ers  in the sample, the coefficient  was positive and statistically significant
(p < .02),  as  shown in Table  5.  Likewise,  companies  with  higher-quality
underwriters  were more likely to install classified boards (p < .0 1). Among
IPOs involving the top ten lead managers in the sample, which have higher
than average C-M ratings, all but one had significantly higher than average
CIs  and classified boards,2"  and regressions  of the top ten sample under-
writers  on  CI  and classified  board  were positive  and statistically  signifi-
cant. Overall, the better the underwriter, the more defenses employed.
5.  Development Stage Companies  and Unit Offerings
About  23%  of the sample  companies  were  still  in the development
stage,  and about  11%  of the IPOs are unit offerings.2"5 Both types of com-
panies adopted  significantly fewer defenses:  a mean  CI  of 107 for devel-
opment-stage  companies, compared to 179 for other companies, and mean
CI  of 56 for companies  engaging in unit offerings,  compared  to  175  for
other  companies  (p < .05 for each).  Companies  engaged  in unit offerings
were  also  significantly  less  likely to  adopt  classified  boards  (11%,  com-
pared to 35% for other companies, p < .02). Dual class structures, however,
were no less common at development-stage  companies  or companies  con-
ducting unit offerings.
6.  Owner Type and CEOs
Prior to the  IPO, about  9%  of the sample  companies were  owned  in
whole or in part by corporate parents, another  19%  by LBO funds," 6 about
35%  by VC funds,2"7 and about 32% by individuals or families (with slight
204.  The one exception is Robertson Stevens (4% of the sample).
205.  Two-thirds  of the  unit  offerings  in  my  sample  are  development  stage  companies.  Field
excludes unit offerings, and finds fewer (7%) development-stage companies.
206.  Cf Field, supra note 8,  at  16  (reporting that  12%  of 1,019  IPOs  1988-92 are  equity  carve-
outs, and 21%  reverse LBOs).  Ritter, supra note  14,  at 16 n.15,  found a tiny number of reverse LBOs
(15  of 1,526 IPOs  1975-84) because LBOs themselves were rare prior to the 1980s. Daines & Klausner,
supra note 8, at 93, purposely oversampled reverse LBOs and VC-backed IPOs.
207.  VC backing in the sample is similar to overall VC backing  of IPOs in the sample period, as
reported by Venture  Economics in  1997, with VCs backing 30%  (287 of 988) firm  commitment non-
closed-end fund IPOs reported in Going Public: The IPO Reporter  in 1991-92.  VENTURE  EcoNoMIcs,
VErTR  CAPITAL  YEaRBOOK  (1997);  GOING  PUBLIC:  Tim  IPO  REPORTER,  Dec.  31,  1991,  at  1;
GOING  PUBLIC:  THE IP0 REPORTER, Dec.  31,  1990, at 1. See also William A. Sahlman, Structure and
Governance of Venture Capital Organizations,  27 J. FIN. EcoN. 473,  478 tbl.1  (1990)  (reporting 30%
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overlap  among these categories). 08 With one exception, none of these  sub-
sets of companies  show significantly different defenses than other compa-
nies. The exception to these nonresults is companies owned by individuals
or families, which  are  more  likely to adopt  dual  class  control  structures.
Companies  that use  an owner name  in their business name  are  also more
likely to adopt dual class structures. 2"9 Table 5 summarizes this data.
7.  Summary of  Mean Comparisons
In  sum, law  firm identity  and location  have clear  relationships  with
defenses  adopted."0  Company  industry  or headquarters  location,  in  con-
trast, have no significant effect. Together these findings support the lawyer
hypotheses:  the  lawyer-client  relationship  has  more  to  do  with  defense
adoption than do any positive or negative  effect of defenses  on company
value.  ' In addition to lawyers, underwriter identity correlates with defense
adoption,  consistent  with  the  banker  hypotheses.  Surprisingly,  however,
companies advised by higher-quality underwriters are more likely to adopt
defenses,  not less. If price penalties  are imposed  by the  IPO market  as a
result of defense adoption, it seems likely that pre-IPO owner-managers  are
aware of that fact, and variation  in defense  adoption cannot  be attributed
solely to failure in the market for underwriter services.
8.  Gaffes
One final preliminary finding supports the core of the lawyer hypothe-
ses, that lawyer-client agency costs are an important part of the contracting
process  leading to defense adoption in IPOs.  In the sample, the process  of
reviewing  governance  terms  uncovered  a  large  number  of "gaffes,"  or
of non-fund IPOs  1977-88  above $1 offer price were VC-backed).  VC backing in the sample is slightly
higher because  Venture Capital Yearbook (which  relies  largely  on  self-reporting  by VCs)  is slightly
less reliable than  inspection of IPO prospectuses.  Only two of 17 unit offerings in the  sample have VC
backing;  if excluded,  VC  backing  rises  to 41%.  Cf Field,  supra note  8,  at  32  tbl.l  (reporting  VC-
backing at 45%  of 1,019  IPOs 1988-92; sample excludes unit offerings).
208.  Field, supra note 8, at 32  tbl. I shows a much lower 4%  for family-owned  firms, because she
counts only firms owned by a single individual.
209.  In contrast, but consistent with  Daimes & Klausner, supra note 8,  at  108 tbl.6, the  fact that a
company was founded by the person who is the CEO at the time of the IPO has no effect on  adoption of
any type of defense in simple mean comparisons.
210.  This  is despite  the  fragmented nature  of the market  for  lawyers  in the  IPO  context,  with
resulting difficulties  in finding empirical  regularities  even  in sizeable  samples. See supra note 97  for
data on fragmented  IPO lawyer market.
211.  These inferences are reinforced by the striking fact  that the number of classified  boards, and
mean and median Cls, are statistically the same for companies with ordinary  one-share/one-vote capital
structures as  for dual  class firms (both for dual class structures  as a whole, and for companies that sell
low-vote  stock  in the  IPO).  This  similarity  suggests  either  that  dual  class  capital  structures  are  not
viewed  as  substitutes  for other types  of defenses,  or that the process  that generates other  defenses is
sufficiently imprecise or unconstrained that defenses are not fine-tuned to reflect something as basic as
whether pre-IPO owners intend to retain a "lock"  on control.
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apparent legal mistakes. 2  Many gaffes are clear and uncontroversial,  such
as contradictions between charter and bylaws, or between charter and man-
datory  terms  of state  corporate  law.  Also  found  are  what appear  to  be
"functional  mistakes,"  such  as  the  selection  of staggered  boards  (which
impose more delay on shareholders'  ability to appoint a new board major-
ity) but the simultaneous inclusion of terms (such as allowing shareholders
to act by written consent and remove  directors) that "undo"  the effect of a
staggered board, rendering  it useless. 21 3 Table 3 reports  summary statistics
on uncontroversial  gaffes:  conflicting or illegal provisions are observed  in
10%  of the sample. In addition,  functional mistakes appear in  an overlap-
ping 18%  of the sample. Clear gaffes  and functional mistakes reinforce the
evidence  suggesting that lawyers  have much to do with defense variation.
If the constraints on law firms were significant and general, one would not
expect to ever see such clear gaffes as illegal provisions. 2 4
L  Multivariate  Regression Analysis
The effects of law firms  on takeover defense  incidence  are tested in
multivariate  regressions,  shown  in  Table  6.215  The  various  hypotheses
212.  Gaffes  were not initially  sought in the research  and were discovered  as a by-product  of the
governance term review process. As a result, only the most egregious and clear gaffes were likely to be
found, and data reported likely understates gaffes in the sample.
213.  Delaware  law provides  in DGCL section  141(k),  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit.  8,  § 141(k) (1991  &
Supp. 1998), that unless the charter says otherwise,  directors on classified boards can only be removed
for cause, but this default rule can be altered by a provision in the charter. The equivalent provision of
the RMBCA allows removal without cause as a default matter, even for classified  boards. In my view,
it is  a  functional  mistake  for  a  Delaware  company  to  adopt  a  classified  board but  simultaneously
include a charter provision allowing removal without cause, as several companies in my sample did, as
well  as for  a  RMBCA-governed  company to  adopt  a  classified  board  and fail  to include  a  charter
provision specifying that directors may only be removed for cause.
214.  Although  some  of what  are  apparently  functional  mistakes  may  have  been  intentional,
justifications for such provisions are not compelling. For example, staggered boards that can be avoided
by shareholder action have been justified on the ground that they provide board stability and were not
intended to serve as  takeover defenses. See Koppes  et al., supra note 21,  at 1053-54.  But there is  no
strong reason  that a board that is not staggered could not provide  for stability in other ways.  It could
adopt a resolution or bylaw specifying that directors'  ongoing tenure would be up for review every few
years or so, and stating that directors  would be  ordinarily replaced in a planned  and careful  manner.
Such a resolution or bylaw would not deter a hostile bid or shareholder effort to remove the board, but
would otherwise provide the same degree of "stability" provided by staggered board provisions, which
do not after all prevent board members from resigning whenever they wish. It should also be noted that
directors may generally not remove  other directors without cause, so that to the extent the concern for
stability is solely about intra-board conflicts,  removal without cause  provisions are  irrelevant.  In any
event, the fact that clear gaffes (other than arguable mistakes) were also commonly found in the sample
reinforces  the general  impression that lawyers working on IPOs  do not spend much  time perfecting,
much less fine-tuning, provisions with a clear and nuanced sense of the client's advantage in mind.
215.  As  data is missing for some companies  (primarily  companies  not found in  COMPUSTAT),
the  number  of observations  declines  as  the  models become  more  complex.  A Cook-Veisberg  test
indicates  heteroscedasticity  in  the base  model,  so all  results are reported  with  White-Huber robust
standard  errors. See H. white, A  Heteroscedasticity-Consistent  Covariance Matrix Estimator and a
Direct  Test  for Heteroscedasticity,  48 EcoNouMErMucs  817  (1980).CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
described  in Parts  II and III may be  formalized in  a simple model  as  fol-
lows:
Defenses  = a +  +XI  + P2X2 +
where  X,  is  a vector  of explanatory  variables,  X2 is  a  vector of control
variables, and e is a standard error term. The principal  dependent variable
is the contestability index described in Part IV.B. The emphasis in this sec-
tion is presentation of findings; the results are interpreted in Part V.
1.  Basic Findings
Model  (1)  is  the  simplest,  ordinary  least  squares  ("OLS")  model,
containing  two  law  firm  variables  (SUITSDEL  and  SILVAL)  and  two
control  variables (MAINDACT  and CM2).  Each law firm variable  is  sta-
tistically  significant  and  has  the  predicted  sign.  The  more  M&A-related
lawsuits involving a company's IPO counsel  in the  1980s,  the stronger the
defenses that company adopts  (measured  by its contestability  index).  Cli-
ents advised  by law  firms based  in Silicon Valley  adopt  many fewer  de-
fenses  (measured  by  the  CI)  than  clients  advised  by  law  firms  based
elsewhere, even after controlling for law  firms'  M&A experience. In addi-
tion,  consistent  with  the findings  of Daines  &  Klausner,z 1 6  significantly
more defenses  are adopted by companies  in industries experiencing higher
levels of M&A activity  in the three years prior to the IPO. Finally, under-
writer quality has a positive and statistically significant impact on defenses.
Better quality  underwriters  correlate  with more  defenses,  controlling  for
law firm proficiency, location, and industry-M&A activity.
216.  Daines & Klausner, supra note 8, at 102  (noting more defenses following more industry level
M&A activity).
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Model  (2)  adds  to the base model  several controls that represent po-
tential  constraints on law firm autonomy,  such as company  size,  company
age, and whether the company is at the development stage.2 17 The results of
model  (1)  continue  to  hold.  Coefficients  for  each  variable  in
model  (1)  are  larger,  levels  of significance  higher,  and  the  explanatory
power (adjusted R-squared) rises to a healthy 32%.  In addition to the vari-
ables reported, Table 6 lists variables testing the alternative hypotheses that
were  added  to model  (2)  in unreported  regressions.  None  of these  vari-
ables tested had a significant impact on the variables shown.
Given the  construction  of the  contestability  index,  interpretation  of
coefficients is straightforward.  Not only are the effects of law firm identity
and location statistically  significant, they are also large in absolute terms.
An  estimate  from  model  (2)  is that  companies  with  Silicon Valley  law
firms can be taken over in  169 fewer days, on average, than other sample
companies.  Companies  advised  by  Silicon  Valley  law  firms,  in  other
words,  will have on average  almost six fewer months  to seek alternatives
should they become targets of hostile bids. For every ten Delaware M&A
lawsuits involving IPO counsel, its client increases by a month the number
of days shareholders need to replace a majority of the board (10  x 3.2 = 32
days). As a law firm's M&A proficiency increases  from the 10th percentile
to the 90th percentile (using SUITSDEL as a measure of M&A proficiency
and  holding  other  factors  constant  at  their mean values),  the  number of
days  shareholders  need to  replace  a  majority  of the board  increases  by
roughly  three  months.  For  every  ten M&A  transactions  in  a  company's
industry, a company increases  its time to takeover by seventy-seven days.
Where significant,  coefficients  on control  variables in model  (2)  are
consistent with the law  firm hypotheses.  Once  law firm  effects  are  con-
trolled  for, VC-backing  increases  defenses.  Defenses  are  more  likely  at
companies that are older, up to the hoary age of 130 years, after which the
negative  coefficient  on  AGECSQ  dominates  the  positive  coefficient  on
AGECO.
2.  Robustness Checks
The  robustness  of model  (2)  is  tested  using  alternative  dependent
variables,  shown  in  Table  6  in  models  (3)  through (5).218  Perhaps  the
217.  Underwriter  quality  is  omitted  from  model  (2)  because  CM2  is  highly  collinear  (~.7
correlation) with LNOFFSZ, as it is in Carter et al., supra note 98, at 1057.  In  unreported  regressions
using  CM2  instead of offer size,  similar findings were obtained:  the sign  on CM2  remains positive
throughout,  although  its statistical  significance is  marginal  in some  models. See also infra note 222
(presenting unreported regression  of CM2 and other predictors of classified boards).  Multicollinearity
of other  regressors  is  excluded  by  confirming  that  none  of  the  correlations  between  them  in
Model (2) exceed 0.2.
218.  Because  the primary measures  of a  law finn's  M&A proficiency  are highly collinear, only
SUITSDEL is included in  the reported  regressions.  As a  further robustness  check,  all of the primary
results  were  obtained  in  unreported  regressions  replacing  SUITSDEL  with  SUITSALL  or MASDC
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contestability index,  though theory-driven,  is  also  dictating the results  in
some  way.  Dual  class  capital  structures  and  classified  boards  are  worth
separate exploration as defenses that require shareholder approval and have
the greatest potential to deter bids. 219 Such defenses in isolation from other
defenses  have  also  been  the  subject  of prior  empirical  work. 22  Mod-
els  (3)  and  (4)  are logit  regressions  with CLASS  or DUALCON  as  de-
pendent  variables,  and  model  (5)  is  an  ordered  logit  regression  using
DEFENSE as the dependent variable, which is a theory-driven ranking that
includes classified boards and dual  class structures  in a  four-level  ranking
of increasing "toughness," in line with prior research.22'
Again,  model  (1)'s  results  continue  to hold.  Model  (3),  which  cor-
rectly predicts board classification in the sample 74% of the time, also pre-
dicts  that  as  a  law  firm's  M&A  proficiency  increases  from  the  10th
percentile to the 90th percentile (using SUITSDEL, and holding other fac-
tors constant),  the odds its clients will adopt a classified board increase by
about 20%. Clients of Silicon Valley law firms are less likely to adopt clas-
sified boards. More  likely to adopt  classified boards  are companies  in in-
dustries where  pre-IPO  bids were  common, companies  that are backed by
VCs, that are older (up to a point), or engaged in larger offerings.  The in-
significance of the other controls tested in model  (3)  compared to the base
model  suggests the other controls  are less related to classified boards than
they are to  other governance terms,  such as whether shareholders  can call
special meetings or remove directors without cause.222
(coefficients  vary  slightly  but  statistical  significance  levels  remain  above  99%).  The  model  also
produces results when  SUITSDEL is replaced  with a combination of LAWFRM1  and LAWFRMSQ,
which have negative  and positive  coefficients,  respectively, although  these results are  less statistically
significant  (p < .05)  and less robust to other controls.  Law  firm size also  matters, but less  than M&A
proficiency,  and has a  curvilinear relationship with defenses:  moderate  CI (-200) at small  firms (<50
lawyers),  low CI  (-100) at mid-sized firms  (50-150  lawyers),  and high CI (-400) at large firms (>150
lawyers).  Finally,  concem  about  possible outliers  suggested re-running  model  (2)  and  both dropping
observations  with Skadden  Arps, which is the non-Silicon  Valley law firm appearing most often in  the
sample,  and  adding  a  control  variable  for  Skadden  Arps.  Results  in  each  case  were  qualitatively
identical to those reported in model (2).
219.  Coates, Critique,  supra note 23, at 273, 325-26.
220.  Daines & Klausner, supra note 8, at 95-97; Field, supra  note 8, at 8-15.
221.  See Appendix C for the definition of DEFENSE, which is similar to a ranking used in Daines
& Klausner, supra note  8.  In  models  (5)  and  (6),  SILVAL  is omitted  because  none  of the  Silicon
Valley clients in the  sample adopt  dual class structures,  making  SILVAL  a perfect  "anti-predictor"  of
such defenses.
222.  In a  separate, simple unreported  logit regression  containing just UNIT,  MASDC,  RETAIN,
and  CM2,  similar  results  are  also  obtained,  with  each  variable  being  significantly  related  to  board
classification.  In that  model,  as  law  firm  M&A  experience  increases  from  the  10th  percentile  (zero
deals) to 90th (seventy-one  deals), odds of board classification  increase from  28% to 44%;  as Carter-
Manaster  ratings of the lead underwriter  increase  from the 10th percentile  (rating of two)  to the 90th
(rating of nine), odds of board classification  increase from  18%  to 37%; as pre-IPO  shareholder share
retention increases from the  10th to the 90th percentile, odds of board classification  increase from 21%
to 46%; and unit offerings have a 23%  lower chance of having a classified  board.
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Not only are dual class structures themselves not correlated with other
defenses,  model  (4)  shows  that  (non-law-firm)  predictors  of dual  class
structures differ from predictors of other types of defenses.  A large propor-
tion of dual  class  incidence in the sample  is predicted by three  variables
from the mean comparison analysis  in Part IV.H:  NAME, FAMILY,  and
LNOFFERSZ.  Consistent  with  Field,2"  dual  class  structures  seem  both
qualitatively  different  from  other  defenses  and related  to  (nonpecuniary)
private benefits of control, represented here by NAME and FAMILY.
The  ordered  logit results  in model  (5),  finally,  confirm the main re-
sults of both this simplified model (for dual class structures)  and the base
model (for other defenses).  The  fact that the ordered logit has  lower pre-
dictive power, and that some of the control  variables that are consistently
significant in the other models are not significant in the ordered logit, con-
firms the theoretical inferiority of simply ranking defenses in broad catego-
ries with little regard to the interactions  among them. 24 But this fact does
not undermine  the main evidentiary  conclusions  of the base  model:  law
firms affect defense incidence.
3.  Testing Persistence: The 1998-99 Sample
To see if the primary findings from the main sample persisted during
the 1990s, a separate sample of 195  IPOs was randomly chosen from  1998
and 1999. The number of variables investigated was significantly reduced
from those investigated in the main sample  (solely for time and budgetary
reasons).  Explanatory variables gathered were lead underwriter and Carter-
Manaster ratings; law  firm identity, location,  and M&A proficiency; 225  of-
fer size; earnings  for the fiscal year in which the  IPO took place; and state
of incorporation.  Dependent  variables  tested  consisted  of the  following
governance  terms:  classified  boards,  dual  class  capital  structures,  and
elimination of shareholders'  ability to act by written consent or call a spe-
cial meeting.  These three terms  are the dependent  variables used to con-
struct the variable DEFENSE tested for the main sample  in model  (5)  in
Table 6.
Again, basic  findings from the main sample  are confirmed.  Defenses
are  common at  the  IPO  stage, but continue  to  vary  significantly  among
companies. Defenses are  more common when companies  are  (a)  advised
223.  Field, supra note 8, at 14.
224.  For theoretical  reasons  that  the contestability  index  is  a better  measure  of legal  takeover
vulnerability, see Coates, Index, supra note 26, at 64-71.
225.  The MASDC variable was updated for this model, to account for M&A experience during the
1990s.
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by  law  firms  with more  M&A  proficiency,  (b)  represented  by  higher-
quality underwriters, or  (c)  engaged in larger offerings. 226
Two contrasts  between  the temporal  samples  are worth highlighting.
First, general defense incidence  in the 1998-99 sample is higher than in the
1991-92 sample. As reflected in Figure 3, classified board incidence at the
IPO  stage rose strikingly from 34%  in  1991-92 to 66% in  1998 to  82% in
1999.227  Companies  in  the  lowest  rank  (weakest  defenses)  of  the
DEFENSE  variable  fell  from 55%  in  1991-92  to 42%  in  1998-99,  while
companies  in  the  highest  rank  (toughest  defenses)  rose  from  23%  in
1991-92  to 39% in  1998-99. Using DEFENSE  and dual class structures to
predict what CI would  have been had the  full index been constructed  for
the 1998 sample,2 8 predicted  CI was 219, 31% higher than in  1991-92.  On
the other hand, companies adopting dual class capital structures dropped by
almost half, from 11%  in 1991-92  to 6% in 1998_99,29  consistent with the
view that those structures  are adopted for reasons  distinct from other types
of defenses.  Delaware's  dominance  over  state  of incorporation  for  new
public  companies  rose during the  1990s from 62% of IPOs in  1991-92  to
75% in 1998-99.
226.  Delaware  companies  also  adopted  more  defenses  in  1998-99.  Coefficients  (p-values)  on
separate ordered  logit regressions using DEFENSE  as the dependent variable are as  follows:  MASDC
0.009  (p < .06); CM2 (0.349 (p <  .03); DEINC  1.340 (p < .00); and LNSZ 0.707 (p < .00).
227.  This  time trend  is consistent  with Field, supra note  8,  at  12,  who  finds classified  boards in
35% of  IPOs  from  1988  to  1992,  and  Daines  & Klausner,  supra note  8,  at 95,  96  tbl.2,  who  find
classified  boards  in 43.5%  of IPOs  from  1994  to  1997.  The  trend  is interesting  given  that existing
public companies have almost never adopted classified boards "midstream"  in the same time period and
that  total  incidence  of classified  boards  in  large  companies  tracked  by IRRC  has  risen much  more
slowly. Coates, Critique,  supra note 23, at 324 fig. 1.
228.  In an OLS regression of DEFENSE on  CI, the R-squared  is 32%.  If dual  class structures are
further controlled for, the R-squared rises to 52%.
229.  Here, all dual  class capital structures are  compared,  rather than dual  class control  structures,
which  have been used  in most of the analysis  for the main sample. Data on  whether  companies  sold
low-vote stock was not gathered for the 1998  sample.
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FIGuRE 3:  CLASSIFIED BOARD  INCIDENCE IN IPOs
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Second,  defenses  adopted  by companies  advised  by  Silicon Valley
law firms no longer depart as dramatically from other law firms,  both ab-
solutely  and  after  controlling  for  M&A  proficiency  (which  increased
somewhat for Silicon Valley firms in the  1990s).2  Classified boards were
installed at 25% of Wilson Sonsini's clients,  and a dual class  structure at
another;  four of Brobeck Phleger's  nine clients  adopted  classified boards,
and another a dual class structure; and for Silicon Valley clients as a whole,
half adopted classified boards  (compared to none for the main sample).23 " '
Predicted CI for Silicon Valley law firm clients was 213, slightly below but
statistically equivalent to that predicted for the full sample.
V
INTERPRETATIONS
Two large random samples of IPOs from  1991-92  and  1998-99 con-
finm that takeover defenses at the IPO stage are common but vary signifi-
cantly from  company  to company  and reveal  the  new  fact that defenses
became  significantly  more  common  at the  IPO  stage  in the  late  1990s.
Analysis of the  samples reveals the new finding that companies  are more
likely to adopt  defenses  if their law firms  have more  M&A proficiency,
230.  Wilson  Sonsini's SUITSDEL rating, for example,  rose from one in the  1980s to thirteen  in
the  1990s,  while ratings  remained  constant for  Skadden Arps (eighty-six  in the 1980s,  eighty-four in
the 1990s) and Sullivan & Cromwell (ten in the 1980s, twelve in the 1990s).
231.  Compared to  other law  firms  in Silicon  Valley, Cooley Godward's  clients  continued  to be
most likely to adopt defenses, with all four adopting classified board structures.
2001] 1377CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
measured by the number of M&A lawsuits or transactions  in which the law
firms were involved  in the period prior to the IPO. Defenses were signifi-
cantly less likely in the early  1990s if the  law firm advising the company
was based  in Silicon  Valley, but  this correlation  disappeared  by  the  late
1990s.  Defenses  are  also  more  likely  if the company  had a more  highly
respected underwriter or venture capital backing or was in an industry that
experienced  high levels of M&A activity prior to the IPO.  In addition, the
data reveal that lawyers commonly made clear mistakes in IPO documents,
including adoption of clearly illegal terms,  terms that clearly  conflict with
one another, and terms in context that appear to perform no useful function.
The correlation between law firms'  M&A proficiency  and defenses is
not driven by testable  differences  in the clienteles of law firms:  the corre-
lation persists  after controlling  for company  size,  age,  profitability,  loca-
tion, industry, leverage, underwriter reputation, stage of development, VC-
backing,  family  ownership,  insider  ownership,  shareholder  dispersion,
CEO tenure and age, R&D intensity, and capex intensity. The correlation is
robust to the measure of M&A proficiency,  to the type of defense adopted,
and to specification of model. Moreover, the correlation between  law firm
M&A proficiency and defenses is stronger than that between  defenses and
any other variable tested,  including recent  M&A activity  in a company's
industry.  The  relationship  between  law  firm  M&A  proficiency  and  de-
fenses  fell  during the  1990s,  in  all likelihood  due to  learning  effects,  but
persists to some extent even in the 1998-99 period.
Interpreting  these  basic  findings  is  relatively  straightforward.  Given
the strength,  robustness,  and persistence of the relationship  between  law
firm  M&A  proficiency  and  defenses,  it  seems  clear  that legal  advice  in
large part determines what defenses companies adopt at the IPO stage.  One
can say with high confidence  that lawyers with more M&A proficiency are
more knowledgeable  about, pay more  attention to,  and are  more likely to
advise clients to adopt defenses. Thus,  the simplest plausible  interpretation
of the  principal  empirical  findings  is  that proficient  law  firms  instill  an
awareness of defenses in lawyers  or cause defense adoption by relying  on
internal boilerplate that includes a large number of defenses. 2  And, given
the absence  of any  evidence that companies  are sorting themselves among
law firms  at the  IPO  stage based  on the  law  firms'  M&A proficiency,  it
seems  highly  likely  that  some  owner-managers  are  getting  good  advice
from  their law  firms,  and  others  are  getting  bad  advice,  about  what  de-
232.  Law  firm  size  also  matters  in  the  multivariate  regressions,  although  not  in simple  mean
comparisons  nor  as  consistently  as  M&A  proficiency.  Other  things  held  equal  (particularly  M&A
proficiency),  larger law firms are more likely to include defenses than  smaller law firms. This is in part
because larger firms  are more likely to have M&A proficiency,  but also because large  firms are  more
likely to use boilerplate,  so that large  firms with proficiency tend to uniformly  include defenses,  large
firms without  proficiency  tend to uniformly  exclude  them,  and  small  and  mid-sized  firms  are  more
variable in the defenses  they recommend.
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fenses to adopt. This interpretation is supported by the evidence of obvious
gaffes  and legal  mistakes  in the  defenses  that are  adopted,  and it would
explain  the  trend toward  greater  uniformity  (less  variation)  in  defenses
during the 1990s.
The interpretation of other findings is less certain.  One explanation  of
the "Silicon  Valley law firm effect,"  for example, is that law firms in geo-
graphically  proximate regions  tend to develop  similar documentation  and
advice that is more similar among themselves than between themselves and
law firms  elsewhere. Prior to the mid-1990s,  few hostile  bids were  made
for high-technology  companies  and for Silicon Valley  companies  in par-
ticular. As such, Silicon Valley law firms  did not engage in large  amounts
of M&A work of any sort. Although the Silicon Valley effect persists even
after a control for M&A activity in a company's  industry is introduced, the
combination of low levels  of M&A  activity  in high-tech  industries  and a
tight-knit  legal  community may  have  made  defenses  even  less  likely  in
Silicon Valley than elsewhere. Lawyers  who are highly successful  in one
line of work, too, may suffer from a touch of complacency when they be-
gin to diversify; Wilson Sonsini's intimate  knowledge  and expertise of the
needs  of private  companies  as they  move  from  start-up  through  several
rounds of private financings  may have made the firm's lawyers  less  anx-
ious than they should have been about advising companies in the IPO stage
about issues (governance terms) that would have little effect for years."3
Consistent with this interpretation,  data from  1998-99 show that Sili-
con Valley lawyers began to install more defenses as the risks of not doing
so  became more  salient to all involved. The mid-1990s  witnessed  several
high-profile  takeovers  of companies  heavily  dependent  on  human  capi-
tal:  GE's bid for Kemper, IBM's  1995 bid for Lotus, and Softkey's  1995
bust-up bid for The Learning  Company  ("TLC"). 4  The last bid, in par-
ticular, was highly salient to Silicon Valley lawyers  and executives,  given
that TLC was based in Silicon Valley and Wilson Sonsini  served as coun-
sel to disappointed  suitor Broderbund,  which had  agreed to acquire TLC
before  Softkey  launched  its  bid.  Although  TLC's  need  to  obtain  share-
holder approval  for its deal with Broderbund  and Softkey's willingness to
overbid  Broderbund  explain  Softkey's  victory,  TLC's  weak  defenses
meant  that  it  did  not  have  the  option  of  canceling  its  merger  with
233.  Cf LAW Flmi MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, § 1.6.1  (setting forth a case study of Csaplar &
Bok,  the Boston  law  firm highly  successful  in net lease  financings  that made  flawed  diversification
efforts and eventually merged with Gaston & Snow just months before it failed).
234.  Susan Antilla, Kemper Board Discusses Hostile G.E. Bid, N.Y. TmsS, Mar.  17,  1994,  at D4
(describing  the  GE  bid  for  Kemper,  a  financial  services  company);  J.  FRED  WEsrON  er AL.,
TAKEovts,  RESTRUCTUmNG,  AND  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  170  (2d ed.  1998)  (setting forth IBM-
Lotus case study);  Lisa Benshoff, Deals and Suits, LEGAL  Tiaas, Dec. 4,  1995,  at 13  (listing lawyers
involved in Softkey-Leaming Company fight); Lawrence M. Fisher, Softkey Reaches Agreement to Buy
Learning Company, N.Y.  Tmms,  Dec.  8,  1995,  at D2  (announcing  Softkey  succeess  in bid  for The
Learning Company).
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Broderbund  and  attempting  to  remain  independent. 235  Given  this  fight,
which directly involved Silicon Valley's premier law firm in a high-profile
takeover battle, it would have been  surprising had Wilson Sonsini  clients
not increased their use of pre-IPO defenses in the  1990s.236
An alternative  interpretation of the Silicon Valley  effect is that some
difference  in the clients that Silicon Valley  law firms advised  in the early
1990s  (but not in the  late  1990s)  explains  the difference  in the defenses
those  clients adopted.  Commenting  on an  early version of this paper,  for
example,  partners  from  Wilson  Sonsini  suggested  that their clients  were
part  of a  different  corporate  culture-the  "whole  Berkeley  peace  love
thing,"  as one put it-that led them to resist advice to  adopt defenses.7
One difficulty with  such an explanation is that it is not  clear how typical
defenses  (classified boards, for example) would conflict with  "West Coast
culture,"  but a bigger  difficulty  is that the Silicon Valley law firm  effect
persists  even  after  controlling  for  company  headquarters'  location.  As
shown in Part IV.H, it is not companies based in Silicon Valley that corre-
late with few defenses; it is clients (wherever located) of law firms based in
Silicon Valley. 238
Law  firm  effects  may also  account  for the relationship  between  de-
fenses  and  state  of incorporation.  Because  the  decision  to  reincorporate
prior to the IPO is made almost exclusively  by companies reincorporating
in Delaware,  one can infer that the decision to reincorporate  is commonly
235.  TLC was  vulnerable because  its charter permitted  its shareholders  to  call a special meeting
and remove  existing  directors.  Kidsco  Inc.  v. The  Learning  Company,  674  A.2d 483,  485  (Del.  Ch.
1995).  TLC  was  able  to  delay  Softkey's  proxy  fight  and  hostile  bid  briefly  by adopting  a  bylaw
delaying the special meeting until some time after the initial TLC-Broderbund  merger agreement could
be  submitted to TLC shareholders,  id.,  but Softkey  would  have been  able to prevail  in  less than  two
months, one way or another. Ironically,  Softkey (subsequently renamed TLC) was able to acquire rival
bidder  Broderbund  not  long  thereafter.  See  Lawrence  Fisher,  Learning  Company  to  Acquire
Broderbund  in Stock Swap, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23,  1998, at D-1.
236.  Even  more  salient  for  Silicon  Valley  was  the  1998  battle  between  Mentor  Graphics  and
Quicktum.  Larry  Sonsini  served  both  as  counsel  in  Quicktum's  1993  IPO,  see Krysten  Crawford,
Quickturn Design Systems, THE RECORDER,  Dec.  15,  1993,  at 2 (reporting  Quickturn IPO, with  Larry
Sonsini of Wilson Sonsini as company counsel), and as counsel to Quickturn  as target during  Mentor's
bid  in  1998,  see Mentor  Graphics's  bid for  Quicktum,  Quickturn  Design  Sys.  v.  Shapiro,  721  A.2d
1281  (Del.  1998). The  near absence of pre-IPO  defenses put pressure  on  Quicktum  to sell  to a  white
knight after its heavily litigated effort to remain independent  failed. Id. This fight came too late in  1998,
however, to explain the increased defenses for Silicon Valley clients in the  1998 sample.
237.  The Wilson Sonsini partners also argued that it is impossible to say with any generality what
defenses companies should adopt;  in essence,  one size does  not fit all. The  problem with this claim  is
that even if it is tre, it is inconsistent the data:  Wilson  Sonsini's clients adopted virtually no pre-IPO
defenses in 1991-92, regardless of industry, size, or other company characteristics.
238.  The  same  is  true  for  "high-tech  companies,"  as  Table  5B  shows.  As  with  the  M&A
proficiency effect, the Silicon Valley effect persists after including controls for company size, age, cash
flow, pre- and post-IPO profitability, leverage, VC-backing, and underwriter  quality. In addition, since
defense adoption by clients of Silicon  Valley law firms has increased markedly  in the  1990s, such  an
account would require that "West Coast culture" persisted through several IPO boom and bust cycles in
the 1970s and 1980s,  but then disappeared for unexplained  reasons during the 1990s.
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initiated and requires drafting and filing of corporate documents  by corpo-
rate lawyers, who in that process  consider  a client's defenses  more  care-
fully than they might otherwise, resulting in the adoption of more defenses.
Passive  adoption of default  law by companies  not reincorporating  is  con-
sistent with the fact that companies  incorporated  in states that follow the
RMBCA's  control  default  provisions  adopt  fewer defenses.  By contrast,
dual  class  structures,  which  in  every  state  must  be  expressly  and  con-
sciously installed, do not vary by state of incorporation, with 7-8% of com-
panies  adopting them  in Delaware,  California,  RMBCA  states,  and other
states.2 9
Another finding of both the mean  comparisons  and multivariate  re-
gressions is that defenses are much more likely to be adopted by companies
in industries with higher  levels  of pre-IPO  M&A  activity.  On  one  level,
this may not seem surprising:  if takeovers are more common,  defenses are
more useful, that is, efficient and value-increasing.  But without more,  this
analysis fails because M&A activity in a given industry is a poor predictor
of M&A activity  in the same  industry beyond the next year or two,240  and
companies are usually invulnerable to hostile bids for a year or two after an
IPO. 24l  A  simpler  interpretation  is  that  high  industry-M&A  activity  in-
creases the salience of takeover risk, making managers  (VCs, directors, and
so on)  more likely to monitor lawyers  with respect to defenses before the
IPO and lawyers more likely to install defenses.
Still, the results  seem more consistent with defenses  being generally
good for owner-managers  to adopt pre-IPO  than for them to be generally
bad.  Defenses  are  more  likely when better  underwriters  are  involved,  so
that  managers  of companies  adopting  defenses  seem  more  likely  to  be
aware  of any price penalty the IPO market may impose  (the same  is true
with  VC-backed  companies).  If defenses  are  generally  bad  for  owner-
managers  of companies  going public,  it can only be  because defenses de-
crease  IPO  prices, yet the correlations  between  defenses  and underwriter
reputation  and  between  defenses  and  VC-backing  both  suggest  that  no
"price penalty"  is in fact imposed at the IPO stage if defenses are adopted.
A lack of pricing penalty is also consistent with anecdotal reports from IPO
participants, including investment bankers, venture  capitalists, and lawyers
from Wilson  Sonsini  (among other lawyers),  who  all uniformly report in
239.  This analysis  is also consistent with the fact that for  Delaware companies that varied  from
default law, actual Cis exceeded Delaware's default CI by 183 on average.
240.  See Mitchell & Mulherin, supra note  153,  at 206 tbl.5.
241.  Mitchell  & Mulherin,  supra note  153.  See also supra Part  IV.G.6  (illustrating  ownership
structure over five years  post-IPO). In addition,  even if post-IPO  bid risk was more  likely when pre-
IPO industry-M&A activity was high, it is not clear why that makes defenses good. If defenses simply
impede bids,  they should  harm  IPO  pricing, inducing  fewer  defenses  on  average;  and  if defenses
improve value by providing bargaining power, high industry-M&A activity should make defenses less
valuable, not more. Daines & Klausner, supra note 8, at 98-99.
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conversations  that  conventional  defenses  do  not  affect  IPO  pricing. 2 4 2  If
IPO  pricing  is  so  poor that IPOs  fail  to constrain  owner-managers  from
adopting defenses  in  IPOs, IPO  pricing must be getting  worse, given that
defenses are more common in 1998-99 than they were in 1991-92.  In addi-
tion, both the positive correlation between  law firm M&A proficiency and
defense adoption and the negative correlation between  Silicon Valley  law-
yers and defense adoption have declined in size and significance during the
1990s.  This shift is more  consistent with the  idea that law firms  generally
(and  Silicon Valley law  firms in particular)  recognize  that defenses  are  a
good idea for pre-IPO owner-managers than it is with the idea that defenses
are bad for pre-IPO  owner-managers  or with the idea that defenses began
as a bad idea and became good over time.
Overall, results are not consistent with the variable efficiency theories
described  in Part  III  that  hold that  defenses  are  a  good  idea  for  some
owner-managers  to adopt but not for others. The results  fail to support the
agency cost hypothesis:  larger and older companies (save  the very oldest)
have  more  defenses,  and neither  free  cash  flow,  leverage,  nor  post-IPO
profitability  have  a  significant  relationship  with  defenses. 43  Results  are
also  inconsistent  with the myopia  hypothesis:  development-stage  compa-
nies are less likely to adopt defenses,  and neither R&D intensity nor capital
expenditures correlate  significantly with defenses. The data also provide no
support  for  the  versions  of the  bargaining  power  hypothesis  that  posit
variation  in the  value  that  defenses  can  add  in  the  form  of bargaining
power:  neither leverage  nor shareholder dispersion are correlated with de-
fenses,  and  the  coefficient  on M&A  activity  in  a  company's  industry  is
strongly  positive. Only the private benefits  of control  hypothesis  receives
some  support, and results  are mixed:  the  fact that older companies  adopt
more defenses  is consistent with the hypothesis,  as  is the fact that compa-
nies founded  by the  CEO have  more  defenses  than  other companies.  But
the latter relationship is sensitive to other controls,  and CEO tenure has no
effect on  defenses.' 4 "  While it  is possible that either bargaining power  or
private benefits of control may explain why defenses are a good idea for all
pre-IPO  owner-managers,  and,  thus, why  increasing  numbers  of defenses
are being  adopted in the  1990s,  this study finds  no support for bargaining
242.  Michael  Price,  a  well-known  and  well-regarded  mutual  fund  manager,  writes:  "In  this
market,  [companies going public]  could  do anything [that is, adopt  any takeover defenses]  they want
and get away with it."  Carolyn Brancato et al., The hIstitutional  Investor's Goals  for Corporate  Law in
the  Twenty-First Century, 25  DEL.  J.  CORP.  L.  35,  58  (2000).  My thanks  to  Larry Hamermesh  for
pointing out this quote.
243.  Transformations  of  cash  flow  (log-normalization  and  exponentiation)  also  produced  no
results, nor are the non-results  on cash flow sensitive to other controls. A variable truncated at zero  to
count  only positive  cash flow, a dummy  set to one if cash flow were  positive, and different post-IPO
measurement periods all had no effect.
244.  Cf Daines & Klausner, supra note 8, at 108 tbl.6 (finding no strong correlation between CEO
founders and defense adoption  in their sample).
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power and only modest support for private benefits in trying to explain the
persistent variation in takeover defenses at the IPO stage.
Finally, the data suggest that dual class  capital structures are qualita-
tively different from other types of defenses.  Dual class  structures  do not
correlate with  other defenses;  they  do correlate  with variables  that proxy
for private benefits of control (family ownership and companies that share
names with ongoing owner-managers),  which in turn do not correlate with
other defenses;  and dual class structures have declined over time, the oppo-
site of the trend for other defenses.  And the evidence that other types  of
defenses  are also related to private benefits  of control  (CEO founders  are
more  likely to adopt  normal  defenses)  does not carry over to  dual  class
structures.
CONCLUSION:
IMPLICATIONS
Overall, the findings presented in this Article provide strong evidence
that lawyers largely determine key terms in the "corporate  contract,"  due to
agency costs between owner-managers and their lawyers. The findings are
also consistent with defenses being generally optimal at the IPO  stage for
pre-IPO owner-managers,  but not all clients receiving that advice. Learning
seems  to have  occurred:  defenses  have become  both  more  common  and
more uniform in the  1990s,  and  one  strong regional variation,  the Silicon
Valley effect, disappeared  in that time. Still, variation in defenses that cor-
relates with law firm M&A proficiency persists even as late as 1999.
These  findings  have implications  for corporate  law and finance,  for
contract  theory,  and  for  the  legal  profession.  The  most  immediate  and
striking implications are for the legal profession. Problems of legal quality
appear to afflict some of the highest-profile transactions  and some of the
best-paid lawyers. That implies that lawyer-client agency problems are  se-
rious, widespread,  and perhaps  even dangerous  for many clients.245 Repu-
tational bonds that law firms use to insure high quality appear weak at best.
Silicon Valley law firms certainly had and have powerful brand names and
hold themselves  out as "corporate  law"  firms, yet they seem to have pro-
vided  inferior  advice  to  IPO  clients  on  takeover  defenses  in  the  early
1990s. Advice about defenses was in all likelihood incidental to the reason
such firms  were  retained. Takeover defense  advice was,  in essence, bun-
dled with other services more important to clients. In retrospect, clients on
average may still be content with their choice of lawyers.
Yet even if we convince ourselves that legal services for large corpo-
rations are second-best efficient  (that is, efficient given existing regulation
and natural barriers to competition), the existence  of bundles of excellent
245.  Cf  HAZARD  E aL., supra note  51,  at  150  ("[Mlarket probably  operates  quite  well  as a
competence filter with regard to sophisticated clients such as large business corporations.").
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and poor services  even in that stratum of the legal profession  suggests that
much  more  transformation of the industry is  to  come.  If lawyers  cannot
provide  a  complete  package  of products  and  services  that  meets  client
needs,  nonlawyers  will pick  up the  slack.  Only tasks  for which  lawyers
have a regulatory monopoly (such as litigation) are likely to remain distinct
from the broader  "knowledge  market"  that has been  and almost certainly
will be dominated by nonlawyers. Whether or not lawyers can or will want
to compete  in that broader market, the "transformation"  of the American
legal profession in the 1980s was just the beginning. 246
The findings  of this Article also raise questions about how courts and
other lawmakers  set default rules  of contract law.  If lawyer-client  agency
problems  distort terms  adopted in the  context  of public  corporations  and
multimillion  dollar  stock  offerings  (where  contract  terms  are  public  and
legal mistakes available  for all to  see),  it seems reasonable  to expect  that
lawyer-client agency problems also distort terms set in contexts that gener-
ate  lower levels  of lawyer and client  scrutiny.  To  reach judgments  about
which  default rules  are most  efficient  in  a given context,  lawmakers  will
often  face a conflict  between  terms  adopted by  private parties  who have
good  legal representation  and those  who  do not.  For academics  studying
private  law empirically,  a related implication  is that lawyers  or law  firms
may generally need to  enter empirical  models  as a control  or explanatory
variable whenever the goal  is to study something requiring legal advice or
implementation.
At  a  minimum,  serious  lawyer-client  agency  problems  increase  the
tension between a rule favoring majoritarian defaults,  on the one hand, and
a rule favoring a hypothetical  bargain between two perfectly  informed  (or
even well-informed)  parties,  on the other. If courts were to review  an IPO
sample  from 1991-92,  they would find both a high degree of heterogeneity
in terms  adopted and  a majority of companies adopting  relatively few de-
fenses.  The majoritarian  outcome would accordingly be few defenses.  But
if the  court  were  to  infer  what  two  well-informed  parties  would  have
agreed  to  based  on  the  defenses  adopted  by  companies  advised  by  law
firms with M&A proficiency,  the court would reach  the  opposite conclu-
sion.
A  final  set of implications,  and  the  ones most  germane  to  takeover
defenses,  should  interest  corporate  legal  and  finance  scholars.  Simple
"company-level"  agency  cost  models  of  how  and  when  defenses  are
adopted utterly fail to predict the control  structures  adopted  in  one of the
most important  moments  in a firm's life-cycle  (the IPO).  At a minimum,
246.  Cf Gilson, supra  note  43, at 893  (proposing that "familiar patterns of lawyer-client relations
and  important  aspects  of  law  firm  structure  can  be  usefully  understood  as  responses  to  quality
uncertainty concerning legal services,"  with an implication that structural  change may be stimulated by
changes in ability of or need for clients to evaluate quality of services).
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the  data  suggest  that  defenses  are  optimal  for  pre-IPO  shareholders  to
adopt at a large subset (and in 1998-99,  a majority) of new firms. Given the
findings that companies advised by law firms with more M&A proficiency,
higher-quality underwriters,  and VC funds are all more likely to adopt de-
fenses and that pre-IPO defenses are more common now than in the past, it
seems more plausible that such defenses are optimal for all firms than it is
that they are optimal for none. It is still possible for defense opponents to
argue that defenses are not a good idea for some companies, but opponents
now  have the burden of identifying  which companies  those  are and why
defenses are not good for those companies, and making an  empirical case
to support their claims.
It is also possible, of course, for defense  scholars to concede  that de-
fenses are privately optimal for all pre-IPO  shareholder-managers  to adopt,
but insist nonetheless  that they reduce both firm value and social welfare.
But that position  entails  abandoning either the theory that  IPO pricing  is
efficient or the theory that contracting at the IPO stage involves substantial
externalities that leave room for efficient mandatory rules  even at the  IPO
stage.247 Either concession thus calls into question many premises on which
conventional  corporate  scholarship  (including  hostility  to  defenses)  has
been built. If IPO pricing is generally poor, can we infer anything about the
governance terms not found in corporate charters? Unseen terms like bans
on  insider trading, "other  constituency"  provisions,  or even codetermina-
tion 4 5  all become candidates  as efficient terms. If IPO pricing is poor, do
we expect secondary market pricing to be better? If so, how and why, pre-
cisely?  If not, then high-premium  bids  are  not indicators  of more  funda-
mentally efficient  owners of targets'  assets, nor are they necessarily good
measures of current firm value.
The argument  and findings  presented in this Article  do not fully re-
solve the many questions surrounding takeover defenses. Nevertheless,  an
answer  to half of the  IPO  defense puzzle  now  seems  clear:  variation  in
legal takeover defense vulnerability at the IPO  stage is explained  in large
part  by  variation  in  the  quality  of legal  advice  provided  to  pre-IPO
owner-managers.  The  evidence  also  seems  compelling  that  defenses  are
247.  One  could  maintain  both  that  IPO  pricing  was  efficient  and  that  defenses  were  at  once
privately  optimal  and  socially  inefficient  by  accepting  that  some  terms  fixed  at  the  IPO  entail
externalities.  See Lucian  A.  Bebchuk  & Luigi  Zingales,  Corporate Ownership Structures: Private
Versus  Social Optimality, John  M.  Olin  Center  for  Law,  Economics,  and  Business,  Harvard  Law
School  (Discussion  Paper  No.  181,  1996).  But  that  position,  too,  would  call  into  question  much
conventional  law and economics scholarship  on corporate  law. E.g., FRANK  EASTERBROOK  & DANIEL
FiscHEL,  THE EcONOHC  STRUCTURE  OF  CoRPOTEa  LAw 25-30  (1991)  (noting that the likelihood of
extemalities when charters are chosen is minimal).
248.  Codetermination  is the inclusion of representatives of nonshareholder constituencies  (usually
employees)  on  the board. See generally Katharina  Pistor, Codetermination:  A Sociopolitical Model
with Governance Externalities,  in EMPLOYEES  AND  CORPORATE Gov_  NANcE  163  (Margaret  M. Blair
& Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (discussing co-determination  in Germany).
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privately optimal  for all pre-IPO  owner-managers,  even  if not all lawyers
provide that advice. In sum, blame the lawyers.BLAME THE LAWYERS
APPENDIX A
GOVERNANCE  TERMS  REGULATING CONTROL  OVER PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS WITHOUT  CONTROL SHAREHOLDERS
Fixed Governance Terms-Mandatory  Federal
Securities  Law and Practice
1.  Tender offers must remain open for twenty business days.
2.  Proxy solicitations must be "precleared" by the SEC, which takes thirty
to forty-five days.
Fixed Governance Terms-Mandatory  Nonvarying State Corporate  Law
3.  All corporate power is held by the board, not by shareholders.
4.  Neither the board nor shareholders may amend the charter unilaterally.
Varying Governance Terms-Varying and/or  Default State Corporate  Law
5.  Do  directors  have  the  power  to  create  "poison  pills,"  which  limit
shareholders from acquiring more than 5-30% of the company's stock?
6.  Does the board have terms of one, two, or three years?
7.  How frequently must the board call an annual meeting of shareholders?
8.  May shareholders act by written consent in lieu of a meeting?
9.  May less than  51%  of shareholders  call  a special meeting?  May less
than 10%?
10.  May shareholders remove directors without cause?
11.  May shareholders  fill vacant board seats?
12.  May shareholders increase the size of the board?
13.  May shareholders  amend the bylaws without board action?
14. May shareholders  "cumulate" their votes?
15.  Does the board have "blank check" authority to issue preferred stock?
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APPENDIX  B
AN INDEX OF  (LEGAL)  CONTESTABILITY
Rather than studying individual antitakeover  defenses in isolation, or
aggregating  them  in ways  not motivated by theory, as prior research  has
done, the contestability index described below unifies  governance terms in
a tractable  system by asking a simple question:  how much delay would  a
firm's governance  terms  impose  on a  majority  shareholder  coalition that
desired to change the composition of a majority of the board?
The index consists  of two components:  a set of variables that derive
from  a  company's  governance  terms,  and  an  algorithm  that  transforms
those variables into a single number. The description  of the index proceeds
as follows:  First, the law that establishes rules included in the index is first
generally  discussed.  Second,  the  primary  governance  variables  are  dis-
cussed and formally defined. Third, a number of instrumental variables  are
constructed, and each is discussed and formally  defined. Fourth, the algo-
rithm is presented, consisting of seven mutually exclusive cases that take as
inputs  certain  of the primary or constructed  variables and produce  as out-
puts  the  contestability  index.  Finally,  two  brief sets  of illustrations  are
given."
I
OVERVIEW  OF GOVERNANCE  TERms
Every public company has  a set of "governance  terms"  that regulate
how easily shareholders  can assert control rights over the company. Terms
are  set forth in  (1)  U.S.  federal  securities  law,  (2)  the corporate code  of
the  state  where  a  firm is  incorporated,  and  (3)  firm-specific  terms,  con-
sisting  of (a)  of securities  issued  by  the  firm,  (b)  the  firm's  charter,
and  (c)  the firm's bylaws.  Governance  terms  vary by firm, because  firm
founders  choose where  to (re)incorporate,  and thus  default law,  and most
state corporate laws provide considerable  (if not total) flexibility for firms
to vary  from default law in their charters  and bylaws.2 ° Federal  securities
249.  One caveat is in order:  Although the contestability index is simple in concept, the devil is in
the details;  as many practitioners  will  attest, legal innovations,  case law developments,  or legislative  or
regulatory  action  will  almost  certainly  eventually  render  some of what  follows  obsolete  over  time.
Despite this caveat, readers  should take some comfort from the fact that little of what follows is new or
has changed since (at least) the late 1980s.
250.  In  general,  conflicts between  terms  are resolved  in the same order.  Federal  securities  laws
override  conflicting state corporate  codes (because of the Supremacy Clause  of the U.S.  Constitution,
U.S.  CONST.  art.  VI,  cl.  2);  state  corporate  codes  override  conflicting  terms  of  individual  firms'
securities;  such terms  typically override  conflicting  charter terms  (because  the specific  overrides  the
general);  and charter terms typically override bylaws. However, many state corporate  provisions govern
only in the absence of overrides in the charter or bylaws, as specified  in the state  law, and the decision
of whether or not two terms conflict is itself often a matter of some debate. See, for example, the debate
over whether the Williams Act conflicted with (and therefore pre-empted) state takeover laws, an issue
that resulted in two U.S.  Supreme  Court decisions and a plethora of lower federal court  decisions, all
reviewed in John  C. Coates IV, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate  Theory:  The Revival of an Old
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laws, by contrast, apply generally  to all "public"  companies,  including all
firms with equity securities  listed on a stock exchange and  all firms with
$10  million in assets and 500  or more  shareholders. 2 1 Terms imposed by
federal  law  are contained  in the Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934,  which
governs both proxy solicitations  and tender offers, and the rules and inter-
pretations of the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted thereunder,
and  the  most  important  of those  terms  are  summarized  in Appendix  A.
(How and why each of these terms may be important will become evident
in the presentation of the index below.)
State laws impose a large number of governance terms on firms, usu-
ally (but not always)  as default terms.  State  corporate codes,  for example,
typically set mandatory rules concerning how frequently shareholders must
meet, but default law governs how the number of directors  on the board is
set.  Many  rules  vary  from  state  to  state,  but  two  important  ones  do
not:  (1)  corporate  statutes  always provide  that  boards, not  shareholders,
manage  the  corporation,  thus  requiring  shareholders  to  go  through  the
board  selection  process  to  seize  working  control  of  the  firm;
and  (2)  corporate statutes in all states effectively give both the board and
shareholders  veto power over charter  amendments,  so that a  majority  of
both groups is required for charter changes.
Since  there  is no  formal  limit to  the length  or  complexity  of firm-
specific terms, the result is (in theory) an infinite number of corporate gov-
ernance  terms.  In  practice,  transaction  costs  and  simple  exhaustion  of
variations  in governance  structures put a  ceiling  on the number of terms
applicable  to  any  given  firm. Even  fewer  will plausibly  have  a material
effect on takeovers. For the vast majority of companies, firm-specific gov-
ernance terms were limited to approximately twelve primary categories,  of
which two (director indemnification or exculpation and standard contingent
voting rights for ordinarily nonvoting preferred stock) would not plausibly
have an effect on takeover fights, leaving ten legally significant categories
of  primary terms, listed in Appendix A.
II
CONTESTABiLITY  ALGORITHM
Despite the large number of variations,  a relatively  simple algorithm
can reduce nearly all significant governance terms to a single continuous2 52
Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 806 (1989).  One might not predict conflicts between or among firm-specific
terms at a given firm, since those drafting and adopting the terms would presumably not want to create
uncertainty  or an opportunity for litigation, but straightforward  conflicts are surprisingly common.
251.  See Securities Exchange Act  of 1934 § 12(g) (codified  at 15  U.S.C.  § 781  (1988));  see also
SEC Rule 12g-l.  17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-I  (1987)
252.  Technically,  the contestability index  is not a continuous  variable.  It is bounded  from below
by zero,  and in the real world  does  not take  on noninteger values.  In this respect,  however, it is not
different  from using salaries  or other dollar-denominated  variables  as dependent variables,  which  are
also bounded  from below by zero and discrete below some threshold of size. In general, however, the
CI should function as a continuous variable over plausible ranges of predicted values.
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variable  (expressed  in  days).  This  time-to-takeover  variable-the
"contestability  index"  ("CI" or "index")-abstracts from many factors that
have been plausibly assumed to affect the contestability  of corporate  con-
trol:  ownership  structure,  firm  size,  and profitability,  bidder  characteris-
tics,  management  quality,  industry-specific  regulation,  etc.  Nevertheless,
the variable  captures the way that bidders,  practitioners,  and  arbitrageurs
think  about  the  effect  of securities  and  corporate  law  and  firm-specific
governance  terms on the relative difficulty  of a takeover for a given  com-
pany, and impounds the effects  of fifteen different legal rules into a single,
easy-to-grasp metric." 3
The  algorithm  can be  described  in two parts:  (1)  analysis  of terms
and definition of variables, and  (2)  determination of the index.
A.  Analysis of Terms
First, governance  terms  are  analyzed  to define  variables  needed  for
determination of the index. Most variables are readily determinable  from a
firm's charter or bylaws ("primary variables").  Others are constructed from
one or more of such primary variables.
1.  Primary  Variables
Determination of the index depends straightforwardly  on a number of
governance  terms.  A  number  of  categorical  variables,  set  forth  in
Table  B-1,  are  set  equal  to "1"  if relevant provisions  are  expressly  con-
tained in the  firm's charter or bylaws,  "0"  if they are  expressly denied or
prohibited in the firm's charter or bylaws, and set equal to "9"  if the charter
and  bylaws  are  silent." 4  In  addition,  a  bounded  continuous  variable
"SEATS"  is defined as the number of board seats of the firm, determined
by reference  to the most recent relevant  SEC filing (typically the most re-
cent regular proxy statement).  Table  B-1 also  sets forth where the primary
variables enter into either other variable definitions or the algorithm itself.
253.  It  is not suggested  that the use of formal  definitions  and the algorithm described below  are
specifically  used  by practitioners.  In  some  respects,  there  is  a  tension between  arriving at a  formal,
tractable measure of legal takeover vulnerability for a large number of firms at multiple points  in time
for research and analytical purposes and the task before practitioners or arbitrageurs,  which is to assess
the legal takeover  vulnerability of a  specific  company at a  specific (if moving)  point  in time. What
follows, for example, will be too precise for many purposes, and not precise enough for other purposes.
Nevertheless,  the  description that  follows is  a  fairly close  description  of what  is done  in law  firms,
investment banks, and hedge  funds whenever  a given public company is put "in play."
254.  If relevant provisions are  contained  in both charter and  bylaws,  and are contradictory,  then
the conflicts are resolved  as discussed supra  note 2.
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TABLE B-i
PRIMARY  GovERNANcE  VARIABLES FOR CONTESTABILITY  INDEX
Categorical Variables
Definition of Variables
Variable  Where Variable  "0" if expressly prohibited in
Enters  firm documents,
"1" if expressly permitted in
firm documents,
"2" if documents are silent
BLANK  Definition of  Directors are given "blank
PILLBAN  check"  authority to set terms
of preferred stock
REMOV  Definition of COUP  Shareholders are permitted to
remove directors
NUMSET  Definition of COUP  Shareholders are permitted to
set the number of directors
CLASS  Definition of COUP;  The board is classified into
Cases 5, 6 & 7  multiple classes
CONSENT  Definition of EARLY;  Shareholders are permitted to
Case 2  act by written consent.
SM10  Case 3  >1 0+% of shareholders are
permitted to call special
meetings
SM50  Definition of EARLY;  >50+% of shareholders are
Case 4  permitted to call special
meetings
CUMUL  Cases 6 & 7  Shareholders can vote cumu-
latively in director elections
VAC  Definition of COUP  Shareholders are permitted to
fill vacancies
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TABLE B-1  (CONT'D)
PRIMARY  GOVERNANCE  VARIABLES  FOR CONTESTABILITY  INDEX
Additional Categorical Variables
STATE  Definitions of COUP  A firm's state of incorporation
and EARLY
ANNUAL  Cases 5,  6 & 7  See Appendix C
WORK-  Definition of COUP  = "0"  if charter or bylaws im-
AROUND  pose supermajority require-
ments on bylaw amendments,
else = "1"
Continuous Variable
SEATS  Definition of HOLD  Total number of board seats,
including vacancies
The  only  exceptions  to  this  scheme  are  the  variables  "STATE,"
"ANNUAL,"  and "WORKAROUND."  "STATE"  is simply a firm's state
of incorporation,  which  determines  shareholder power  over  board  selec-
tion, both as a default  and a mandatory matter, as discussed more below.
"ANNUAL"  is the number of days that may elapse between annual share-
holder meetings  before  shareholders  can  compel  another; this varies from
state  to state, as  set forth in Table B-5.  "WORKAROUND"  is  defined as
"0"  if relevant provisions  of the  charter  or bylaws  impose  supermajority
requirements  on bylaw amendments  by shareholders,  and "1" otherwise. 255
Shareholders  are  permitted  to amend  the bylaws  in  all  states. 256  Absent
charter  or shareholder-approved  bylaw terms raising  the shareholder  vote
required to amend the bylaws, 257 a majority of determined shareholders will
255.  Additional  variables "WORKAROUND-67"  and  "WORKAROUND-80"  could be defined to
take account  of the possibility that a bidder or dissident  shareholder group  could obtain  the  necessary
supermajority  votes to meet supermajority  requirements of 67%  or 80%. For the basic index, however,
it is assumed that if a vote of greater than  50% is required, the vote cannot be obtained.
256.  See REv.  MODEL  Bus.  CORP.  ACr  annot.  § 10.20(b)  (1998);  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit.  8,  §  109
(1991).
257.  Even  such  limitations  on  shareholder  bylaw amendment  power are  of uncertain  legality in
Delaware  and many other  states. For purposes of the index, close questions such as this will generally
be resolved against shareholders  on the theory that bidders will generally want to have a clear legal path
to bid victory before launching  an expensive  takeover bid.  Thus, the following  analysis  assumes that
such charter or shareholder-approved  bylaw provisions restricting bylaw amendments  by shareholders
are legal.  There is the further possibility that boards could  (under concurrent  bylaw amendment power
typically granted  in the  charter)  amend the bylaws  to add  supermajority  vote  requirements on  future
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be able to "work around" any terms found in the bylaws that slow or inter-
fere with their taking control of the board. In particular, terms  commonly
found in the bylaws include terms  (a)  specifying the number of directors,
or providing  that the number may be  set only by the board,  (b)  limiting
the circumstances under which directors  may be removed to "cause"  only,
and  (c)  limiting the right  to fill vacancies  to the board.  Some  firms  at-
tempt to provide for staggered boards in their bylaws, something prohibited
in most states,  and permitted in Delaware  only  in initial  or shareholder-
approved bylaws. Other firms  attempt in their bylaws to limit shareholder
rights to call special  meetings  or act by written consent,  despite the  fact
that default law in most states permits such rights to be limited only in the
charter.  Even  where  such  provisions  are  legal,  shareholders  can  work
around  such  provisions  by  successively  amending  the  bylaws  and  then
taking  whatever  action  would  have  otherwise  been  prohibited.  By  and
large,  such workarounds  can be accomplished in little more than the time
normally required for a proxy fight.
Where firm-specific governance terms are located can be important in
evaluating the takeover vulnerability of a given  firm. Table B-2 sets forth
several  categorical variables  are determined by inspecting a firm's charter
and bylaws, each variable set to  "1"  if the relevant  governance term is lo-
cated in the charter, "2"  if located in the bylaws, and "0"  if no express term
exists.
Finally, variables  relating  to  a  firm's  authorized  and  issued  capital
stock are determined by reference  to the charter and the most recent rele-
vant SEC filing prior to the date with respect to which the index is being
determined. Table B-3  sets forth these variables and their definitions. Each
variable equals the relevant number of shares:
In addition to the foregoing primary variables, a number of additional,
more  complex variables  are  constructed  on the basis of the primary vari-
able. Each of these variables is separately discussed below. Table  B-4 sets
forth these variables, as well as their formal definitions. Table B-4  also lists
where these variables enter into the algorithm.
bylaw  amendments by shareholders.  This  sort of restriction, too, has been  enjoined by the one court
that has considered the question,  seems on its face highly unlikely to  survive legal  challenge, and  so
will not be considered in the following analysis. Burkhart v. Smith,  157 A.299 (Md. 1931).
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TABLE B-2
LOCATION  VARIABLES FOR  CONTESTABILITY  INDEX
Definition of Variables:
Variable  Where Variable Enters  "0"  if documents are silent,
"1" if express provision in charter,
"2" if express provision in bylaws
BLANKLOC  Definition of PILLBAN  Location of term granting black
check authority
REMLOC  Definition of COUP  Location of term restricting
shareholder ability to remove
directors without cause
NUMLOC  Definition of COUP  Location of term restricting
shareholder ability to set number
of directors
STGLOC  Definition of COUP  Location of term establishing
staggered board
CONLOC  Definition of EARLY  Location of term prohibiting
shareholders from acting by
written consent
SMLOC  Definition of EARLY  Location of term imposing higher
levels of shareholder call for
special meetings
VACLOC  Definition of COUP  Location of term restricting
shareholder ability to fill vacancies
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TABLE B-3
CAPITAL  STOCK VARIABLES  FOR CONTESTABILITY  INDEX
Variable  Where Variable Enters  Definition  of Variables
CSAUTH  Definition of PILLBAN  Number of shares  of
authorized common stock
CSOUTST  Definitions of PILLBAN  Number of shares of
and HOLD  outstanding common stock
PSAUTH  Definition of PILLBAN  Number of shares of
authorized preferred stock (aggregat-
ing all classes)
PSOUTST  Definition of PILLBAN  Number of shares of
outstanding preferred stock
(aggregating all classes)
INSIDE  Cases 6 & 7  Number of common shares
beneficially  owned by
directors and officers
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2.  Pill  Bans
If a  firm  either  has  explicitly  or  implicitly  adopted  a  prohibition
against a poison pill in its charter, then the firm cannot adopt a poison pill,
and no further analysis of terms  is needed.  Here the point is not whether a
firm has a pill at any given point in time, since the presence or absence of a
pill is  almost always  irrelevant  to a firm's takeover vulnerability.  Rather
the point is whether the firm has the ability to adopt a pill in the future.
Explicit bans  on pills are relatively simple to imagine,  although they
are so rare as to be almost nonexistent for research purposes.  (Their rarity
must be one of life's great mysteries to those who believe that pills are uni-
formly  and generally harmful  to shareholder value.)  Charter prohibitions
on pills would clearly be legal in Delaware  and under the RMBCA"'  Ex-
plicit prohibitions on pills  contained  in bylaws  are  legal  in Oldahoma,"9
illegal  in Georgia, 26  and are unlikely to be found legal in Delaware. 26'  For
firms in states in which bans on pills contained in bylaws are legal, no fur-
ther  analysis  of terms  is  needed;  the  index  is  given  in  Case  1  under
"Determination of Index" below.
Implicit bans on pills may arise as a result of the relationship between
a company's outstanding and authorized capital stock. In general, for a pill
to sufficiently dilute a bidder to make it a meaningful deterrent to a hostile
bid, a firm needs to have at least twice the number of authorized  common
shares than it has outstanding.  Suppose,  for example, that a firm has  100
shares outstanding, and 120 authorized.  It adopts a pill, which at most  can
result in the issuance of 20 more  shares.  Suppose the pill trigger is  10%.
The bidder buys  11  shares, the pill is triggered, and all other shareholders
exercise  their rights.  The result is that the bidder's  ownership  and voting
rights  are  diluted  from  11%  to  9%.  Clearly this  will  not normally  be  a
meaningful takeover deterrent. At 200 authorized shares, the bidder can be
diluted down to 5.5%, and at 300, 3.7%.  Calculating economic dilution is
more complicated,  and economic dilution can have deterrent effects even if
voting dilution is not significant, but generally speaking "the key driver [of
the  deterrent  effect  of the  pill]  is  the  flood  of new  shares  issued  upon
exercise  [of the pill],"262 so  that when the "flood"  is constrained  by a low
258.  See Di.. CODE ANN. tit. 8,  §§  102, 141,  157 & 242 (1991  & Supp.  1998); REv.  MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT §§ 2.02, 6.24, 8.01  & 10.03 (1998).
259.  See  FLETING,  supra  note 40.  Given  this decision,  and  given  the  ability  of a  majority  of
shareholders  in all  fifty states to adopt bylaw amendments without board concurrence or approval,  the
index of all firms incorporated in Oklahoma is effectively thirty.
260.  See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs, Inc.,  968 F. Supp.  1578  (N.D. Ga.  1997).
261.  See  Lawrence  A.  Hamermesh,  Corporate  Democracy  and  Stockholder-Adopted
Bylaws:  Taking Back the Street?, 73 TuL. L. REv. 409 (1998);  Charles  F. Richards, Jr. and Robert J.
Steam,  Jr.,  Shareholder  By-Laws  Requiring Boards  of Directors  to  Dismantle  Rights  Plans  Are
Unlikely to Survive Scrutiny Under Delaware Law, 54 Bus. LAw. 607 (1999).
262.  Robert  Bruner  carefully  analyzes  the  various  effects  of various  types  of pills  there  and,
consistent with the analysis here, characterizes  as "weak" but effective a pill that results in the issuance
of  3x  pretrigger  outstanding  shares.  See  ROBERT  BRUNER,  THE  POISON  PILL  ANTI-TAKEovER
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level of authorized but unissued  shares, the deterrent effect of a pill will be
greatly weakened.
This analysis,  however,  is complicated by the possibility of fraction-
alizable  preferred  shares  serving  as  synthetic  common  shares.  Based  on
IRRC data as of December  31,  1998,  more than 90%  of public companies
have adopted  charter provisions  giving boards  "blank check"  authority to
issue preferred  stock as needed without further shareholder approval,  and
preferred  stock may be  issued in lieu  of common stock, making  limits  on
common stock in the charter irrelevant for purposes of implicit prohibitions
on pills. Even limits  on the number of preferred shares that may be issued
pursuant  to such  authority  are generally  non-binding,  because  each share
preferred  can be "fractionalized"--that  is,  issued  in  fractional  units, with
each fractional unit being given (pursuant to the "blank check"  authority)
rights equivalent to a single common share  (with the result being that each
whole preferred  share  has  rights  equivalent to  large  multiples  of a  single
common share). Suppose  again there are  100 common shares outstanding,
120 common  shares authorized,  but now  10  shares of "blank check" pre-
ferred stock authorized  and unissued. The board can authorize the issuance
of preferred  shares  with  lOx  normal  common  stock  rights  (voting rights
and  rights  to  participate  in  dividends  and  other  distributions),  and  then
adopt  a pill  consisting  of rights  to purchase  1/10  of a  share of preferred
stock. The bottom  line  is  as if the  10  shares  of preferred  had been  con-
verted into 100  shares of common stock for purposes  of the pill, restoring
(marginal) deterrent effect to the pill.
Thus,  for  an  implicit  ban  on  pills  to  be  effective,  the  firm  needs
to  (a)  have authorized  common stock equal to  less than 200% of its  cur-
rent outstanding and  (b)  either not have granted blank check  authority or
have granted blank check authority  subject to constraints on fractionaliza-
tion of preferred  stock. Although  uncommon, about  5%  of public compa-
nies fall in this category, based on a sample of 165 firms that went public
in  1990-92.  As  with  explicit  bans  on  pills,  no  further term  analysis  is
needed  for  such  firms,  and  the  index  is  given  in  Case  1  under
"Determination of Index" below.
Formally,  a variable  "PILLBAN"  should  be  set  equal  to  "0"  unless
either of the following  is  true, in  which case,  "PILLBAN"  should equal
"1":  (1)  the number of authorized common shares is at least 200% of the
number of outstanding common shares
CSAUTH > 2 * CSOUTST
DEFENSE:  THE  PRICE  OF  STRATEGIC  DETERRENCE  8  tbl.B-1  & 32  (1991)  ("weak"  pill  effective
deterrent with 2x exercise multiple and 2x purchase multiple, which at their weakest would be based on
a purchase value double the expected future stock price,  which results in issuance of [(purchase value I
future stock price)+l]  = 3).
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or  (2)  there is at least one authorized but unissued preferred share and the
charter gives the board "blank check" authority to set the terms of unissued
preferred shares
PSAUTH - PSOUTST > 1 and BLANK = 1
3.  Coups via Removal or Board  Packing
Default law in most states, including Delaware,  permits shareholders
to  remove  directors  without  cause.
26   Firms  may  attempt to  restrict  this
ability,2"  but if the restrictions  are in the bylaws and shareholders  are able
to amend  the bylaws,  such restrictions  can be "worked  around"  (as  dis-
cussed above).  Removal  power gives shareholders  the ability to mount a
"coup"  rather than waiting  for regularly  scheduled  elections  of directors.
Directors can simply be removed and replaced.2 65 Default law in every state
except Massachusetts and Ohio permits shareholders to fill vacancies.266
If the firm has a staggered board, then default law in Delaware  and a
few other states (Kansas,  Texas, and Maryland) permit shareholders  to re-
move directors  only with cause  or as otherwise provided  expressly in the
charter. Thus,  at firms with staggered boards in these states, a coup is only
possible via removal if the charter expressly permits.
A shareholder "coup" may also be possible by "packing the board." If
shareholders  are  (a) permitted to set the number of directors  and  (b)  fill
263.  The only exceptions are New Jersey, which permits removal without cause only if the charter
expressly  permits, and  New York  and Texas,  which  permit  removal  only if the charter  or bylaws
expressly  permit.  In  addition,  Maine,  Montana,  and  Nevada  require  a  two-thirds  vote  to  remove
directors without cause, as a matter of default law.
264.  Delaware law does not appear to permit any restrictions on removal by shareholders  at firms
that do not have  staggered  boards, whether  in  the charter or bylaws.  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit.  8,  §  141
(1991  &  Supp.  1998).  Outside  Delaware,  charter  restrictions  would  appear  to  be valid  under  the
RMBCA,  but for the same reason  (inclusio unius est exclusio  alterius),  the legality of restrictions  on
removal contained  in the bylaws is doubtful.  Because of the ability of shareholders  to "work around"
restrictive  bylaws at most firms, the issue will not often be of significance. Such bylaws are presumed
invalid for the rest of the analysis.
265.  It might seem that power to fill  those vacancies  is also necessary  for an effective  coup to be
carried out; however, in Delaware, if at the time of filling any vacancy, the directors in office constitute
less than a majority of the whole board, the Chancery Court may upon application by 10%  shareholders
order an  election.  DEL.  CODE  ANN. tit.  8,  §  223(c)  (1991  & Supp.  1998). Thus,  if shareholders  can
remove the entire board in one fell swoop, a coup can be mounted even if they do not technically have
the power to fill vacancies.  A similar outcome  could be  expected even  in states  that do not expressly
provide for such an emergency election.
266.  As with removal restrictions, charter restrictions on vacancy filling by shareholders  are valid
under  RMBCA  section 8.10,  and for that  reason  bylaw  restrictions  are not.  See supra note 23.  By
contrast, the DGCL gives the power to fill vacancies  as a default matter to the directors; the shareholder
right to  fill  vacancies  is a common law right, Moon v. Moon Motor  Car Co.,  151  A. 220  (Del. Ch.
1930);  Campbell  v. Loew's,  Inc.,  134 A.2d 852  (Del.  Ch.  1957).  Vacancy filling  powers could thus
presumably be restricted in the charter or bylaws of a Delaware firm,  although bylaw restrictions have
never been tested. EDWARD  P. WELCH  & ANDRE W J. TuREzYN,  FOLK  ON THE DELAWARE  GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW:  FUNDAN1,  rrALs 485  (1993). Again, shareholders  can "work around"  the absence
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the newly created and vacant board seats, they can increase  the size of the
board by the number of existing seats plus  one, and then  fill those newly
created vacancies,  thereby taking  control  of a majority  of the board.  De-
fault law in every state provides that the number of directors is to be set as
specified in the charter or bylaws; thus,  as a default matter, board packing
may not be permitted.  However, shareholders not only may "work around"
bylaw restrictions  on setting the number of directors,  they  may also  give
themselves express authority to set the number.
In  general,  the  variable  "COUP"  is  set  equal  to  "1"  unless
both  (a)  removal  is blocked and  (b)  board packing  is blocked,  in  which
case the variable is set equal to "0."  Formally defining a variable  to repre-
sent shareholder "coup"  power is complicated by state-by-state  variations,
and the full definition of "COUP"  is set out in ANNEX  B-1.267  Formal defi-
nitions for Delaware firms,  and for firms in the majority of states that fol-
low the RMBCA, are set out there.
At  Delaware  firms,  for  removal  to  be  blocked,  the  charter
must  (a)  provide  for a staggered  board and  (b)  prohibit or remain silent
on removal.  Delaware law  does not allow the bylaws to permit removal at
firms  with  staggered  boards,  and  at  firms  without  staggered  boards,  re-
moval  appears to be a rare mandatory term that cannot be varied either in
the  charter  or bylaws. 68  For  board  packing  to  be  blocked  at  Delaware
firms, one of three things must be true:  (i)  vacancy filling by shareholders
must  be prohibited  in the charter  or bylaws,  and if the latter, the bylaws
must require a supermajority  vote to be  amended by shareholders;  (ii) the
charter  fixes (or prohibits the changing by shareholders  of) the number of
directors,  or (iii) the bylaws fixes (or prohibits the changing by sharehold-
ers  of) the number  of directors,  and bylaw  amendments  require a  super-
majority vote.
For firms  that  follow  the RMBCA,  for  removal  to  be  blocked,  the
charter  must prohibit removal;  as with the DGCL,  the RMBCA  does  not
permit removal  to be  restricted in the bylaws. 69  For board packing to  be
blocked at RMBCA  firms,  one of three things must be true:  (i)  vacancy
filling by shareholders  must be prohibited  in the charter; 27° (ii) the charter
fixes  (or prohibits  the changing  by shareholders  of) the number of direc-
tors, or (iii) the bylaws fix (or prohibits the changing by  shareholders  of)
the number of directors,  and bylaw amendments  require  a  supermajority
vote.
267.  As  with workarounds,  additional  variables  "COUP-67"  and  "COUP-80"  could be  added  to
account for possible supermajority  requirements.
268.  See DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 8, §  141.
269.  REV.  MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.08 (1998).
270.  See supra  note 25.
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4.  Early Shareholder  Action
To bring a "coup,"  shareholders  must be able to act. Normally, they
can act only at annual meetings,  which occur  every  12-18  months  or so.
Shareholders  can  accelerate the process of electing  directors,  however,  if
(as at the majority of firms) they can call and then act at a special meeting,
or if they can act by written consent "in lieu of' a meeting.
Default law  in Delaware  and a  few other  states  (including  Florida,
Illinois,  Michigan,  and  New  Jersey)  provides  for  shareholder  action by
written consent, and permits  restriction  of this power only in the charter,
not the bylaws. 27 1 States that follow the RMBCA allow shareholder action
only by unanimous written  consent, which for public  companies  is  effec-
tively a prohibition. 272 On the other hand, while Delaware  does not permit
shareholders  to call  a special meeting as a default matter, the RMBCA  al-
lows  more  than  10%  of  shareholders  to  call  a  special  meeting.  The
RMBCA rule may be mandatory, but in any event it permits supermajority
requirements only in the charter, not in the bylaws. 27 3 Only in three  states
(New York, Minnesota and Indiana) are shareholders  not given the ability
to act "early"  as a matter of default law. Some states raise the percentage of
shareholders  required  to  call a  special  meeting  to higher  levels,  such  as
25%  (Georgia  and  Ohio),  or permit companies  to raise the levels  in the
charter  (often  up to some  maximum,  such  as  in Ohio and  Texas,  which
permit the charter to raise the level to 50%).
Formally, for firms in Delaware or states that follow Delaware  on ac-
tion by written consent (see Table B-4), the variable "EARLY"  is set equal
to "1" unless the charter expressly prohibits or imposes  supermajority  re-
quirements on shareholder action by written consent
CONSENT = 0 and CONLOC = 1
in which case they are set equal to "0."  For firms that follow the RMBCA
(see  Table B-4),  the  same  variables  are  also  set  equal  to  "1" unless  the
charter  expressly  prohibits  or  imposes  supermajority  requirements  on
shareholders calling special meetings,
SM50 = 0 and SMLOC = 1
271.  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit. 8,  § 228  (1991  & Supp.  1998);  REv.  MODEL Bus. CORP.  ACT  § 7.04
(1998).
272.  Thus, workarounds are not relevant to consent prohibitions. Outside Delaware, consents must
be expressly  permitted. In Delaware, consent prohibitions  must be in the charter to be effective,  which
shareholders  cannot change without board concurrence. See supra note 23.
273.  Thus,  workarounds  are not  relevant to  prohibitions  on  shareholder  rights  to  call  special
meetings.  In  Delaware, special  meeting  calls  by  shareholders must be  expressly  permitted.  Outside
Delaware, prohibitions on and supermajority requirements for special meeting calls by shareholders  are
either illegal or must be in the charter to be effective, which shareholders cannot change without board
concurrence. See supra note 25.
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in which  case  those  variables  are  set  equal  to  "0." '7 For  firms  in  New
York,  Minnesota,  and  Indiana,  "EARLY"  is  set  equal  to  "0"  unless
CONSENT = 1 and CONLOC = 1.
5.  Annual Meeting Requirements
With one or two exceptions  (designed primarily for mutual fund com-
panies), state corporate  codes all  require firms to hold annual meetings  of
shareholders,  whether  or not requested  by shareholders.  State  laws,  how-
ever, vary  considerably in how much  leeway they permit  in when an  an-
nual meeting  is  required.  At  one  extreme,  for example,  Nevada  requires
annual  meetings  every twelve  months;  at another  extreme,  Pennsylvania
requires annual  meetings to be  held within six months  of the time desig-
nated for the meeting  in the firm's charter or bylaws, with at least one in
every calendar year, a formulation that can permit up to eighteen months of
delay  between  meetings;  and  Delaware  requires  annual  meetings  within
thirteen months of the last held meeting. Because the variation in these  re-
quirements  can have  a substantial  effect on how long takeover fights can
last, they are reflected in the index.
Formally, a variable "ANNUAL"  is constructed by reference  to  state
law, taking on the values reflected in Table B-5.
274.  As with workarounds and coups,  additional variables "EARLY-67"  and  "EARLY-80"  could
be added to the analysis. Again, supermajority requirements on early action appear to be rare.
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TABLE B-5
MAXIMUM  DAYS  BETWEEN ANNUAL  MEETINGS
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Days
450
390
390
420
450
420
420
390
390
420
390
450
420
420
420
390
420
State
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Notes:  Most state corporate  statutes expressly  provide that a court may order an annual meeting if
one has not been held within a designated time.  In many states,  the specified time is the earlier of
some  number of months  after the  end  of the  fiscal year  or  some number  of months after  the  last
annual meeting.  For such states, it is assumed (as is most common) that the last annual meeting was
held within four months of the end of the fiscal year (i.e., by the end of April following a December
31 fiscal year end).  Thus, in state  like North Carolina,  which provides for a court-ordered  meeting
if none has been held before the earlier of six months after the end of the fiscal year or  15  months'
after its last annual meeting,  it is assumed that the appropriate cut-off is June 30,  six months after
the most  common  fiscal  year end,  which  will  be  approximately  420  days  after the  last annual
meeting.
New  York  does  not  provide  in  its  statute  for  court-ordered  annual  meetings,  but  recognizes  a
common law right of shareholders  to compel a meeting.  Atter v. Dressel,  306 N.Y. 427 (1954).  No
statutory or case law could be  found in Alaska, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,  Minnesota, Missouri,
North  Dakota,  Ohio, Oklahoma  or  Pennsylvania.  However,  given  that 48  states  require  annual
meetings, courts are assumed to be willing to rely on equitable powers to compel a meeting if one is
not held.  The two states not requiring annual meetings are Minnesota and North  Dakota; Minnesota
provides that if none held within  15 months, 3%  of shareholders  may demand a meeting.  For states
that do  not  statutorily  provide for  a  court-ordered  meeting,  a  390-day period  is assumed,  on  the
theory that a court would be reluctant to force a meeting until at least a full year had passed, and the
practicalities of distributing proxy material required by the SEC for all shareholder meetings would
make  holding  one  earlier  than  30  days  after  the anniversary  of the last  meeting  unlikely.  An
exception  is Pennsylvania,  which  specifies  a meeting must be held within six  months of the date
designated therefor, which  should  give  a target company  at least  six months  after the  last annual
meeting before a court would intervene.
State
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Days
390
390
390
420
450
450
420
390
420
390
540
390
390
390
390
420
390
Days
390
390
420
540
390
510
390
420
390
450
420
450
420
390
420
420
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6.  Cumulative Voting and Staggered  Boards
For firms with staggered boards,  cumulative voting may add delay to
a takeover.' 75  Whether or not  delay  is added  depends  on whether or not
insiders own enough stock, or can persuade enough unaffiliated sharehold-
ers to vote with them, so  as to use the ability to cumulate votes and hold
onto  one  seat per election.  For  firms with  staggered  boards  and  a  small
enough number of board seats relative to the number of accumulated  vot-
ing power of the insiders, this effect may delay a takeover. The minimum
number of voting shares necessary  for directors  and officers  to retain one
seat ("HOLD")  depends on the number of board  seats  (SEATS  or "B"  in
the following  formula)  and  the number  of outstanding voting  shares  (as-
sumed to equal common shares outstanding, CSOUTST,  or "S"  in the fol-
lowing formula), as follows:
HOLD = [ (B  /  ( 3B + 9 )) +( 5 / 3S ) ] / S
The formula reflects the classic cumulative voting  formula for how many
shares incumbent managers  need to elect N'  directors,  given that N direc-
tors  are to  be elected at the next  meeting, and  S  shares outstanding. 276  It
also reflects the additional  constraint that incumbents need to elect at least
B/3 directors at each annual meeting to be able to stretch out their incum-
bency to a total of three meetings, rather than only two.
B.  Determination of  Index
With these definitions  in hand, the contestability  index can be calcu-
lated. The following calculation  can be readily programmed  into standard
spreadsheet programs  using the foregoing  analysis of terms  and definition
of variables. There are seven mutually exclusive cases.
Case I  If PILLBAN = 1,  then CI = 30
If the company cannot  adopt a poison pill,  then the index equals  30,
which is the minimum tender offer period under the Williams Act, plus 2-5
days for preparation. The remaining cases assume the firm can adopt a poi-
son pill.
275.  See supra  note  187.
276.  The number of  shares, X, needed to elect  N' directors, given that N directors are to be elected
and S shares are outstanding, is given by the following classic formula:  X = (S + N'  + 1) / (N + 1). See
R. CrARK, CoRpoRATE  LAW 363 (1986).
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Case 2  If PILLBAN = 0, COUP =  1, and CONSENT = 1,  then CI = 45
If the  shareholders  can  act  by  written  consent  and  can  mount  a
"coup,"  then the index  equals  45,  which  is  the minimum period  of time
practically  necessary  to  prepare  and  clear  consent  solicitation  materials
with the SEC under the federal proxy rules, circulate the materials, and file
them with the firm.
Case 3  If PILLBAN = 0, COUP = 1, and SM10 = 1, then CI = 65
If the shareholders  cannot act by written consent but less than 10%  of
shareholders  can call a special meeting of shareholders, and at the meeting
shareholders  can mount a "coup,"  then the index is 65.  If shareholders  call
a special  meeting, the  firm  is  generally  required  to hold  such a meeting
within 10-60  days (the minimum period specified in the notice of meeting
under all corporate  codes).  The index represents the maximum 60  day de-
lay before the meeting and 5 days for preparation and proper demand of the
meeting.  No  additional  time  is  added  for  processing  under  the  federal
proxy rules  because  such processing periods  are  assumed to run concur-
rently with the 60-day notice period under state law.
Case 4  If PILLBAN  = 0,  COUP  =  1, SM10 =  0,  and  SM50 =  1, then
CI = 90
If the  shareholders  cannot  act  by written  consent,  and  10-50%  of
shareholders  can  call  a  special meeting,  and at the meeting  shareholders
can  mount  a "coup,"  the index  is  90,  which  reflects  the minimum time
practically  necessary  for  shareholders  to  (a)  spend 20-30  days to  solicit
consents/demands  to  call  the special  meeting  (which will require  a prior
filing with the SEC, as with written consent solicitations) and  (b)  60 days
for the company to hold the meeting (during  which time the shareholder
may solicit proxies to act at the special meeting). 277
277.  If a supermajority of shareholders  can call a special meeting, then the index will be presumed
to reflect  a practical inability of shareholders  to do so, given  the difficulty  of obtaining supermajority
votes  for  a  preliminary  step  in  a  takeover  bid.  Unusual  circumstances  might  indicate  that  such  a
supermajority  might be forthcoming-for example,  where  a bidder is making a large  premium offer
and  the  target  directors  are  attempting  to  "just say  no"  to  the  bid,  or where  a  supermajority  of
shareholders have tendered into an offer already. In those cases, the index might be more appropriately
set  at  ninety.  In  any  event,  with  the  foregoing  analysis  complete,  terms  defined,  and  algorithm
programmed into a spreadsheet,  the index can be recalculated readily to examine relative legal takeover
vulnerability making different assumptions about the size of the shareholder coalition mobilized against
the target.
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Case 5  If PILLBAN  =  0,  EARLY  =  0  and  (CLASS  =  (0  or  2)  or
COUP = 1) then CI = (ANNUAL*  0.5) + 23
If shareholders  cannot act "early,"  and the board is not staggered,  or
(regardless  of whether  the board  is  staggered)  shareholders  are  able  to
mount  a "coup"  at a shareholder  meeting, then the index will  depend  on
how  long  shareholders  must  wait  until  the  next  annual  meeting. 2 8  For
practical  analysis  of a  given  company's  vulnerability to  takeover  at any
given moment in time, of course, the appropriate measure would be to sim-
ply add onto the  date of the  last annual meeting  the value  of and subtract
the current date from the sum. At a given point in calendar time, in other
words,  a given firm's legal vulnerability to takeover depends on how long
it has been since the last annual meeting and how much flexibility the tar-
get board has under state law to delay the next annual meeting. 79
Starting approximately forty-five days prior to each annual meeting,8 '
the firm's index rises suddenly to the maximum of 390,  and then declines
during the year until  a  date  approximately  345  days  after the last  annual
meeting.  At this  point, any  bidder  wanting  to use  the  upcoming  annual
meeting  to  coordinate  shareholders  against  existing  directors  must  com-
mence  its proxy statement  filing and preclearance process with the SEC to
leave sufficient time to solicit and obtain a majority of proxies. The precise
cut-off point  will  vary  depending  on  target  shareholder  dispersion,  the
number of target  shareholders  willing to support a bid, and the  degree  of
target resistance,  all of which can affect the time needed for a proxy fight.
Nevertheless,  at some point around  forty-five  days  prior to the scheduled
annual meeting, the index  again rises discontinuously to its maximum,  re-
flecting the fact that the bidder has lost its chance,  for the next year, to be-
gin  an  effective  proxy  fight.  As  a  result  of this  fluctuation,  bidders
sometimes wait until the point in the calendar year when the target is most
vulnerable before commencing a bid, but often other factors (financial risk,
potential competition, regulation) may prompt a bidder to commence with-
out regard to where the target is in its annual meeting cycle.
For purposes  of research  or analysis  of a  large  number  of firms  at
varying  points  in  annual  meeting  cycles,  a  precise  calculation  of  each
278.  Massachusetts  switches  the normal  default  rule on  classified  boards,  so  for Massachusetts
firms only, the algorithm for Case 5  is:  If PILLBAN = 0, EARLY =  0 and (CLASS = 0  or COUP = 1)
then CI = (ANNUAL*  0.5) + 23.
279.  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit. 8,  § 21 1(c) (1991  & Supp.  1998). Delaware  law also  requires an annual
meeting within  thirty days of the date designated for the annual meeting  in the bylaws. Id. However,
most  companies  allow  boards  to  amend  bylaws,  making  this  requirement  non-binding  in  many
circumstances.
280.  In an actual  takeover fight, the target could hold its annual meeting at any point  prior to the
maximum of 390 days  after the last annual meeting,  so  that the cutoff for commencement  of a proxy
fight may  be  earlier.  Firms  must  generally  provide  advance  notice of the  scheduling  of an  annual
meeting  in  order to prevent  them from  lulling  bidders  into  inaction  and  then  scheduling  an  annual
meeting  sufficiently close  in time so  as, in effect,  to push past the cut-off point  for an effective proxy
fight.
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firm's index is neither feasible nor necessary. Instead, an average index can
be calculated, equal to the expected time to the next annual meeting from a
(random)  point in  the annual  meeting  cycle  that  shareholders  decide  to
wage a proxy fight or a bidder decides to launch a hostile bid. As reflected
in the formula given  above, the index equals  the forty-five-day  minimum
for proxy preclearance  plus 50%  of the time before shareholders  can judi-
cially compel another annual meeting (less forty-five),  or
(ANNUAL - 45) * 0.5 + 45
which after rounding simplifies to
ANNUAL  * 0.5 + 23
Advance  notice periods  frequently  required  by bylaws  will not  generally
add any additional time to a proxy fight, because they can run concurrently
with SEC preclearance.
Case 6  If PILLBAN = 0, COUP = 0, CLASS = 1,  and
either (STGLOC = 1 or WORKAROUND  = 0), and
either (CUMUL = 0 or INSIDE < HOLD), then
CI = (ANNUAL* 1.5)  + .23
If shareholders  cannot mount a  "coup,"  and the board  is  staggered
(either in the charter or, if shareholders  cannot workaround the bylaws,  in
the bylaws),  then shareholders  will have to fight through at least two  an-
nual meetings, which means waiting at least one full annual meeting cycle,
plus  an  expected  average  time  of 50%  until  the first  annual meeting.  If
shareholders  may not cumulate their votes,  then only  1.5  annual meeting
cycles  will  be  necessary  on  average.  (The ability  of shareholders  to  act
"early"  is irrelevant to control fights unless they can also mount a "coup.")
Even  if shareholders  may cumulate  votes,  but insiders  own less  than the
minimum percentage of outstanding voting shares necessary to hold onto a
seat with cumulative  voting, then, again,  only  1.5  annual meeting  cycles
will be necessary on average.28t
In each case, the index is equal to forty-five days'  minimum SEC pre-
clearance  for the next annual meeting (as  discussed for Case 5), plus  50%
of the time to the next annual  meeting  less  forty-five  days for  SEC pre-
clearance  already included (again as discussed  for Case 5), plus  100%  of
the time to the number of annual meetings  needed to obtain a majority of
the board, given by multiplying the time  between annual meetings by 1.5,
and adding 23.282
281.  For Massachusetts  firms  only, the  algorithm  for Case  6  is:  If PILLBAN  = 0, COUP  = 0,
CLASS = (1 or 2) and either (CUMUL = 0 or INSIDE < HOLD), then CI = (ANNUAL *  1.5) + 23.
282.  This analysis assumes a staggered board has three classes, as with nearly all staggered boards.
The law of most states  (including  Delaware and those that follow the RMBCA),  as well  rules of the
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As with Case  5,  analysis of a particular company  at a given point in
time would not use the average expected time to the next annual meeting,
but  would  calculate  an  actual  time,  resulting  in an  index  that  fluctuates
over  the annual  meeting  cycle,  but shifted  upward  by the total  time  be-
tween annual meetings.
Case 7  If PILLBAN = 0, COUP = 0, CLASS = 1, CUMUL = 1  and
INSIDE > HOLD, then CI = (ANNUAL* 2.5) + .23
If shareholders  cannot act "early,"  a "coup"  cannot be mounted, the board
is staggered, shareholders may cumulate their votes, and directors  and offi-
cers own more than the minimum percentage  of outstanding voting shares
necessary to hold onto a seat with cumulative voting, then insiders will be
able  to hold onto  a majority  of board  seats  through  two  elections  rather
than just one, increasing the index to equal the time between annual meet-
ings  multiplied by 2.5, plus  23.283  This analysis assumes that directors  and
officers are assumed to vote as a "block"  against the dissident coalition or
bidder;  this assumption may not be  valid in all cases,  but is a reasonable
simplification for research.
III
How THE INDEX WORKS:  FOUR EXAMPLES
To briefly illustrate how the contestability index would be determined
for real  companies, consider the following public  companies:  CompUSA,
Inc.,  Dell Computer  Corp.,  Exxon Corp.,  and Alteon,  Inc.  CompUSA and
Dell are  well-known,  Texas-based  computer  retailers;  Exxon  is  of course
one of the largest companies in the world; and Alteon is a small-cap health-
care company. None has  a shareholder with more than 20% of the voting
stock;  none has a  dual-class capitalizations. Thus,  each is subject to a hos-
tile takeover bid (although a bid for Exxon might be impossible to finance).
Exxon  is the  direct corporate  descendant  of Standard  Oil  of New  Jersey,
founded in  1882, and is still incorporated in New Jersey, although it moved
its headquarters  from New York to  Texas  in  1990.  CompUSA,  Dell and
Alteon were  founded  in the  1980s  and  are  all incorporated  in Delaware.
Dell went public in  1988, CompUSA and Alteon in  1991.
New York Stock Exchange,  see New York Stock Exchange Listed Company  Manual § A-15,  at A-280,
limit the number  of classes  to three. Two  classes are sometimes seen,  and four are  permitted in New
York  and  North  Carolina.  In  the two-class  case  the  index  equals  1.25  * ANNUAL+  23,  as  delay
consists of one normal annual meeting cycle, weighted at 50%, as in Case 5. Evenly divided classes are
equivalent  to  three  classes  (bidders  will  assume  deadlock  may  not  provide  control).  If classes  are
lopsided, with one more seat in one class than the other, the odds the larger class will be elected at the
next  meeting  are  50/50.  If the  odds  of an  even  or lopsided  split  are  also  50/50,  the  probability  a
majority will not  be elected  at the  next  annual meeting  is 75%,  resulting  in a  total expected  time to
majority control of (0.5 + 0.75)*ANNUAL + 23.
283.  For Massachusetts  firms  only, the algorithm  for Case  7 is:  If PILLBAN  = 0,  COUP =  0,
CLASS = (I or 2), CUMUL =  I and INSIDE > HOLD, then CI = (ANNUAL * 2.5) + 23.
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For all four firms, calculation of the contestability index is simplified
because  all  have  blank  check  authority  in  their  charters  and  sufficient
authorized  and unissued preferred stock, so that none bans pills,  and each
firm will be able to adopt a pill in response to a bid (if it has not previously
done  so).  For Exxon  and Dell, the  calculation  is  also  simplified because
neither has a staggered board, rendering cumulative voting and inside own-
ership  irrelevant  for purposes  of the index.  Both Alteon  and  CompUSA
have  staggered  boards,  but  only  CompUSA's  is  effective,  because  at
Alteon shareholders  can both mount a "coup"  and act "early,"  in advance
of an annual  shareholders'  meeting. An  "early  coup"  is  also  possible  at
Dell. At Exxon,  a "coup"  is possible, but shareholders  must wait until the
next  annual  shareholders'  meeting,  making  a  "coup"  irrelevant;  and  at
CompUSA shareholders can neither mount a coup nor act early.
Based  on  this  analysis,  the  indices  for  Exxon,  Dell,  Alteon,  and
CompUSA can be determined from Algorithm Cases 2, 4 and 5,  and equal
208,  45,  45,  and  608,  respectively.  Thus,  a bidder can  expect to bring  a
takeover bid for either Dell or Alteon to  a closing within forty-five  days,
absent antitrust concerns, bid competition,  or some  effective  transactional
or litigation defense,  whereas  at Exxon it will take between  two and four-
teen months, and at CompUSA, it will take a minimum of thirteen months,
and could take over two years. As asserted at the outset, the legal takeover
vulnerability  of the three  firms  varies  significantly, based  on each firm's
set of takeover defenses and governance terms.
IV
CONTESTABILITY  INDICES  UNDER DEFAULT LAW
Another way to illustrate the way the index works  is to consider what
indices would apply to firms that do not vary from default governance rules
supplied by state law. Interestingly, the result of a strict default law analy-
sis is uninteresting:  all states provide that the board's authority to issue  or
set the terms of common or preferred stock extends only so far as expressly
provided in the charter; thus, all firms begin life with a ban on pills implic-
itly in place. All firms,  however, grant boards  at least some flexibility to
issue  stock, for obvious financing reasons, and nearly all grant boards suf-
ficient flexibility in this authority that an implicit ban on pills is absent.
If a ban on pills, then, is assumed to not be part of default  law, the
analysis of the contestability index under default law becomes only slightly
more interesting. Variations  remain remarkably minor:  indices range  only
from  forty-five  to ninety,  nowhere  near  the range  found in  any random
sample of public companies.
Perhaps  surprisingly  to  legal  academics  who  think  of Delaware  as
captured  by management  (antitakeover)  interests,  Delaware  imposes  the
lowest amount of delay on takeovers as a matter of default law. California
and RMBCA states impose only slightly more delay:  they effectively pro-
hibit shareholder action by written consent but allow special meetings to be
called by  10%  of the shareholders.  Pennsylvania only partially lives up to
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its  reputation  as  being  the  state  most  inhospitable  to  takeovers:  it  bars
shareholder action by written consent and requires 20% of shareholders to
call  a special meeting, thus imposing the highest hurdle of any state's  de-
fault  law  to  "early"  action by  shareholders,  but the delay  expected even
under  Pennsylvania  default  law  for a takeover bid  is  still  only  a modest
ninety days. Massachusetts, on the other hand, imposes no more delay than
does the RMBCA, despite its infamous imposition of staggered boards as a
matter of default law during the Norton takeover battle, and despite its be-
ing one of the few states to not give shareholders  the ability to remove  di-
rectors  as a  default matter:  the  ability  of shareholders  to pack  the board
under default law defeats the effectiveness of the staggered board provision
anyway.BLAME THE LAWYERS
ANNEX B- 1
DEFINITION OF COUP FOR DELAWARE FimMs
(1)(a)(i)  If CLASS = I  and (STGLOC = 1 or WORKAROUND  = 0)
and [REM = (0 or 2) or REMLOC  = 2], and
(1)(b)(i)  VAC = 0 and [VACLOC= 1 or (VACLOC = 2 andvWORKAROUND = 0)],  or
(1)(b)(ii)  NUMSET = 0 and NUMLOC = 1,  or
(1)(b)(iii)  (NUMSET = 2 or NUMLOC = 2) and WORKAROUND = 0, then COUP = 0
(2)  Else  COUP = 1
Explanation
Delaware  default law on removal of directors without cause depends
on whether the board is classified:  if it is, removal  is prohibited unless the
charter expressly permits it; if it is not classified, removal is permitted, and
neither charter  nor  bylaws  may prohibit  it.  To  be effective,  a  staggered
board must be specified in the charter, or, if  in the bylaws, the shareholders
must not be able  to amend by the bylaws  without a  supermajority  vote.
Thus, at Delaware firms without classified boards, coups are mandatory. At
Delaware  firms with classified boards, coups are still possible if the board
may be packed,  or if the charter permits  removal  without cause.  Default
law permits  directors to fill vacancies, but does not shareholders  to set the
number of directors  unless  so  specified  in the bylaws.  Thus,  to prevent
board packing:  (i) vacancy filling must be prohibited in the charter or by-
laws,  and if the latter, the bylaws must require a supermajority vote to be
amended;  (ii) the charter may prohibit  shareholders  from setting the num-
ber of directors;  or (iii) the bylaws may prohibit or be silent on sharehold-
ers'  ability to change the number of directors, if the bylaws may  not be
changed without a supermajority vote.
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RMBCA  (MODEL NON-DELAWARE)  DEFINITION  OF COUP
(1)(a)  If  REM  = 0 and REMLOC =  1,  and
(1)(b)(i)  VAC = 0 and VACLOC  =  1, or
(1)(b)(ii)  NUMSET = 0 and NUMLOC  = 1, or
(1)(b)(iii)  (NUMSET = 2 or NUMLOC = 2) and WORKAROUND = 0, or
(1)(b)(iv)  STATE = MA, VAC = (0 or 2), and WORKAROUND  = 0)], then  COUP = 0
(2)  Else  COUP = 1
Explanation
Default law  in most  states  permits  shareholders  to  remove  directors
without cause unless otherwise provided in the charter. Thus, the  first part
of the definition-labeled  (1)(a)  above-specifies  that a coup is not possi-
ble only if removal is barred and the bar is in the charter. In addition,  for a
coup to not be possible, shareholders  must not be able to pack the board.
Board packing has two steps:  changing the number of directors  and filling
the resulting  vacancies.  Most  states  allow  shareholders  to  fill  vacancies
unless otherwise provided in the charter; thus, case (1)(b)(i)  above requires
the charter to specifically bar shareholders  from filling vacancies. Alterna-
tively,  board  packing  may  be  blocked  if (ii)  shareholders  are  expressly
barred  from changing the number of directors  in the charter or (iii) the by-
laws are silent or prohibit directors from changing the number of directors,
and need  a  supermajority  vote  to  amend  the  bylaws.  A  special  case  is
added  for  Massachusetts,  which  uniquely  requires  shareholders  to  be
granted the  power to  fill vacancies  either in the charter  or  bylaws.  This
standard definition of COUP  does not apply to  firms  in Delaware, Maine,
Montana,  Nevada,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  Ohio,  or  Texas,  which  also
have unusual provisions regarding removal.
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DEFINITION  OF COUP FOR OHIO FiRMs
(1) If  REM = 0 and (REMLOC  = 1 or WORKAROUND = 0) then  COUP = 0
(2)  Else  COUP  = 1
Explanation
Ohio does not permit shareholders to fill vacancies; thus, a coup is not
possible via packing the board. Shareholders may remove directors without
cause  (even if the firm's board is  staggered) unless  the charter  or bylaws
provide Else. Thus, unless either the charter expressly provides  sharehold-
ers may not remove directors,  or the bylaws provide  shareholders may not
remove directors and may not be amended without a supermajority vote, a
coup is possible.
DEFINITION OF  COUP FOR MAINE, MONTANA, NEVADA  AND NEW
JERSEY FiRMs
(1)(a)  If  [REM = (0 or 2) or REMLOC = 2] and
(1)(b)(i)  VAC = 0 and VACLOC = I,  or
(1)(b)(ii)  NUMSET  = 2 or (NUMSET = 0 and NUMLOC = 2)] and WORKAROUND  = 0,
or
(I)(b)(iii)  (NUMSET = 0 and NUMLOC = 1)
then  COUP = 0
(2)  Else  COUP = 1
Explanation
New Jersey does not permit removal of directors  without cause unless
it is expressly provided for in the charter;  Maine, Montana and Nevada re-
quire a two-thirds vote for shareholders  to remove directors without cause.
Unless the charter changes  these rules and permits removal  without cause
by a shareholder majority, the only way for shareholders to mount a coup is
by packing the board. There  are three different reasons  packing the board
may be impossible:  (i)  the shareholders  may not fill vacancies by express
provision of the charter;  (ii) the charter and bylaws are silent on whether or
not shareholders  may fix the number of directors,  or the bylaws  prohibit
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shareholders  from changing the number of directors, and shareholders may
only amend the bylaws with a supermajority vote; and (iii) the charter pro-
hibits shareholders  from setting the number of directors.
DEFINITION  OF COUP FOR NEW YORK FiRMs
(1)(a)(i)  IfREM = 0 and REMLOC =  1, or
(l)(a)(ii)  REM = 0 and REMLOC = 2 and WORKAROUND  = 0, or
(1)(a)(iii)  REM = 2 and WORKAROUND  = 0, and
(1)(b)(i)  VAC = 0 and VACLOC =  1, or
(1)(b)(ii)  NUMSET  = 0 and NUMLOC =  1, or
(1)(b)(iii)  NUMSET  = 0 and NJMLOC = 2)] and WORKAROUND = 0, or
(1)(b)(iv)  NUMSET  = 2 and WORKAROUND = 0, then  COUP  = 0
(2)  Else  COUP = I
Explanation
New  York does  not allow  shareholders  to  remove  directors  as  a  de-
fault matter, so the ability to remove directors may not be available  in three
situations:  first,  where  the charter  expressly  prohibits  it  (case  (1)(a)(i));
second, where  the bylaws  prohibit it and  may not be amended  without  a
supermajority vote it (case  (1)(a)(ii));  and third, where  the charter and by-
laws are silent, and the shareholders  cannot amend by the bylaws to add the
power to remove  directors without a supermajority  vote it (case (1)(a)(iii).
In  addition,  as with the standard  definition  of COUP,  shareholders  must
also be prevented  from packing  the board, which can  be  done in  one  of
four ways.
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DEFINITION  OF COUP FOR TEXAS FiRms
(1)(a)(i)  If CLASS = I and (STGLOC =  I or WORKAROUND = 0)
and [REM = (0 or 2) or REMLOC = 2], or
(I)(a)(ii) CLASS = 0 and REM = (0 or 2) and WORKAROUND = 0, and
(1)(b)(i)  VAC = 0 and [VACLOC =  I or (VACLOC =  2 and WORKAROUND  =  0)],  or
(1)(b)(ii)
(l)(b)(iii)
(2)  Else
NUMSET = 0,  or
(NUMSET = 2 or NUMLOC = 2) and WORKAROUND = 0, then COUP = 0
COUP = 1
Explanation
Texas  follows  Delaware  law  on  removal,  but  expressly  requires
shareholders be given the ability to remove  directors in the charter or by-
laws,  even  in firms without classified boards.  But  such  a power may  be
added by  shareholders  unless  a supermajority  vote is  required  for share-
holders to amend the by laws.
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS
AGECO  is the  age of an issuer's business  (that is, the year of the  IPO less
the oldest year given by the issuer  as the date of its founding or organiza-
tion in either its IPO prospectus or latest annual report on Form  10-K).
AGECSQ is AGECO squared.
AGEFIRM  is the age of an issuer's legal entity (that is, the year of the IPO
less the year of the latest of the issuer's incorporation or most recent  rein-
corporation given by the issuer as the date of its founding or organization
in either its IPO prospectus or latest annual report on Form 10-K).
AGEFSQ is AGEFIRM squared.
BUST is a dummy set to  one if the issuer had been delisted as a result of
bankruptcy  between  the  IPO  and  the  end  of  1999,  as  reported  by
COMPUSTAT  and  confirmed  by  searches  in  Lexis  and  other  news
sources.
CAHQ is a dummy set to  one if the issuer's principal place of business  at
the IPO is in California, given by the IPO prospectus.
CAINC is a dummy set to one if the issuer is a California corporation at the
IPO, given by the issuer's charter at the IPO and confirmed  in the IPO pro-
spectus.
CAP5ASST  is the ratio of the issuer's average  annual capital expenditures
in the  five  years after  the  IPO to book value  of the issuer's  assets  at the
IPO, from COMPUSTAT.
CEOAGE is the age of the CEO at the IPO, given by the IPO prospectus.
CEOTEN is the number of years the  CEO has worked at the issuer, given
by the IPO prospectus.
CEOFOUND  is a dummy set to  one if the CEO  at the IPO founded the is-
suer. FCF5 is the average annual free cash flow over the five years after the
IPO.
CEOPRE  is the percentage voting power held immediately before  the IPO
by the person who is chief executive  officer at the time of the IPO (CEO),
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given by the IPO prospectus.  Where  an issuer does not have a dual class
capital structure,  this is also be the percentage  equity owned by the CEO
before the IPO.
CEOPOST  is the percentage  voting power held by the  CEO  immediately
after the IPO, given by the IPO prospectus.
CEOSOLD is a dummy set to one if the CEO reduced her voting power in
the IPO, determined from the IPO prospectus.
CLASS as dependent  dummy variable,  set to one if the issuer had a classi-
fied board.
CM2 is the Carter-Manaster rating,  given by Carter  et al., supra note  98,
for the lead underwriter in the IPO, given by the IPO prospectus.
DEBTASST  is  the  ratio  of book value  of the  issuer's  long-term  debt  to
book value of assets at the IPO.
DEFENSE as  dependent dummy  variable, ranking  an issuer's legal take-
over vulnerability, most to least, by their takeover defenses,  given by refer-
ence to default  law  of an issuer's  state  of incorporation  and the issuer's
charter and bylaws and IPO prospectus, as follows:
Rank 1:  Issuers  that permit  shareholders  to  "act  early,"  either by
written consent of a majority of shareholders  in lieu of a
meeting,  or by permitting a majority or less of sharehold-
ers to call a special meeting of shareholders.
Rank 2:  Issuers that do not permit shareholders  to "act  early,"  and
do not have classified boards.
Rank 3:  Issuers that do not permit shareholders  to "act  early"  and
have a classified board.
Rank 4:  Issuers that have a dual class capital structure and sell low-
vote stock in the IPO.
Note:  For reasons discussed in Appendix B, this ranking is an imper-
fect index of an issuer's legal takeover vulnerability,  but it is (a) sim-
pler to determine  from public information than a firm's contestability
index,  (b)  a better  approximation  of a  firm's legal  takeover vulner-
ability than merely using single defense terms, such as board classifi-
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cation or dual  class structure,  in isolation,  and (c)  requires fewer de-
grees of freedom with little loss of theoretical power than loading  all
relevant  defenses  into  a  term-by-term  unordered  multinomial  logit
(when  defenses  are the regressand)  or as  separate  independent  vari-
ables  (when defenses  are the regressor).  It is also  similar to a ranking
used by Daines & Klausner, supra  note 8.
DEINC is a dummy set to one if the issuer is a Delaware corporation at the
IPO, given by the issuer's charter at the IPO and confirmed in the IPO pro-
spectus.
DEVEL is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO prospectus discloses the
issuer was  in the development  stage (that  is,  had not yet begun shipping
product or providing services) at the time of the IPO.
DOPRE  is  the percentage  voting  power  held  by  directors  and  officers
("D&O") immediately before the IPO, given by the IPO prospectus.
DOPOST  is  the voting power  held by D&O  immediately  after the  IPO,
given by the IPO prospectus.
DUALCLAS  is  a dummy set to one if the issuer had a dual  class  capital
structure at the time of the IPO, given by the charter and confirmed  in the
IPO prospectus.
DUALCON  is  a dummy  set to  one  if the issuer had  a dual  class  capital
structure and sold low-vote  stock in the IPO.  See Field, supra note  8, for
reasons this variable may differ from DUALCLAS.
EARNI  is the issuer's  net income  in the first fiscal  year  ended after  the
IPO, from COMPUSTAT
EARNPOS is a dummy set to one if an issuer had positive earnings  in the
last period reported in the IPO prospectus.
FAMILY  is  a dummy  set to  one if the issuer was  majority  owned by an
individual or a family of related individuals prior to the IPO.
FCF5  is an issuer's average  annual operating income before income taxes,
depreciation  and  amortization  charges  ("OBITDA")  over  the  five  fiscal
years after the IPO,  from COMPUSTAT.
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FCF5POS is an issuer's average annual OBITDA, if positive, over the five
fiscal years after the IPO, from COMPUSTAT.
IDOPRE is the percentage voting power held by independent D&O imme-
diately before the IPO, given by the IPO prospectus. "Independent" means
not an officer.
IDOPOST  is the percentage voting power held by independent  D&O im-
mediately after the IPO, given by the IPO prospectus.
LAW1  is the number of lawyers at the  office working on the IPO  of the
law firm serving as issuer's counsel in the year of the IPO, as reported by
Martindale-Hubbell,  Inc.
LAWFRM1  is the total  number of lawyers  in the law firm serving as  is-
suer's counsel in the year of the  IPO, as reported  by Martindale-Hubbell,
Inc.
LAWFRMSQ is LAWFRMI  squared.
LBO  is a dummy set to one if the issuer is  owned in part by a leveraged
buyout ("LBO") fund prior to the IPO, as indicated in year-end surveys in
Buyouts  (an industry publication)  and  confirmed  by  the IPO  prospectus.
The variable was set to  one when it was clear from the prospectus that an
IPO was backed by  a LBO fund or had recently undergone  an LBO even
though it was omitted from the year-end surveys.
LNASSETO  is the natural log of the book value of the issuer's assets at the
end of the last period reported in the IPO prospectus.
LNOFFSZ is natural log of the IPO offer size, and LNASSETO  is the natu-
ral log of the book value of the issuer's assets at the end of the last period
reported in the IPO prospectus.
MA is a dummy set to one if the issuer had been delisted as a result of be-
ing acquired or had engaged  in a "merger of equals"  (that is, a merger in
which the counterparty  had assets with a book value of at least 20% of the
sample  issuer)  between  the  IPO  and  the  end  of 1999,  as  reported  by
COMPUSTAT  and  confirmed  by  searches  in  Lexis  and  other  news
sources.
MAINDACT  is a count from  SDC data of merger or acquisition transac-
tions over $10 million in the period  1988-90 that involved targets with the
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issuer's  three-digit  SIC  code, given by the IPO prospectus.  Only majority
acquisitions of publicly held targets  without control  shareholders  were in-
cluded.
MASDC is  a count from  SDC  data of merger  or acquisition  transactions
over $10  million in the period  1988-90 that involved the IPO issuer coun-
sel as counsel to  one of the principal parties. Only majority acquisitions  of
publicly held targets without control shareholders were included.
NAME  is  a dummy  set to  one if the issuer's  corporate  name  includes  or
consists  of the name of a pre-IPO  majority shareholder,  given by the IPO
prospectus.
PPEASST is the ratio of the issuer's book value  of net property, plant and
equipment ("PPE") to the book value  of its total  assets as of the most re-
cent date reported in the IPO prospectus.
PPENET is the book value of the issuer's PPE as of the most recent  date
reported in the IPO prospectus.
PBIND is a dummy set to one if the issuer's primary three-digit  SIC code,
given  by the  IPO  prospectus,  is  one  in  which  a large  number  of issuers
were reported to have dual  class capital  structures in Field, supra note  8.
An  alternative  specification,  PBINDB,  was  set to  one if the issuer's  pri-
mary three-digit  SIC code  is one in which a large number of issuers were
reported to have dual  class  capital  structures in the sample  studied in this
article.
RMBCA is a dummy set to one if the issuer is incorporated at the IPO in a
state  that follows  the  Revised  Model  Business  Corporation Act's  provi-
sions  governing  special  meetings,  action  by written  consent,  removal  of
directors by shareholders,  determination  of the number of board seats, fill-
ing of board vacancies,  and  board classification.  State of incorporation  is
determined  from the issuer's charter and confirmed  in the IPO prospectus;
whether  a state follows  the RMBCA  is determined  by the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act Annotated.
RD5ASST  is the ratio of the issuer's  average annual research  and develop-
ment expenses in the five years  after the IPO to book value of the issuer's
assets at the IPO, each given by COMPUSTAT.
RETAIN  is the percentage of voting power retained by pre-IPO sharehold-
ers after the IPO, given by the IPO prospectus.
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ROE is average annual return on equity over the five full fiscal years after
the IPO, from COMPUSTAT.
ROA is average annual return on assets over the five full fiscal years after
the IPO, from COMPUSTAT.
SHHl  is the number of issuer's  shareholders  at the end  of the first fiscal
year after the IPO, from COMPUSTAT.
SILVAL is a dummy set to one if the office representing a given IPO issuer
is in located in Silicon Valley (that is, Palo Alto, California).
SPLIT  is a dummy set to  one if the  a public  company is both the largest
shareholder of the issuer and the public company owned more than 20%  of
the issuer prior to the IPO, as indicated by the IPO prospectus.
SUITSALL is a count of decisions by all Federal and state  courts reported
in Lexis in lawsuits  1980-89 in which the law firm acting as issuer counsel
was  mentioned  and  in  which  one  of  the  following  was  mentioned:
"merger,  .... acquisition,"  "proxy fight," or "tender offer."
SUITSDEL is a count of decisions by Delaware courts reported in Lexis in
lawsuits  1980-89 in which the law  firm acting as issuer counsel was men-
tioned  and  in  which  one  of the  following  was  mentioned:  "merger,"
"acquisition," "proxy fight," or "tender offer."
UNIT is a dummy set to  one if the IPO was  a unit offering of stock  and
warrants, as indicated by the IPO prospectus.
VC is a dummy set to one if the issuer is owned in part by a venture capital
("VC") fund prior to the IPO,  as indicated  in year-end  surveys  in Going
Public: The IPO Reporter (an industry publication) and confirmed by the
IPO prospectus.  The variable  was  set to  one  when it was  clear from the
prospectus that an IPO was backed by a VC fund even though it was omit-
ted from the year-end surveys.
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